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SUAREZ ON HUMAN FREEDOM

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SUAREZ ON HUMAN FREEDOM

BY

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TO

MY FATHER AND MOTHER

THIS BOOK

IS AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATED

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INTRODUCTION

This study is written in explanation of a theological problem. Yet, at first sight, its contents appear to be, for the most part, philosophical in nature rather than theological. The reason for the apparent discrepancy is quite simple. Our knowledge of supernatural things is conditioned by our knowledge of the natural order, for all those things which we know first and best are natural realities. In this life we know supernatural things only by analogy with the natural. Misconceptions or disagreements about things in the natural order, therefore, can lead to misconceptions or disagreements about analogous things in that higher order.

The intricate and difficult theological questions which center about the nature of grace and of God's causality of free human actions are no exception to this rule. They suppose in their solution some accurate knowledge of the nature of man's free will, and its acts. About these very questions of grace and God's causation of our free acts certain controversies between the Dominicans on one hand and Jesuit congruists on the other arose and still continue to our own day. This book is a study of one great Jesuit—Francisco Suarez—in this field, and an attempt to show that his disagreement from the Thomists in this matter is radically a disagreement about things in the natural order. Thomists and Suarez disagree on the question of grace because Suarez misconceived the nature of man's freedom—a natural reality. Our interest, then, in this work, is primarily theological: but the ultimate solution of the problems raised must (as we hope our work shows) fundamentally involve a solution of some merely natural questions.

To undertake, now, a new study of the teaching of Francisco Suarez about human freedom may seem rather futile. For one thing the centuries-old discussions in the Schools between Thomists and Suarezians have made at least the broad outlines of Suarezianism very common knowledge. There is no text, no

manual of either theology or Scholastic philosophy which fails to give at least some general idea of Suarezianism. In recent times new and very worth-while studies of Suarez' system have appeared (as a mere glance at our restricted bibliography will indicate). Yet in spite of the considerable literature on the point the fact remains that for centuries Suarezians and Thomists have been in open disagreement on the subject of human freedom. They are today no closer to agreement than they were over three hundred years ago. What is the reason for that? Men who disagree on an important issue for some considerable period of time frequently come at least to agree on certain fundamental points; but even after centuries Suarezianism and Thomism are quite as apart as they were from the very beginning; for outside the propositions which are of faith there are few points relative to human freedom and God's motion on which the two schools agree.

This study is an attempt to explain that phenomenon. Our purpose here is extremely simple. We attempt to show only this: through the centuries Thomists and Suarezians have not agreed on questions relative to man's free acts simply because they lack, in natural order, a common starting point. Their disagreement on this question is only part of a far more fundamental disagreement; and their divergent teachings on liberty and God's motion shall not, except of course in the case of a final decision in the matter by the Church, be reconciled so long as the more basic disagreement persists. What is essentially at stake in the discussions between the two groups is 1) the nature of man's free power, and 2) the very nature of potency itself. Suarezianism—and this is the whole burden of our study—can be summed up in two propositions; and to those propositions Thomists shall never agree. The propositions are these 1) reason does not enter in as a *per se* cause of a free act; and 2) potency and act are not really distinct principles of created being; for one reality which is actual can be intrinsically limited; conversely one reality can be of itself potential yet eminently contain its own actuality. Thomists and Suarezians disagree about liberty because they disagree about these two proposi-

tions; and so long as they are in disagreement on them they shall (save, always, in the event of a final decision by the Church) be in disagreement about freedom and Divine motion.

The question is, are those two judgments really Suarezian? As to the first there can be no doubt at all: Suarez explicitly says that freedom is in the will alone formally; and what he means by that is clear from his discussion of knowledge and appetites in general. Knowledge, he says, concurs as a merely accidental cause to any appetite; any appetite is of itself constituted in first act and needs no form to constitute it in first act; an appetite cannot use the formal apprehension of the object since it exists in another potency. The whole point of Suarez' arguments against God's predetermination of the human free faculty is that such predetermination destroys liberty; the fact that it is determination to an object known to be an indifferent good does not safeguard liberty. Hence, it is presupposed that a characteristic derived from whatever intellectual activity is required for a free act does not intrinsically modify that free act—which can only be because the intellect is not a *per se* cause of the free act; in other words liberty is in the will alone; the free act is essentially an act of will alone.[1] It seems clear then from Suarez' own teachings that he conceived the will as the *liberum arbitrium*.

Other authors, non-Suarezian and Suarezian, admit this same contention. Thus, Garrigou-Lagrange, for example, points out that Suarez, in effect, denies a *per se* dependence of the *liberum arbitrium* on reason; and Mahieu states boldly that it is Suarezian doctrine that freedom exists in the will only.[2] Among the followers of Suarez both Dumont and Pesch,[3] for example, admit the same thing: in fact, Dumont clearly repeats Suarez'

[1] *De Anima*. Liber V, cap. 2, 3; Prol(egomenon) Primum (ad Gratian), cap. 4.

[2] Garrigou-Lagrange, *God, His Existence and His Nature*. St. Louis, 1934, vol. 2, pp. 311-318. Also Mahieu, *Francois Suarez, sa Philosophie et les rapports qui elle a avec Sa Theologie*. Paris, 1921, p. 462.

[3] Dumont, *Liberte Humaine et Concors divin d'apres Suarez*. Paris, 1926, pp. 6-20; 48-60. Also Pesch, Tilmannus, S.J., *Institutiones Psychologicae*. Fribourg, 1898; vol. 3.

initial failure to grasp the Thomistic teaching about the interplay of intellect and will. In any case they all admit that Suarez denied the intellect any *per se* causality in a free act.

As to the second proposition it seems to us that any study of Suarez' teaching about potency and act suggests a certain unity. One comes to know what Suarez said about predicamental potency and act in one order; what he thought of essence and existence in another order; what he taught about matter and form in a third order—and one senses at least vaguely a common denominator in it all. So the fundamental question arises whether there truly is a basic simplicity in all the Suarezian teaching on the point. Is there one rock-bottom proposition on which his whole doctrine is based, and which reaches out to affect his teachings on our freedom? The answer is that there is such a proposition; one single judgment which is basic in the Suarezian teaching. One does not find that judgment stated in a single proposition in explicit terms, perhaps precisely because it was so basic in Suarez' thought. The proposition is this: potency (or limitation) and act (or perfection) are not really distinct principles which divide being; rather whatever is, is of itself actual, in such a way that a thing which is also potential can have both aspects by reason of itself and not by reason of distinct principles which compose it; and Suarez adds an *extrinsic* limitation through God as by an efficient or an exemplary cause. Now that proposition is ultimate. Other propositions flowing from this and reducible to it abound in Suarez, but it is not reduced to any more ultimate judgment. But let us see whether we can justify our claim that this judgment is indeed Suarezian.

It is patent that Suarez' entire discussion of essence and existence in the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* is ultimately an assertion that even created being is, of itself actual (though not in the sense of denying that it has a distinct *efficient* cause, clearly). To deny a real distinction, in creatures, between essence and existence, to assert that creatures exist without any real composition with their own existence is, very obviously, to insist that created essence is actual of itself and not through

composition with some really distinct, actual principle. What is not composed has what it has of itself.

Now side by side with this Suarez teaches plainly that this actual reality is also in itself, limited. Suarez can mean nothing else in saying that a created essence (which let us remember, is, in his system, its own actuality of existence) can be limited by its own nature because it is of just so much perfection. Hence the one thing which is the act of existence is also the limitation of that act to this degree of actuality; and again he says that it has not yet been proved that an *actual* thing can be limited only by *composition with potency*. Suarez then conceived that an actual created thing can be entitatively simple, and in the one simple reality he identified the actual perfecting aspect with the limited and perfectible aspect. This must be grasped from the outset—the same Suarez who taught the actuality of all real being conceived that created being can be limited without entering into any composition with passive potency. This doctrine is not confined to his discussion of essence and existence. In his discussion of the Angels he argues that there can be numerically many Angels of one species because an Angel is not infinite in his species but is contained in a certain grade and limit of such a species. This can only be based on the judgment that an Angelic form is, of itself, at one and the same time, an intrinsic principle of actual perfection and of the limitation of that perfection. This identical proposition underlies Suarez' rejection of signate matter as the principle of individuation—his position is that the individual as such, while it adds something real above the common nature, adds nothing really distinct (*ex natura rei*) from the *specific* nature; what is added is only *rationally* distinct from the specific nature. Here the very principle of essential limitation and multiplication is *really* identified with the actuality which is limited and multiplied.[4]

Truly, then, the evidence is convincing; for Suarez there is no repugnance is one thing being at one time the principle of both

[4] *Disp(utationes) Meta(physicae)* disp. XXI; De Angelis. Liber I cap. 12, 15; Disp. Meta. disp. V, sect. 2.

perfection and of intrinsic limitation of its own perfection. Others, before us, of course, have recognized this same thing.

Thus, Boyer, himself a Jesuit, indicates that Suarez attributes to pure potency an actual existence identical with potency; and moreover, that Suarez makes each actual thing to be its own principle of individual limitation; that, in fine, he teaches that act can be limited of itself. Again Descoqs, after exposing Suarez' arguments on essence and existence sees this implication in Suarez and accepts it wholeheartedly.[5] Michel also recognizes that implication in the Suarezian teaching: for example, he argues that if, as Suarez maintains, primary matter is composed of both essence and existence which are not really distinct, then, at one time, one thing is both potency and act: the actual is its own limitation in the very line in which it is actual. Getino in *La Ciencia Tomista* indicates this proposition as being basic in all Suarezianism.[6]

Thus whatever originality our work may have derives not from showing that these propositions are Suarezian but simply from our reduction of Suarez' teaching on man's freedom to these principles; for, granted that the two propositions in question are Suarez', it is our purpose to show that his whole system of congruism is rooted in them: for that congruism is not an isolated thing to be considered in itself only but is part of the whole of Suarez' system integrated with and dependent on his general concept of potency and act.

Procedure:

We have endeavored in these pages to preserve, at least in general, the order of discovery even though in particular we frequently resort to the order of discipline (in order to empha-

[5] Boyer, S. J., *Cursus Philosophiae*. Desclee et Cie. 1939, vol. 1, p. 332; p. 483; vol. 2, pp. 167-168. Also Descoqs, Pedro, S. J., *Thomisme et Scholastique*. Paris, 1927, pp. 119-185.

[6] Michel, A., article *Essence* in *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*. The same teaching is to be found in Martin, A., *Suarez, Metaphysicien et Theologien;* but the latter is now unobtainable outside of a few European libraries. Also Getino, Fr. Luis G. Alonso, *El Centenario de Suarez,* article in *La Ciencia Tomista,* vol. 15 (1917), pp. 381-390.

size the basic unity in Suarez). Thus since we are chiefly interested in Suarez' teachings on human freedom and God's motion we give first a reasonably full exposition of that teaching—an exposition which is not an interpretation but Suarez' doctrine expressed so far as is possible in his own terms. Now any Thomist who meets so full an expositttion of that teaching for the first time is certain to finish with a sense of not having seen a complete picture. He will know what Suarez taught about the relation of man's freedom to God's motion; he will see (granted Suarez' premises) the logic of that teaching: but he will still have the sense that something has escaped him. He will feel dissatisfied particularly with his knowledge of why Suarez insists that man's *liberum arbitrium* needs no distinct premotion by God, sensing that Suarez is supposing something which the Thomist does not understand about the very nature of the *arbitrium* as a potency. There is nothing for him to do then but to clear up that difficulty; so in the second place we expose the Suarezian doctrine on potency and act. Since Suarez himself does not set out to give his whole doctrine on this highly metaphysical point in any one tract it is necessary to collect that teaching from the various parts of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. Here again our aim has been simply to expose—to give Suarez' doctrine without reading Thomism into it.

Given then the necessary knowledge of Suarez we have proceeded to Part II—The Critcism. Since we wish to see what influence the teaching on potency and act has on Suarez' notions of liberty, logic clearly demands that the former be analyzed and criticized first. In Chapter I of this part therefore we expose the fundamental simplicity and unity of that teaching; in Chapter II, enlightened now by the knowledge we have of Suarez' basic notion of potency, we show first the working out of that notion in the whole teaching about free acts, and secondly the factor which made the application of the metaphysical notion of potency so easy here—that factor is the Suarezian divorce of intellect from will in man's free acts. Thus, it seems to us, the real basis of Suarezian congruism is explicated and that by appealing to the teachings of Suarez him-

self. For this, we have, for the most part, used the Vives edition (1866) of Suarez' works: but for the most of the Metaphysical Disputations (except Disputation 19) we were forced to use instead the Cologne edition (1614).

A final word about the spirit in which this work is undertaken. We wish to make it clear from the outset that this work is not controversial. For this reason we make no attempt here to evaluate or to reply to Suarez' individual arguments in support of his teachings. It is not our intention in these pages to ridicule the teachings we discuss—we intend simply to analyze those teachings and to indicate their very roots. In doing that we sincerely try to be mindful of the respect due so great a master as Suarez; mindful, too, of the spirit of sober moderation which such a study, by its very nature, demands. May St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Robert Bellarmine, who in their life times defended such different systems, but whose differences now are so gloriously reconciled, obtain for us the grace that this study shall not have been in vain.

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Part I. The Exposition

Chapter I

THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

Section I. The Appetitive Faculties in General

1. *Appetites in General.* Everything that it has a propensity toward its own good, an appetite called natural which follows every form, even the forms of non-living things.[7] Over and above this, living, knowing substances have an appetitive power peculiar to them, a power through which the soul, by an elicited act proper to that appetite seeks what is good for it in a living way. The reason for this is that appetite always follows form. Therefore, according to the diversity of the ratio of the form there follows a diverse ratio of appetite. Agents which know apprehend what is good and what is evil for them; and that apprehension is a form in them. Necessarily, then, they have a special and peculiar power of seeking that good and avoiding the evil.[8]

Even within the general class of knowing subjects we find differences. Some things endowed with knowledge do not rise above the level of sense knowledge; others are intellectual. Since from diverse kinds of knowledge there flow diverse kinds of appetites we must conclude that the appetites of knowing things differ: some are sensitive, and as such are material and limited to individual material objects; others are rational, rising above the plane of mere sense. They are, in their object and nature, spiritual.[9]

We can consider the object of an appetitive power in a two-fold way: that of which it is " prosecutive " (to which it tends),

[7] Appetitus naturalis dicitur quaelibet propensio cujusvis rei in suum proprium bonum (*De Anima, Liber* V, cap. 1, n. 1).

[8] Appetitus sequatur formam, ideoque juxta diversum modum, rationemque formae diversa ratio appetitus consequatur (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[9] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

and that to which it is "aversative" (from which it turns away). The adequate object of appetite in general as it is *prosecutive* is good, or the ratio of good. This does not mean that *bonum in universale* is the object of every appetite; but every appetite does seek good either *in general* or *in particular*. The object of appetite in general as it is *aversative* is evil. This aspect is founded, rooted, in the first; the appetite cannot bear on the evil (as desiring it) under the aspect of evil, as some have said that the intellectual appetite (will) can do; for the appetite is always for the good of the supposit, and for its perfection, which cannot be attained by evil. Hence when an appetite does in fact tend to an evil it always seeks it under some aspect of good, real or apparent, in it.[10] For this reason we cannot desire an impossible thing, apprehended as impossible, except in a conditional way, "if it were possible." It is to be noted that we can never will any good that does not have some reference to ourselves. We will good to God, but He is universal good, the font of all good, in Whom is all good; we will good to creatures because they are in some determined way one with us, or for us.[11]

A capital point in the Suarezian account of the acts of the appetite is the role played by the object. The appetite elicits its own act without any efficiency on the part of the desired object, or on the part of our knowledge of that object. Many have maintained that the object as well as the appetite has efficiency with respect to the act. This for him is false. For it to do so it would be necessary either: 1) that the object produce something in the appetite, given which the appetite could then move to act; or 2) the object *per se* concurs to the substance of the act. The first is inadmissible because the object has no efficiency. Only God, as object, can move the

[10] Notandum est . . . non esse sensum conclusionis potentiam appetitivam habere pro objecto bonum sub absoluta ratione boni . . . sensus ergo est omnem potentiam appetitivam habere pro objecto formali rationem boni communis, vel particularis (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 4).

[11] Impossibile est appeti quod non respiciat bonum proprium ipsius appetentis, vel illud includat aliquo modo (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

appetite efficiently. Moreover, supposing the truth of the position, the object would effectively move the appetite either by efficiently producing a form in it or, though producing nothing, by impelling the powers to second act. The first of these is impossible since the appetite is *of itself* constituted in first act, therefore needs no form. "An appetitive power is of itself constituted in first act . . . the appetite is of itself inclined to good and therefore needs no form through which it is constituted in first act. . . ." [12] The second alternative (that the object impels the power to second act) is impossible for if such objective attraction were efficient the potency would be merely passive; the act then would be from the object and not from the potency.[13]

The second possiblity (the object concurs to the substance of the act) is also impossible, since only that efficiency concurs in the act of a power which constitutes it in first act, and the appetitive power is constituted in first act of itself, and not through its object. Neither can it be said that power and object concur as two partial agents, since the appetite alone is sufficient; besides it would lead to an impossibility, namely, that the appetite use knowledge. "If some other cause should concur clearly it would be none other than the previous act of knowledge . . . but the appetite, as it cannot use the object known, neither (can it use) the formal apprehension of it, since it (the apprehension) exists in another potency." [14] Knowledge

[12] Potentia appetitiva ex se est in actu primo constituta . . . potentia appetitiva de se inclinatur ad bonum, proindeque nulla eget forma per quam in actu primo constituatur (*Ibid.*, cap. 3, n. 3). Suarez here cites St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica* I. q. 27, a. 4, in support of this position. St. Thomas' point in that article is that the intellect is in act because the thing known is in the intellect according to its likeness, through a species; but the will is in act, not through the presence in the will of the thing willed, but from this, that the will has a certain inclination to the thing willed. St. Thomas neither says nor implies that the will needs no form in order to be constituted in act.

[13] Tractatio illa sive impulsio potentiae ab objecto facta non nisi objectum dici aut concipi valeat in quo certe nulla involvitur efficientia, praeterquam quod jam alias potentia haberet se mere passive et ab objecto actum reciperet, quod improbatum est (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[14] . . . cum appetitus ipse ex se habeat sufficientem inclinationem ad objectum,

is a necessary condition for the act ("apprehension is a required condition of the object.")[15] "The apprehension of the object concurs . . . as an accidental cause."[16] The object, since it does not concur effectively in producing the substance of the act, cannot effectively concur in its specification.[17] The union of appetible and appetite, in fact, differs from that of object known and knower; for in the latter case the union must be in the knowing power, whereas for appetition it is enough that the object be in another power, namely, in the knowing power. Thus, says Suarez, whenever St. Thomas speaks of the will as passive, or of the motion on the will of the end, the term must be understood as a metaphor; when he speaks of the end as a principle of action he is speaking morally and not physically.[18]

2. *The Will in General.* Coming now to that appetite which is the will, its object is the good in general, not any aspect of good in particular. This is clear, since 1) the will is supreme among appetitive powers, hence its object must be supreme, and 2) since the will follows the intellect its act is co-extensive with that of the intellect. But the intellect can know all good; therefore the will can seek all good.[19]

The acts of the will include all eleven acts of the lower appetitive faculties (love, joy, desire, flight, delight, sorrow,

ex se est sufficiens elicere proprium actum superflue ergo fingitur efficientia in objecto. . . . Cum enim appetitio sit vitalis elici aliter non potest quam a potentia cujus est actus, quod si causa alia concurreret, non alia sane foret quam praevius cognitionis actus . . . appetitus autem sicut non potest uti objecto cognito, ita neque ipsa formali ejus apprehensione, cum in alia potentia existat . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[15] Apprehensio est conditio objecti tantum requisita, et applicans illud potentiae (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[16] Apprehensio itaque objecti tantum concurrit ad amorem, ut causa per accidens physice loquendo (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[17] Objectum autem efficienter non concurrit ad substantiam actus: ergo neque ad specificationem (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[18] Averroes vero agit de motione metaphysica, de qua etiam interpretandus erit D. Thomas ubicumque de eo tractat, quando autem finem vocat principium actionis intelligit moraliter, non physice: similiter appetitus potentia passiva dicitur, metaphorice, sicut motio finis metaphorica est. (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[19] *Ibid.*, cap. 7, n. 2.

hope, despair, fear, and anger), but in a higher, a spiritual way. Such acts are divided into those concerned with the end of man, and those concerned with the means to it. With respect to the end as such we can have desire (intention) and delight (fruition). With regard to a means as means two acts are possible: election and use. By the former we separate and prefer one of the means offered by reason as capable of leading to the end desired; by *use* that means is placed in the order of execution.[20]

Acts of the will are elicited or imperated according as they proceed from the will itself or from some other faculty moved by the will, for the will can move all the powers which can help attain the end, since the will regards the end.[21] With regard to the acts of the intellect there is some difficulty, for while intellect is moved by the will, it also moves the will (since appetition follows knowledge). St. Thomas answers that the intellect moves the will after the manner of a final cause but the will moves the intellect efficiently. If the intellect at times, through imperation, effectively moves the will this is not due to the intellect as such, but to a previous act of the will; the efficiency is altogether from the previous election on the part of the appetite. Of the acts of the two powers that of intellect is first. To its first act it is moved not by the will but either by a natural inclination or by the extrinsic proposal of some object.[22] We often experience, Suarez adds, certain acts in our intellect which proceed from the will in no way but come from God, angels or devils; both intellect and lower faculties then can act without the will.[23] The motion by which the will moves the

[20] At circa medium ut medium duo versantur proprie actus voluntatis: nimirum electio et usus. . . . Primum est acceptare aliquod illorm (mediorum) . . . facta autem electione necessarium est ut id medium executioni mandetur cui deservit usus (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[21] *Ibid.*, n. 5.

[22] Absolute loquendo intellectus tantum potest movere finaliter voluntatem, voluntas vero intellectum effective. Ex quo colliges inter actus harum potentiarum praeire primo oportere actum intellectus. Quoad primum actum non movetur a voluntate sed vel ab inclinatione naturali, vel ab extrinseca aliqua propositione objecti (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[23] Saepe experimur actus quosdam apud intellectum nostrum qui a voluntate neuti-

other faculties is merely a moral motion, an efficiency which is accidental in the eyes of the philosopher, though it is *per se* to the moralist.[24] As between intellect and will the former is the more noble power, since 1) its object is more simple and more abstract (the quiddity of things, abstracting from their existence, whereas the will bears only on things having order to existence), 2) it flows more immediately from the essence of the soul, 3) it is from the intellect that man's dignity is especially derived, and 4) it is the rule of all voluntary operations.[25]

Section II. The Existence of Human Freedom

1. *Significance of Freedom.* But we are more concerned with the precise nature of human freedom. Freedom can be understood in a three-fold way: 1) as freedom from the servitude of sin and punishment; 2) as freedom from coaction only. This is two-fold: a) freedom from that coaction which brings absolute necessity of a motion which is against the internal appetite of the thing moved; and b) freedom from that coaction which brings necessity improperly so called, such necessity as arises from fear which induces us to avoid some undesirable thing; and 3) freedom from necessity. Suarez noted that freedom from coaction is not identical with freedom from necessity. Love of God in heaven is free of coaction, yet necessary; the act of a created will can be truly voluntary and therefore free of coaction, yet necessary because impelled by an extrinsic efficient cause.[26]

2. *The Fact of Human Freedom.* Can the notion of freedom

quam praecedunt. . . . Motio ergo voluntatis non est adeo necessaria in his potentiis ad agendum ut sine illa operari omnino nequeunt; saepe enim aliae potentiae in actionibus suis motionem intellectus praecurrunt (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[24] (illa motione voluntatis a qua dicuntur effective moveri potentiae reliquae) . . . est nimirum sola moralis motio, quae in philosophia naturali efficientia est accidentalis in morali vero censetur per se (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[25] *Ibid.*, cap. 9, nn. 2 ss.

[26] Dilectio enim Dei in patria a conactione libera est, non tamen a necessitate (*Ibid.*, n. 4, aliquando vero actus voluntarius potest esse necessarius tantum ab extrinseco efficiente); (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 1, nn. 4, 7).

be verified of man's will? It can, and that in the third and most perfect sense of freedom from necessity, necessity such as is found in irrational things. Man's freedom is so evident that Suarez pauses only once to prove it. He shows it: 1) from the common agreement of men and especially of philosophers, pagan as well as Christian; 2) from common experience. We know that we have in ourselves the power to do something or not to do it; that we think things over in order to decide on one or the other course of action; and 3) from the fact that we are intellectual. This argument is simple enough. A universal and indifferent appetite follows knowledge which is universal and (in its own way) indifferent. But intellectual knowledge, such as men have, is universal and perfect in such a way that the intellectual being knows what constitutes its final goal, and what constitutes a mere means to that goal, a means not really necessary to it. The appetite therefore which follows such knowledge (the appetite called the will) has this same indifference or power so that it does not desire everything, nor does it desire every means necessarily, but rather it freely desires those things which the intellect shows it are not necessary. Thus free selection follows on reason's weighing of the goodness of various things. The major premise is proved by pointing out that vital appetition always follows knowledge. Hence the more perfect the knowledge the more perfect the appetition.[27]

The argument is confirmed by a consideration of man's participation of God's attributes. God is free with regard to things not necessary to Him. Since man participates God's intellectual nature it follows that man also participates, in his operations, God's freedom.[28]

[27] Appetitus vitalis sequitur cognitionem et ideo perfectiorem cognitionem comitatur perfectior appetitus; ergo et cognitionem universalem et suo modo indifferentem sequitur etiam appetitus universalis et indifferens; cognitio autem intellectualis ita est universalis et perfecta ut propriam rationem finis et mediorum percipiat . . . ergo appetitus qui hanc cognitionem sequitur habet hanc indifferentiam seu perfectam potestatem in appetendo ut non omne bonum aut omne medium necessario appetat (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 2, nn. 12-17; cfr. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-225; 339-351).

[28] *Ibid.*, n. 17.

Section III. The Free Faculty in Man

1. *The Nature of the Free Faculty.* Suarez now determines more precisely what this freedom of will is and what are its conditions. We have seen that liberty from mere coaction is not human liberty, for the former implies that the act is free of extrinsic compulsion, not that it is free in the sense that the agent has determined himself to do this. Clearly, then, human liberty implies freedom from necessity arising from natural determination to one thing, such as animals have. But what is this freedom?

There are four possibilities. The name might indicate: 1) an act; 2) a habit; 3) a potency as modified by a habit; or 4) a potency as unmodified. It cannot be an *act* since man remains free even when he is not operating. Neither is it a *habit.* Any habit is either acquired or natural. Now there are no innate or natural habits in a man's will, hence that possibility is ruled out. If freedom were an acquired habit it would have to be preceded by similar acts (i.e., free acts) which would generate it and hence freedom would exist prior to the existence of the habit which, on the supposition, is freedom. But nothing can be prior to its own being.

Nor can freedom be the will as modified by a habit for no habit gives a faculty power to act. Presupposing that power, it gives facility in its use. Any natural act which is placed by the will as modified by a habit can be placed by the will without the habit. The only possibility is that freedom is a faculty, absolutely taken.[29]

Just which faculty is the subject of freedom is a much discussed question. Suarez' answer is clear: the will is the *liberum arbitrium.*[30] His argument is this: freedom must be

[29] *Ibid.*, sect. 5; Pesch, *op. cit.*, p. 221.

[30] Quia hic modus operandi soli voluntati convenit, ideo illa est formaliter libera et liberum arbitrium (*Prolegomenon* I, cap. 3, n. 7; cfr. particularly *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 5 and 6, in which Suarez clearly denies to the intellect any determining judgment in a free act. He rejects a preceding definite practical judgment on the ground that "si illud judicium rationis est ita praerequisitum ad operandum ut in suo genere sit causa necessaria ad actum liberum voluntatis ergo voluntas . . .

in a spiritual faculty but it cannot be formally in the intellect and therefore it is in the will alone, formally. That it is not in the intellect is clear from this, that the intellect is not indifferent. As to specification this is clear, for the intellect is naturally determined to assent to the true, to dissent from the false. In probable matters the intellect does seem to have some freedom, but this is only because the object is not sufficiently applied for reason's natural impulse to bear on it. Again the object of the intellect is truth, and since truth consists in the indivisible there cannot be, in one object, truth and falsehood. Hence the intellect, unlike the will, is naturally determined to one thing as to the species of its act.

Neither is the intellect free as to exercise, since only the act of a faculty which is intrinsically voluntary can be free in this way. This is clear since the determination of a power to an act can only be either voluntary (i. e., from the elicited inclination of the one operating) or natural. But a power free as to exercise cannot be determined only by nature, but must be determined voluntarily. This can be either: 1) extrinsically (by a voluntary act elicited by another power), and the power so determined is not free since it is moved and determined by another faculty; or 2) intrinsically, i. e., by the power itself, which can only be an appetite. Since the intellect is not an appetite it is not free as to exercise. To dispute whether it is the root of freedom or simply a necessary condition of freedom is simply to dispute in words for Suarez. He says it is both. Intellectual knowledge is certainly a necessary condition for the formally free power which is the will.[31] To maintain that it is

non est potentia libera"—*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, sect. 6, n. 2). Suarez also rejects the doctrine that the act of intellect and will can mutually cause each other: "Dicunt . . . illos duos actus esse sibi invicem causas in diversis generibus causarum, quia et voluntas determinat intellectum, ut ita practice judicet, et intellectus determinat voluntatem, ut velit rem talem. . . . Voluntas enim determinat intellectum efficienter, intellectus autem voluntatem finaliter. Sed haec doctrina mihi non probatur . . . et praeterea ostendo esse impossibilem (*Ibid.*, n. 5; Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 222-223; 351-355).

[31] Neque oportet disputare (utrum) . . . rationem dicendam esse radicem libertatis, (vel) solum conditionem necessariam . . . nam hi auctores videntur de modo loquendi magis quam de re contendere. Nam cum cognitio solum est neces-

also free is to open the way to such inconvenient conclusions as this, that sin would really be two sins: one of judging evil that is to be done, another in electing the evil.

The first characteristic of a formally free power is that it be active.[32] Scripture,[33] The Council of Trent,[34] and St. Thomas [35] are among the authorities cited for this. Suarez argues from reason, that a free faculty is that which has in its own power to change or not to change; for in that power is dominion over the act. But this power is not in a passive faculty as such. Therefore it is in active faculty. The minor premise is clear from this that, whether a passive power receives an effect or not depends, not on the power of the patient, but on the power of the agent; for granted the action the passion necessarily follows. If the will received its act from an extrinsic agent, then, it would be necessitated and not free. The very notion of freedom supposes determination from within; only an active faculty can so determine itself.

The second characteristic of a free faculty is that it be indifferent. For the formal liberty of any faculty there is required indifference through a certain dominative eminence of the active power (precisely as active) both as to various actions and as to exercising or not exercising those acts. Here we are speaking of created liberty which regards principally internal acts of the will. God's freedom falls only on external acts and effects since in His internal acts (acts *ad intra*) "no effect or reception or addition can be free." [36] That liberty is indifference is a dogma of faith accepted by all Catholics. "It

saria conditio . . . ideo modum cognitionis solum appellare volunt conditionem necessariam ad modum volitionis. . . . Optime tamen dici potest radicem libertatis esse rationis . . . usum (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, sect. 5, n. 21).

[32] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 1-6.

[33] Suarez cites *Ecclesiasticus* xv: "Ad quod volueris porrige manum tuam" and "Quae enim odit, ne feceris."

[34] Suarez cites Trent, sess. VI, cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797) and cap. 6 (Denz., n. 798).

[35] *Summa Theol.*, I. Q. 82, a. 4; I-II, Q. 9, aa. 1, 3; *Q. D. de Verit.*, Q. 22, a. 9.

[36] Secundo dicimus . . . ad formalem libertatem alicujus facultatis requiri indifferentiam per eminentiam quamdam potentiae activae ut activa est, tum ad varias actiones, tum ad exercendas vel non exercendas illas . . . in Deo ad intra nulla effectio, vel receptio seu additio libera esse potest (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 7).

is certainly of faith therefore that there is in us liberty of indifference or dominion." "It is a dogma of faith that liberty consists not only in the faculty of operating voluntarily and freely, but moreover that there is in us that condition of liberty which includes the power of acting and not acting, indiffenence in operating."[37] Again Suarez says that the Council of Trent enunciates the doctrine that liberty is indifferent. "It (the Council) declares that the use of this (liberty) consists (*positum esse*) in the aforesaid indifference."[38]

Supposing that liberty in indifference, of what is it indifference and with respect to what? Here we must distinguish. Liberty can be understood, as Scotus says, in order to: 1) diverse acts immanent in the free faculty (i. e., indifference of the faculty with respect to acts; 2) different objects (i. e., indifference of the acts with respect to objects); or 3) to diverse effects extrinsic to the agent. The third is consequential and posterior to any liberty, so interest centers in the first two. Human liberty is primarily in the faculty with respect to acts. Divine freedom is the indifference of most pure act with respect to created objects; and in this is the distinction between the two. To have this indifference immediately in the act with respect to objects is proper to God; creatures have liberty as a faculty which can act or not act. To argue then in this way: "God is determined and yet free; therefore men can be determined to act and yet free" is to overlook the perfection of God's liberty which no creature can attain. God's determination is an act of His own freedom, it comes from His own intrinsic liberty and

[37] In hoc solum (asserimus esse certum de fide) dari indifferentiam in actibus humanis et liberis quod in nobis nostrisque actibus inveniri potest haec perfectio . . . quae in hoc dominio et indifferentia consistit. . . . Est igitur certum dogma fidei (ut existimamus) libertatem hanc non consistere tantum in facultate operandi voluntarie . . . sed praeterea dari in nobis . . . eam libertatis conditionem quae potestatem agendi et non agendi includit quae . . . dici solet dominium in actionem propriam seu indifferentia in operando (*Opusculum Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1, n. 2).

[38] Sufficit nobis definitio Concilii Tridentini (sess. 6) ubi non solum definit esse in nobis liberum arbitrium sed etiam illud ejusque usum in praedicta indifferentia positum esse declarat (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

not from something other than Himself. Therefore it is not at all in conflict with liberty, as determination in us would be.[39]

Admitting the distinction between freedom of exercise and freedom of specification (" The first of which consists in the power of having or not having the act, the latter (consists) in the power of having this or that act ") Suarez shows that indifference is necessary for each. For freedom of exercise an active power is needed (otherwise the power will always lack action). If the power lacks act from some impotency there is necessity and not freedom in that lack, since impotency equals impossibility. Hence for the lack of power to be free there must be in the very faculty a power of action such that by its own power it can not act by reason of its dominion.[40]

If freedom of specification is with respect to many acts it is necessary that there be in the faculty a power effective of all these acts. If it lacks that power it is not free since it is not active. Thus for both kinds of freedom indifference is necessary, an indifference which has a certain dominative eminence so that it chooses between the possibilities.[41]

In the third place it is required for the proximate and absolute freedom of the will that the power of the faculty in its order of proximate cause have complete active and dominative power over those acts with respect to which it is said to be simply and proximately free. If the faculty does not have in

[39] Si vero est sensus non esse necessariam potentiae indifferentiam in ordine ad actus sed in ordine ad objecta sufficere, est quidem hoc verum in Deo, non vero in nobis; Deus enim ex se est indifferens ad volenda objecta extra se, non per modum potentiae ad actus sed per modum simplicissimi actus . . . quod in Deo mirabile est et proprium ejus. . . . Creatura vero non potest attingere perfectionem illam. . . . Neque ad rem spectat quod voluntas Dei fuerit ab aeterno determinata; . . . illa determinatio non pugnat cum indifferentia quia est ab intrinseca libertate (*Ibid.*, cap. 2, n. 14; cfr. also *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19).

[40] Nisi supponatur vis agendi in tali facultate semper carebit actione . . . si potentia careat actione ex aliqua impotentia agendi tunc non est libertas in carentia actionis sed necessitas quia impotentia aequivalet impossibilitati: ergo (libertas) supponit . . . potentiam . . . exeminentia virtutis (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 8).

[41] Si talis indifferentia (quoad specificationem) sit respectu plurium actuum, necesse est ut sit in tali facultate sit vis effectrix omnium illorum actuum: nam si tali virtute careat ad aliquem illorum . . . respectu illius non erit libera, cum . . . non sit activa (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

itself this complete power it cannot will or not will; therefore it lacks dominion and hence freedom. Suarez claims the support of St. Thomas for this position quoting his words that "free will consists in this that it does not exceed the powers of the potency."[42] Even if one supposes that the will is not the sole proximate principle of the act but requires the object too (which, according to Suarez, is more probably incorrect) the will still has complete active power; for on the supposition the will has only inchoative liberty prior to the presentation of the object; given the presentation it is completely free. For supernatural acts the will clearly needs some complement. The point is, granted the complement, it is free.[43]

Suarez' fourth condition is that while liberty in first act can be both remote and proximate it requires, in both cases, the *indifference of an active power*. Remote freedom is that of an operative faculty regarded in itself alone, a faculty which does not have the other things required for act. Proximate freedom in first act is that of a faculty expedited and endowed with all that is needed to act, for, simply speaking, one is able to act (*potens*) in first act who is so disposed that he can place the act without any immutation at all, in himself, in the object, or in anything else.

That liberty in the first state (i. e., remote) requires indifference is clear; a man who is sleeping (or one who is not actually thinking) is still free, for his will can still act without necessity. Should he lose the faculty or its property he can no longer be called free.

[42] *Q. D. de Verit.*, Q. 24, a. 4. St. Thomas in this place points out that the liberum arbitrium is a faculty. He does so by showing that the judgment involved does not require that peculiar principles be added to the faculty since the judgment is a natural one, hence does not exceed the power of human reason. His point is that the act of this faculty is a perfectly normal one; he does not say or imply that the liberum arbitrium is of itself a complete principle of its own operation.

[43] Dico, tertio, ad libertatem proximam et absolutam arbitrii requiri ut virtus facultatis, in suo ordine causae proximae habeat completam vim activam et dominativam illormum actuum . . . alias non habebit dominium . . . neque proximam et absolutam libertatem. . . . Quomodocumque ergo voluntas supponatur habere integram vim agendi actum sive per se sola, sive per aliquid jam illi additum, vel sufficienter conjunctum esse poterit plene et sufficienter libera (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 10-12).

That proximate liberty in first act also requires indifference (and this is, for Suarez, the cardinal truth in reconciling freedom and divine motion), is proved from a three-fold consideration. 1) The power in question is, on the supposition, free. Therefore it must have active indifference in operating, since that is the very definition of freedom. 2) Otherwise, the power which is remotely free would never be proximately free to act and not act; which is against the very nature of a free power and makes the actual use of liberty impossible. 3) Formal liberty includes a two-fold power with respect to one and the same object, namely, the power of willing and the power of not willing. If the faculty as proximately disposed to act is not indifferent to both parts of its power it must be proximately and simply potent as to one part, and remotely potent but proximately impotent as to the other part. In acting, then, the will would not be master of both powers but would have one part of its powers only and therefore would not be free.[44]

So much for the notion of and conditions requisite to a free power. Suarez is now in a position to determine the very definition of such a power.[45] It is one " which, given everything necessary to the act, can act and not act " (quae positis omnibus requisitis ad actum, potest agere et non agere).

This description is nothing new, Suarez maintains; it simply gathers in one formula the elements of freedom described by

[44] Dico, quarto, libertatem in actu primo esse remotam et proximam et utramque requirere indifferentiam potentiae activae. . . . Quod quidem in statu remoto per se notum est. . . . Altera pars est difficilior; est tamen verissima . . . et fortasse est cardo totius concirdiae gratiae cum libero arbitrio. . . . Primo ergo probatur quia illa etiam est potestas vere libera: ergo in illo etiam statu retinere debet indifferentiam activam . . . quia haec est de intrinseca ratione libertatis . . . secundo quia alias nunquam potentia libera in actu primo remoto esset proxime libera ad agendum vel non agendum quod est . . . contra usum liberatis. Tertio probatur quia libertas formalis . . . duplicem potestatem inadaequatam . . . includit circa idem objectum; potestas volendi . . . (et) non volendi. Si ergo voluntas jam expedita . . . ad operandum non est indifferens ad utramque . . . ad unam manebit proxime et simpliciter potens, ad alteram vero non nisi remote ac subinde proxime impotens (*Ibid.*, nn. 13-15).

[45] Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 3 for the discussion of this definition; also Pesch, *op cit.*, pp. 365-371.

authorities who preceded him.[46] St. Thomas's description for instance, " *liberum arbitrium* is the faculty of will and reason," with St. Thomas's own modification " by which man is master of his acts," [47] is equivalently expressed in " the faculty of will and reason for both acting and not acting," for the very mastery or dominion mentioned by St. Thomas is precisely the power of doing or not doing. The final element of Suarez' definition " granted everything necessary to the act " is added to indicate in which faculty freedom resides, for while many faculties can act or not act (as intellect can believe or not believe in credible matters, assent or dissent in probable matters) the will alone continues to have this power even when everything necessary to its act is present. It alone can do or not do by its internal force. Thus the will alone is a free faculty.[48]

Now the definition just given is to be understood in the composed sense, and not in the divided sense, that is, granted the prerequisites the will can still both act and not act. The divided sense is this, that given the prerequisites the will can use its freedom not to act, only if one of the requisites to act is taken away. If this divided sense is maintained the will is no more free than any natural agent. The sun, for example, while acting can still not act on condition that a requisite for its operation be removed; and again the blessed in heaven who love God necessarily by reason of the object (God Himself) can stop loving Him if something necessary to the act be taken away. Formal freedom, then, demands that the free power have the power to cease acting of itself and by its own dominion, and not merely because requisite external conditions no longer

[46] *Ibid.*, nn. 4-5.

[47] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, 1, a. 1.

[48] Intellectus autem non habent hanc facultatem (agendi et non agendi, ut credendi et non credendi, vel etiam dissentiendi et assentiendi) ita indifferentem ut sese possit determinare ad actum vel suspendere illum aut ad oppositum se determinare. . . . Et tunc intellectus nunquam positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest agere et non agere. . . . Voluntas autem sicut potest agere ex interna facultate . . . sine motione alterius potentiae ita ex eadem interna facultate potest non agere (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 3, nn. 6-7).

obtain. Things which stop acting for that reason are not said to have a power to non-act; rather they are said not to have the power to act.[49]

The divided sense destroys freedom, for if the will's power to non-act were not intrinsic, then, supposing the necessary conditions, the act would flow necessarily, not freely; for if in the presence of the prerequisites there is no power not to act, the power to act is necessary. Again if the will in the presence of everything necessary to its act can not-act only in the divided sense (i. e., if a requisite be subtracted), then the will has never the proximate power to act and not act, but only to act. Thus there would be no true use of liberty; there would be only exercise of that one member of the disjunction to which the will is proximately disposed. Moral imputability and responsibility for our acts thus becomes impossible.[50]

What has been said of the prerequisites to act in general is also true of that prerequisite which is God's concursus. Granted God's influxus man can still act and not act in the composed sense, a proposition which must be defended for the reasons indicated above. If the will could not-act only on the supposition that concursus were removed the will would not have a proximately free power; for the condition of its not acting would not be under its control. Hence free use would be impossible. The hand while writing can not-write, supposing that the will ceases to move the executive faculties, but no one maintains that the hand is therefore free. To reply that

[49] Dicimus descriptionem illam in sensu composito esse intelligendam . . . quia positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum posse non agere in sensu diviso, i. e. retinere potentiam ad agendum ablata aliqua conditione ex praerequisitis non est proprium potentiae liberae, sed cuilibet naturaliter agenti convenit . . . ita operari . . . ut solum possit facultas ab operatione cessare in sensu diviso . . . non est posse cessare ex interna potestate et domino actionis . . . quia tunc non cessatur ex potestate non agendi, sed potius ex impotentia agendi (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-10).

[50] Si ergo voluntas positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum potest non agere tantum in sensu diviso, tunc non est potentia proxima ad non agendum, sed tantum potentia remota. . . . Quando non habet omnia praerequisita ad agendum non est potentia proxima ad agendum; nunquam ergo est potentia proxima ad agendum et non agendum, sed ad alterum tantum . . . ergo . . . nunquam exercet potestatem liberam sed solum eam partem exercet ad quam proxime est praeparata (*Iibid.*, n. 11).

the will is a peculiar kind of agent in that even under God's motion it retains its power to not-act solves nothing. If that is understood in the composed sense, then the Suarezian position is admitted. If it is understood in the divided sense (and it can be meant in only one or the other sense), then the will, like any other faculty, does not (supposing the removal of a prerequisite to act) have intrinsic power to not-act, but rather *necessarily does not act.* To safeguard the reality of freedom we must accept his formula in the composed sense Suarez assures us.[51]

To safeguard the same human liberty he also denies any previous concursus on God's part. Concurrent motion suffices in his view. God wills to concur with men who cooperate with Him he argues; but whether, in fact, this man does cooperate is left in man's own power. God's volition falls on the (human) act, not absolutely, but as the act is co-produced by the human and divine wills; His volition is quasi-conditional; " if this man wills to co-operate." God's will in such a matter of itself alone effects nothing. From all eternity the divine will is, as it were, prepared, and has its power applied to co-acting with the created will.[52]

2. *The Relation of Freedom to Partial Goods.* To understand more fully the Suarezian notion of the nature of the free faculty we must now take up another question, whether this indifferent power can by God's motion be necessitated to act with respect to an object which is indifferent, that is known not

[51] Omnia quae generaliter diximus de praerequisitis ad agendum aeque procedunt de omnibus praerequisitis sive ex parte Dei sive ex parte aliarum rerum vel causarum. . . . Si (divina motione) posita non manet in voluntate potestas ad non agendum nisi in sensu diviso . . . ergo in voluntate sic mota non manet libertas non agendi et consequenter nec ipsum operari liberum est (*Ibid.*, nn. 12-15).

[52] Negamus priorem partem de concursu praevio; sufficit enim simultaneus. . . . Concedimus enim aliquam voluntatem Dei esse praeviam ad volitionem hominis . . . non oportet ut sit voluntas absoluta quod talis actus fiat et in rerum natura ponatur . . . sed sufficit voluntas concurrendi cum arbitrio hominis . . . si ipse cooperari velit quod semper relinquitur in manu et potestate ejus . . . per illam volitionem (Deus) non vult actum voluntatis humanae simpliciter et absolute, sed ut coefficiendum ab eadem voluntate humana et quasi sub conditione . . . et ideo talis voluntas Dei nihil operatur per se sola (*Ibid.*, n. 16).

to be the perfect good.[53] As to specification there is no difficulty since God can necessitate it in this way by denying concurrence to every species but this one. The problem arises, Suarez thinks, with reference to exercise of act, and his answer to it is that God can necessitate the will even in this way.[54] The argument from authority includes: a) a very lengthy list of theologians said by Suarez to favor this position, among them St. Thomas; [55] b) the mode of argumentation used by the Fathers against the heretics; and c) such pronouncements as those contained in the Council of Trent, which latter imply not that such necessitating motion is never given, but that when freedom is used, such motion cannot precede that use.[56]

His proof from reason is easily grasped. Since God can do all things He can change the will when and as He chooses (provided no contradiction is implied), preserving its liberty or not, as He decides. There is repugnance in neither, though it seems more difficult to Suarez to move the will by preserving its liberty, than to move it by necessitating it. It is clear that when God does so necessitate the act it is not free because liberty in operation is not only the being of the act or its intrinsic mode, but is its denomination from the power of acting and not-acting precisely as that power is expedited to both parts. Since that power is not used in the act in question, denomination from it must be lacking. To deny that God can necessitate the will with respect to such an object is, Suarez adds, to derogate from God's omnipotence.[57]

[53] *Ibid.*, capp. 4, 5; cfr. Pesch, *op. cit.*, pp. 261 ss.

[54] Dico ergo Deum posse ita movere voluntatem (quoad exercitium) stante integro judicio rationis de objecto ex se indifferente, seu non necessario, ut motu non libero sed simpliciter necessario in illud feratur (*Ibid.*, cap. 4, n. 9; cfr. Joannes a Sancto Thoma, *Philosophia Naturalis*, IVa Pars, Quaestio XII, art. 2). Suarez adds, however (*Opus. Primum*, cap. 2, n. 7), that God does not ordinarily do this.

[55] *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 22. a. 8.

[56] Suarez appeals to Sess. 6, c. 5 (Denz. n. 797) and can. 4 (Denz. n. 814).

[57] Posse Deum, quia omnipotens est mutare voluntatem hominis quando voluerit, et ubi voluerit . . . non solum potest mutare voluntatem servando ejus libertatem sed etiam necessitando illam. . . . Imo difficilius videtur voluntatem mutare efficaciter salva ejus libertate, quam eam necessitando . . . tunc autem operatio erit

Those who deny this position and simultaneously assert that God can efficaciously or physically predetermine the will are illogical. The predetermination they affirm would be the necessitation they deny. The fact that the object of the act in question is indifferent does not guarantee actual liberty for the will itself can be necessitated *ab extrinseco*. The argument that an indifferent object makes a free act overlooks these elements: 1) judgment is the root of liberty, not its form; 2) the intellectual judgment is natural, not free; 3) the object of the judgment, though not necessitating the will, cannot be the form from which the volitional act is denominated free since formal liberty is a property not of the object, but an intrinsic property inhering in the will of the one operating.[58] What the proponents of this theory forget Suarez thinks, is that necessity arising from an extrinsic principle is quite as absolute as that from an intrinsic principle. Liberty requires freedom from both.

Those who deny that God can necessitate the will with regard to indifferent goods and who yet affirm that He does predetermine it with regard to those same things argue that the will bears only on known goods, therefore it cannot be necessitated to what is known not to be necessary. Suarez uses their own argument against them. The will bears solely on known goods, he answers; therefore it cannot be predetermined unless the good (object) be judged as something to be loved. So long, then, as the judgment is indifferent, i. e., proposes the object as apt to be either chosen or rejected, the will cannot

necessaria et non libera quoad exercitium quia libertas . . . est denominata a potestate agendi et non agendi ergo tunc actus carebit tali denominatione et consequenter erit necessarius (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 4, n. 13).

[58] . . . illud ipsum praedeterminare illo modo est necessitare . . . cum objectum sic judicatum non necessitet voluntatem potest aliunde voluntas superari et extrinseca necessitas illi imponi. . . . Illud judicium est origo libertatis . . . non ergo est ipsa formalis libertas. In illo judicio . . . actus non est formaliter liber, sed naturalis prout antecedit voluntatem; ergo non potest esse forma denominans liberum actum. . . . Formalis libertas non est proprietas abjecti, sed intrinseca proprietas hominis operantis voluntati inhaerens . . . argumentum (Thomistarum) enim probat actum a voluntate elicitum cum indifferentia judicii non esse necessarium ab intrinseco, ac subinde fore liberum nisi ab extrinseco necessitas inferatur voluntati; hanc vero inferrie non posse illo argumento non probatur (*Ibid.*, nn. 14-16).

be predetermined to one part. It is impossible, then, for the will to tend to the good by reason of this supposed predetermination; since, in fact, predetermination is true necessity, the argument, if valid against necessitation, is valid against predetermination.[59]

How can God necessitate the will with regard to an indifferent object? [60] Suarez indicates two ways: 1) by a mutation in the will antecedent to and really distinct from the act of the will, by which mutation the will is so impelled that it necessarily elicits its acts; or 2) God immediately by Himself makes the will act necessarily, not by some prior reality distinct from the human act, but by an action imbibed into that human act. God's action is an aid or simultaneous concursus which cooperates with the human will.[61]

The first of these is for Suarez the same thing as the premotion spoken of by some of his adversaries. It is a quality in the order of first act given to produce the act efficiently together with the will, yet it is inseparable from second act and might be permanent or transient. The non-repugnance of this notion is evident from this that a finite power (such as the will) can be overcome by an infinite power (such as God).[62]

The second mode is deducible from St. Thomas' teaching [63] and also from reason, that is, what God can do through second causes, He also can do alone. But we have seen that God can necessitate the will by a created quality, therefore He can do it without that quality. Necessitation of the will comes through

[59] Voluntas non fertur nisi in bonum cognitum; ergo non potest praedeterminari nisi bonum illud judicatum sit ut determinate amandum; ergo quamdiu judicium est indifferens ex parte objecti . . . non potest voluntas ad unam partem praedeterminari; ergo erit impossibile mediante illo judicio voluntatem intendere in illud bonum ex praedeterminatione (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

[60] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

[61] Unus (modus necessitandi voluntatem) est per antecedentem mutationem factam in voluntate, distinctam realiter ab ipso actu . . . alter est si Deus per seipsum immediate faciat voluntatem necessario velle . . . per actionem ipsam ibibitam in ipso velle quae ut est a Deo, habet rationem auxilii seu concursus simultanei cooperantis. . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[62] *Ibid.*, nn. 2-9.

[63] *Q. D. de Verit., loc. cit.*

an absolute and efficacious divine will which excludes every contingent condition on the part of man and is antecedent to human consent. It is of such decrees as these that theologians understood such Scriptural texts as: "No one can resist Thy will."[64]

God's effective decrees, then, are two-fold. 1) the *intention* which of itself effects nothing in creatures, but is an internal predefinition by God; 2) *execution* through which God efficaciously and immediately causes what He wills. This second necessitates our will and efficiently produces in it some reality distinct from act and distinct also from ordinary concursus, since it necessitates the will by effectively restraining its natural power of resisting God's help. This reality changes the connatural mode of its (the will's) operating. Its possibility arises from the subordination of the created will to the divine, a subordination having its fundament in the active power of the divine will.[65]

Since we are now at the very heart of the controversy (the relations of necessity and freedom) Suarez pauses to clarify the terms and precise things controverted.[66] In this matter certain propositions are universally admitted. They are: (1) a certain suppositional necessity of producing some effect, and impotency to produce, at the same time, some other effect, are reconcilable with the freedom both of the power and of its

[64] Quidquid Deus operatur per causas secundas potest se solo operari . . . sed dictum est posse Deum necessitare voluntatem media qualitate creata: ergo etiam sine illa. . . . Est . . . certum sc. necessarium esse ut Deus, efficaci et absoluta voluntate excludente omnem conditionem contingentem ex parte voluntatis humanae et ontecedentem ad consensum hominis velit facere ut homo . . . consentiat (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 5, nn. 9-11).

[65] . . . distinguere soleo in divina voluntate duplex decretum efficax: unum per modum intentionis tantum . . . nihil per seipsum et immediate ad extra operans . . . aliud per modum usus seu executionis quia per illud efficaciter Deus ad extra operatur quod vult (*Ibid.*, n. 13) . . . quando Deus efficaci et absoluta voluntate . . . vult hominis voluntatem velle objectum alias indifferenter propositum . . . minime possit voluntas per innatam libertatem illi (concursui) resistere (n. 20). Actus voluntatis nunquam est necessarius quoad exercitium nisi quia voluntas privatur potentia proxima suspendeni influxum suum vel . . . impeditur omnino ne illa uti valeat (n. 22).

[66] Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 6.

act. Some other necessity, even though suppositional, can be repugnant to liberty or to its use. The first part is clear. Divine foreknowledge and predestination imply a free effect so preknown that it is impossible for the effect not to take place; yet the act does not therefore cease to be free. There are other such suppositions which leave the act free. Supposing an end already intended there necessarily follows the election of the unique and necessary means to the end; yet there is liberty in that election provided the original intention was free.

The second part of this proposition is likewise clear from examples. The love whereby the blessed love God is necessary yet it supposes the sight of God; and the acts produced in us by exciting grace (*actus gratiae excitantis*) are necessary in us, though only on the supposition of divine motion.[67]

All likewise admit (2) that the distinction of two-fold necessity, in the composed and divided senses, explained in the legitimate way, is very good and necessary.[68] (3) There is no repugnance in one faculty's being, at one time, potential to two acts; wood, for example, is, at one time, capable of being both hot and cold; the intellect, at one time, has the active power of assenting and dissenting. The same is true of the will.[69] (4) When a faculty which is capable of contrary effects or acts receives one of them it does not lose its power for the other, though it cannot exercise that power while yet retaining the act being exercised. The will, then, while acting, has the natural power to suspend the act or to place a contrary act, though it cannot use this power while persevering in the act in question. It is said to suspend the act, or to do the contrary, in the divided sense, and no one disputes this explanation of the famous distinction.[70] (5) Necessity is two-fold, that is, preceding (which makes the thing to be) and subsequent

[67] . . . beatificus amor in patria eam habet necessitatem quae libertatem excludit et tamen illa necessitas non est sine aliqua suppositione saltem visionis Dei . . . actus gratiae excitantis sunt ita necessarii in nobis ut non sint liberi, et tamen non fiunt necessarii nisi ex aliqua suppositione divinae motionis (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

[68] *Ibid.*, n. 4. [69] *Ibid.*, n. 5. [70] *Ibid.*, n. 6.

(which the thing operating makes). The first is, as St. Anselm teaches, opposed to freedom, the second is not. We can apply this distinction to the composed sense, and have it:

composed < from a previous supposition
from a subsequent supposition

According to Suarez, the first of these induces necessity absolutely speaking, but a consequent supposition does not. St. Thomas' dictum that necessity of consequent is opposed to liberty, but that necessity of consequence is not opposed to it, is to be distinguished in the same way, for some necessity of consequence does destroy liberty, as in this reasoning: "Man sees God, therefore man loves Him." Hence the Thomistic dictum should be:

necessity of
- consequent destroys freedom = Concede
- consequence
  - necessary from an antecedent supposition destroys = Concede
  - necessary from a consequent supposition destroys = Deny [71]

These points, then, are admitted by all, Suarez states. As to the application of the distinctions agreed on, there is no unanimity. Some hold that no supposition inducing necessity in the composed sense excludes active freedom except that by

[71] Unam (necessitatem) vocat (S. Anselmus) praecedentem quae facit rem esse; alterum subsequentem quam facit ipsamet operans et priorem dicit repugnare libertati, non tamen posteriorem. . . . Similique modo distingui potest duplex sensus compositus. . . . Itemque dicendum est de alia duplici necessitate consequentis et consequentiae quae sumitur ex divo Thoma . . . nam prior necessitas dicitur contraria libertati quia est absoluta necessitas rei, posterior vero dicitur non tollere libertatem. . . . Secundum autem membrum solum negative et permissive seu indefinite accipiendum est. . . . Aliqua enim necessitas consequentiae repugnat libertati, qualis est haec: Homo videt Deum; ergo amat illum. . . . Et ideo membrum illud distinguendum est. . . . Nam si consequentia est necessaria ex suppositione antecedente, repugnat libertati; si . . . ex suppositione consequente, non . . . (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

which the will is intrinsically determined to one thing and to exercise of the act. Any other necessity is compatible with freedom. Thus in heaven the will is necessitated by the medium of the Beatific Vision; but on this earth man can be necessitated only when the mode of cognition naturally determines intrinsically, i. e., the judgment presents the object not as indifferent but necessary. For the freedom of an act the power of not eliciting it in the divided sense is sufficient, according to this theory.[72]

The Suarezian position is: 1) that a supposition inducing necessity in the composed sense is not opposed to liberty provided it be such that it itself is placed through the use of liberty; 2) any supposition is opposed to freedom which altogether precedes the use of freedom, and, in the composed sense, induces necessity of the will's operating so that the simultaneous composition in the will of this supposition and of lack of act, is impossible.

The first proposition is quite generally agreed upon. The will in the very instant in which it is freely operating cannot at the same instant lack the operation. Its necessity is the necessity common to all things that they be while they are. The same is true of God's concomitant concursus. Supposing it, it is impossible that the will be not acting, but this composed necessity does not militate against freedom for the very supposition of such concursus involves a human, voluntary act.[73]

The second and controverted proposition is, Suarez thinks, the common opinion of all theologians who accept the definition of freedom already given.[74] Under the preceding supposition the

[72] *Ibid.*, nn. 8-9.

[73] Suppositionem inducentem necessitatem in sensu composito si talis sit ut per usum libertatis fiat vel illum usum liberum involvat seu comitantem habeat, inducere tantum necessitatem consequentiae . . . et non pugnare cum libertate; si vero . . . omino antevertat usum libertatis et necessitatem operandi in voluntatem inducat . . . et in sensu composito . . . talem suppositionem inducere necessitatem simpliciter et contrariam libertati . . . Voluntas in eo instante in quo libere operatur . . . jam non potest in eodem instanti carere actu sed habet necessitatem, de qua dixit Aristoteles res, quando est, necesse est esse (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[74] Cfr. *Ibid.*, nn. 11-25 for Suarez' treatment of the opinion of Theologians on this point.

will can only act or not act, it cannot do both. The position that an antecedent supposition necessitates if it comes from a created agent but not if it comes from God is called unacceptable.[75] For in the first place, it cannot be reconciled with the definition of freedom, since freedom demands that both act and not-act be compatible with the pre-requisites to act. In the second place it is unreasonable, for even God cannot move the will by a previous motion which necessitates in the composed sense and at the same time preserve the will's freedom; St. Thomas' authority cannot be alleged for this position, Suarez argues; but rather the Angelic Doctor holds with St. Anselm and Suarez himself. He says, for instance, that the principle: "It is necessary that everything that is, while it is, be," is founded on the principle: "It is impossible for one thing simultaneously to be and not to be." "And," he adds, "this is not absolute but suppositional." Later he says: "That which is not absolutely necessary becomes necessary from the supposition of that thing." [76] It is clear that for St. Thomas the true composed sense (excluding absolute necessity) should be founded on the supposition of that very thing to which necessity is attributed. Thus he agrees with St. Anselm that all necessity which is not from the supposition of the thing, but of some prior thing, is absolute and antecedent necessity, necessity simply speaking. Even more clearly in the *Physics*,[77] he writes: "That necessity which depends on prior causes is absolute," and "However, that which has necessity from some-

[75] Quoties suppositio omnino praecedit et inter praerequisita ad agendum ponitur et talis est ut illo stante . . . tantum non agere compositive . . . illam suppositionem impedire usum libertatis (*Ibid.*, n. 11). (In doctrina) necessitatem provenientem ex antecedenti influxu voluntatis divinae non impedire libertatem . . . sed causare illam . . . neque expositio verborum Anselmi nec doctrina ipsa probari potest. . . . Ratione item id convinci potest, qua simul improbatur illa doctrina, etc. (*Ibid.*, nn. 15-16).

[76] Et haec est necessitas non absoluta sed ex suppositione (*I Periher.*, lect. 15, sect. 1). illud quod non est absolute necessarium fieri necessarium ex suppositione ejusdem (*Ibid.*, sect. 2).

[77] Necessitas illa quae pendet ex causis prioribus, est absoluta. Quod autem habet necessitatem ab eo quod est posterius in esse est necessarium ex conditione vel suppositione (*II Physic.*, lect. 15).

thing after it in being is necessary conditionally or by supposition." Some distinguish St. Thomas and say that which depends on prior causes, the first cause excepted, is absolutely necessary. This is unreasonable, Suarez repeats, it is also against St. Thomas' own words, " necessity from an exterior principle . . . if it is the efficient or moving cause brings about necessity of coaction," [78] and under this he includes that which comes from God.[79]

Reason itself indicates that when a supposition is antecedent to the act and the effect is connected necessarily with that supposition the necessity is not rooted in the principle: " it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at one and the same time," since what is supposed is not the same thing as that which follows from the supposition. But necessity which is not rooted in this principle is necessity simply so called, necessity of consequent. Therefore a supposition which precedes actual liberty makes a free effect impossible. Given the supposition the will can do only one thing that, namely, which flows necessarily *quoad exercitium* from the supposition. Hence it is not proximately disposed to act and not-act, as the use of liberty requires that it be.[80]

God's preknowledge and predestination of things for Suarez is not a precedent but a consequent supposition; foreknowledge is not a cause of reason that a thing is future, but *an intuition* of a future thing; and *predestination* supposes divine knowledge of the future free use of the created will with divine concursus, (if the other prerequisites to act are fittingly prepared for that will). God, in predefining, always observes this respect. Hence

[78] Quamdam necessitatem ex aliquo exteriori quod si sit causa efficiens vel movens facit necessitatem coationis (*Summa Theol.*, III, Q. 46, a. 1).

[79] Intelligit sub illa violenta necessitate proveniente ex aliquo exteriori principio includi etiam illam quae a Deo provenire potest (*Prol. Primum*, cap. 6, n. 24).

[80] Quando suppositio est antecedens in sensu dicto . . . si effectus est necessario connexus cum tali suppositione, talis necessitas non est fundata in illo principio . . . posita hujusmodi suppositione voluntas . . . tantum potest unum agere, illud, scilicet, quod ex tali suppositione sequitur cum necessitate quoad exercitium: ergo non agit ut potens agere et non agere (*Ibid.*, nn. 26-27).

the predefinition too is a consequent supposition.[81] Lastly Suarez maintains that those passages in St. Thomas cited by Thomists as opposing Suarez' notion actually favor it. Thus in the *Summa Theologica* (I. q. 14, a. 13, ad 2^{um}), what he actually teaches is that future free things are necessary by the necessity common to all things that they be, while they are; and this is consequent necessity. In the same article (ad 3^{um}), St. Thomas says that God's knowledge is extrinsic to the thing known, imprints nothing intrinsic to it, and so leaves it contingent. Everywhere in his works the Angelic Doctor teaches that, because God is the first root of all free effects, the efficacy of His will does not induce necessity in created free causes.[82] As to God's motion, in the *Summa* (I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3^{um}), St. Thomas is speaking of God's moving created wills by concomitant concursus, and not by a previous motion.[83] Again in the *Summa* (I-II, q. 112, a. 3), he proves only that God at times efficaciously intends an effect, depending on man's free cooperation, and that He has a way of moving man's will so that He obtains human consent freely but infallibly. He does not say how this is done; but Suarez explains that it is through a supposition which induces consequent, not antecedent necessity; that is, through the mediation of God's foreknowledge.[84]

3. *The Relation of Human to Divine Freedom.*[85] Suarez now

[81] Scientia Dei involvit rem esse futuram, et ita . . . non est suppositio antecedens . . . praescientia haec futurorum, ut scientia visionis est, non est causa vel ratio quod res sit futura, sed pura intuitio rei futurae. . . . Voluntas divina . . . praedestinans seu praedefiniens quatenus est de actibus liberis . . . supponit aliquam praescientiam, saltem conditionatam ipsius liberi usus voluntatis futuri cum solo concursu concomitante si caeterae . . . voluntati praeparantur ex hac parte (praedefinitio) est suppositio consequens, et non antecedens (*Ibid.*, n. 28).

[82] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 19, a. 8, ad 3^{um}; q. 22, a. 8; q. 23, a. 6; *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 6, a. 12, ad 7^{um} Cfr. *Prol. Primum*, cap. 6, n. 30.

[83] Respondemus D. Thomam loqui de Deo movente per concursum concomitantem (*Ibid.*, n. 31). Thomists hardly agree.

[84] Solum probat Deum interdum efficaciter intendere effectum pendentem ex libera cooperatione hominis . . . quomodo autem id faciat Deus, D. Thomas ibi non exponit (*Ibid.*) St. Thomas, however, in the place cited, appeals to God's indefectible power, not to His knowledge; and the movement of the human will through God's power includes a precedent supposition.

[85] Cfr. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 3.

considers the relation of human freedom to divine freedom. We can state the question simply: Can man act freely if God does not? Now that question has many senses, so to avoid ambiguity Suarez distinguishes them. The first sense is, whether, if there is no freedom in the first cause, there can be freedom in second causes. The answer is negative. Created perfection supposes divine perfections since they are participations of the divine.[86] The second sense of our question is: if, through an impossible supposition, God acted by natural necessity but creatures had a free faculty, would God, because of His natural mode of acting, impede the creature's *use* of liberty so that it would not have a free act, despite its free potency? Some Thomists seem to think not, insisting that given a free faculty and an indifferent object the act will always be free. Suarez disagrees saying that God can efficiently produce in such a faculty a necessary act with reference to such an object, as we have seen. On the supposition, then, that God is acting by necessity of nature none of our acts would be free, for God's motion being always infinite (for every agent acting as a nature acts with all its powers; only a free power can temper and moderate its own act) would always overcome man's finite faculty.[87]

The third sense of the question is: if God acted necessarily but nevertheless moved the will only as He now does by concursus, would He then take away our freedom of action? The Suarezian answer is negative. Liberty requires not that every cause of the free act be able to act and not-act, but only that the proximate cause be such.[88] In the hypothesis, the proximate cause would be such, for God's concursus does not now necessitate, so neither would it necessitate if the mode of its bestowal

[86] *Ibid.*, nn. 5-6.

[87] Fieri autem potest ut agens alioqui ex se indifferens, ita feratur vel determinetur ad agendum ab alio superiori agente ut . . . non habeat potestatem non agendi, . . . potest privari usu libertatis. . . . Deus potest per infinitam suam potentiam ita movere voluntatem ut necessitatem illi inferat . . . sed si Deus ageret ex necessitate naturae . . . ageret quanta efficacia posset; ergo semper ageret necessitatem illi inferendo (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-12).

[88] *Ibid.*, nn. 15-16.

were necessary and not free. The different mode would make no real distinction because then (as now) the concursus would be given dependently on the human will. It could not be placed in reality without the will, without its cooperation; hence it would not be absolutely necessary. It is a general rule that even though some cause concurs by natural necessity to a given effect (e. g., habits so concur), that necessity does not destroy the contingency of the act so long as the cause with respect to which the act is denominated free acts with indifference.[89]

Here Suarez raises the difficulty that, even granted that God's motion is freely given and not necessarily, it must necessitate the will.[90] He states the difficulty in the following ways: 1) The second cause can do nothing unless moved by the first cause. But, when the second cause is moved by God it necessarily moves itself. 2) A free cause is that which can act and not-act, given everything necessary for it to act. But one of the things necessary to its act is God's motion given which it cannot act and not-act. Therefore under that motion its acts necessarily.[91]

His opponents, Suarez points out, will avoid the difficulty by distinguishing the minor of the first syllogism: When the second cause is moved by God it necessarily moves itself: by necessity in the composed sense, yes; in the divided sense, no. But necessity in the composed sense does not militate against freedom. Therefore. . . . To the second syllogism, they answer: A free cause is that which can act and not-act given everything necessary for its act must be distinguished in this wise: it can still act and not-act given everything necessary on the part of intellect and will, yes; but it cannot still act and not-act given God's motion.[92] For they say indifference of the faculty is not required for freedom, but indifference of the

[89] (Data illa hypothesi motio) Dei solum enim esset necessaria, quantum esset ex parte Dei; quia, tamen, simul penderet a voluntate creata nec posset in re poni sine illa, ideo non esset absolute necessaria (*Ibid.*, n. 19). Huic colligitur generalis regula . . . nihil obstare libertati . . . quod aliqua causa naturali necessitate ad illum concurrat dummodo aliqua cum indifferentia efficiat, respectu cujus effectus denominetur liber (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

[90] *Ibid.*, sect. 4. [91] *Ibid.*, n. 1. [92] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

object is sufficient. Suarez repeats that this position fails to distinguish between radical and formal liberty. To have his definition of freedom apply to a free act as well as to the free faculty, the prerequisites must include God's motion, and not merely the requisites on the part of intellect and will. In answering the first objection the use of the distinction of the composed and divided sense is termed unjustified. God can necessitate the will by His motion. Now the act will not be necessary in the divided sense (for apart from that motion the will can not act), but in the composed sense. Yet this necessity in the composed sense even destroys the free use for we are supposing that God necessitates the human will by all His strength.[93]

In the answer to the second syllogism, the limitation of things necessary to the act is termed arbitrary and unproven. One could as easily say, Suarez argues, that given a celestial or diabolical influence our will could not not-operate and yet be free since the judgment remains free, as does the faculty in itself. Indifference of the potency is, in fact, just as necessary to a free act as is indifference of the object. To argue that God is free, yet determined to one thing, is not to the point. That determination is not natural, or God would not be free. Divine determination is from liberty, an eternal self-determination. The consequent necessity is a necessity not of nature but of immutability, which does not take away the freedom which a free thing has of itseslf. In God's will there is no efficiency of the

[93] Tota haec doctrina . . . non distinguit satis inter radicem libertatis et formalem libertatem (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Nec recte limitare descriptionem facultatis liberae . . . ad requisita ex parte judicii et ipsius voluntatis et existente . . . facultate de se libera potest in ipso usu non esse libera. Unde . . . haeretici . . . aiunt nos non libere operari eo quod ab ipso Deo necessitatem patimur. In quo quidem errant . . . non errant tamen in illatione . . . quod si Deus infert extrinsecam necessitatem actui non est de facto liber (*Ibid.*, n. 5). Distinctio illa sensus compositi et divisi . . . ita generaliter sumpta satis esse non potest. . . . Deus aliqua motione potest inferre necessitatem voluntati et tunc actus non esset necessarius in sensu diviso . . . esset necessarius in sensu composito quia posita illa motione non potest non exerceri; et tamen illa necessitas in sensu composito tolleret usum libertatis quia supponimus Deum tunc necessitare voluntatem quantum potest (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

act, no composition of potency and act, the indifference which is His liberty is not liberty with indifference of a power with respect to acts.[94]

To give the real answer to the difficulties raised above Suarez says we must remember the definition of freedom. It contains two elements: 1) it is an active faculty which, of itself, has power both to act and to suspend action; 2) that faculty while acting is, proximately, so disposed that given everything needed for its act it can act and not-act. The second element, which touches what is necessary to the use of freedom, must be distinguished. A thing can be necessary to the placing of an act:

antecedently:	prerequisite to act; in the order of first act.
concomitantly:	intrinsically included in the second act, and not distinct from it.

In his definition the phrase: " given everything necessary " refers only to things which are antecedently necessary.[95] The fact that indifference still remains, given these, is clear. If it did not remain the non-position of the act would not be from internal ability to not-act but (because of the deficiency of the requisites) inability to act. On the other hand the term " everything required " as used in the definition cannot include those

[94] Pari ratione posset quis dicere posita quadam influentia coeli, vel adhibita speciali daemonis motione non posse voluntatem nostram non operari sequendo illam et nihilominus tunc libere operaturam (*Ibid.*, n. 6). Exemplum de voluntate divina . . . non est ad rem. . . . Voluntas enim divina . . . vere tamen est indifferens de se ad volendum creata objecta . . . et licet ab aeterno se determinaverit . . . tamen illamet determinatio . . . est ex libertate; ejusque necessitas non est naturae sed immutabilitatis quae non tollit . . . indifferentiam. . . . In voluntate Dei . . . illa indifferentia est . . . in puro actu respectu objectorum et ideo in hoc non est comparanda indifferentia liberatis creatae cum divina (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[95] Cfr. *Ibid.*, nn. 8-10. Dupliciter posse dici aliquid requiri ad actum: uno modo tanquam praerequisitum ad actionem alio modo tanquam intrinsece vel essentialiter inclusum in ipsa actione . . . prius dici solet praerequisitum antecedenter; . . . posterius . . . requisitum concomitanter. " Positis omnibus requisitis ad agendum, potest agere et non agere " . . . intelligendum est de praerequisitis antecedenter . . . non de aliis (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

things which are concomitantly necessary for they are included in the very act as essential elements. Certainly the action itself is required as that by which the faculty is formally determined, and by which it is constituted as acting; therefore the act can hardly be included among these things given which the faculty remains indifferent to acting and not-acting. Neither therefore can the essential elements of the act (those things concomitantly required for the action) be among those things in the presence of which the will retains its indifference.[96]

To the first syllogism, then: "Second causes can do nothing unless moved by first cause. But when the will is moved by God it moves itself necessarily." Suarez answers that God's motion is two-fold: a) that which precedes actual concursus; and b) concursus itself. The former (which is certain in theology, but hardly known in philosophy), a motion which is in the order of first act with respect to operation, but is after the manner of second act with respect to the faculty itself, leaves the power free to place or not to place the act. If it did not do so it would, of course, determine the faculty and so take away freedom. Thus Trent defines (with respect to supernatural acts) that given this previous motion the will can still not consent. "If anyone shall say that the free will of man, moved and aroused by God . . . cannot dissent if it will, or as a lifeless thing does nothing at all and is merely passive, let him be anathema." [97] Man can dissent, not because God is deficient in power, but because He moves us wisely, providentially. When He wishes to, He efficiently causes the will infallibly to consent, though it can not-consent. Absolutely speaking it is not repugnant that, granted this motion, the will does not move.[98]

[96] Quod ad usum liberum sit necessarium . . . dictam indifferentiam (patet) . . . quia alias cessatio . . . ab opere non esset ex intrinseca vi . . . sed ex defectu . . . non est posse non agere, sed est potius impotentia agendi (*Ibid.*, n. 11). Definitio intelligenda non sit de requisitis concomitanter . . . est autem actio requisita ut id quo formaliter determinatur potentia et constituitur actu agens et ideo non potest includi in his conditionibus cum quibus potentia debet esse indifferens (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[97] Trent, Sess. 6, can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

[98] Duplicem intelligi posse motionem Dei respectu voluntatis nostrae. Una est

The second motion, actual concursus (better known in the natural order than the first motion, since it is, physically, more intrinsically necessary to the created action) is that through which the act of the second cause esssentially depends on the first cause. Granted it, the will cannot not-move. Freedom does not thereby suffer, however, since concursus is not a prerequisite to act, but an essential element included in the act.[99]

To the second syllogism Suarez answers with the same distinction: " A free cause is one which can act and not-act, given everything necessary to its act. But among the necessary things is God's motion, given which it can no longer act and not-act, but must act." God's concursus is not among the antecedent requisites of which the definition of liberty speaks. Under concursus that will cannot not-move, for it is already supposed as constituted in act by its own determination.[100]

4. *The Relation of the Free Faculty to Intellect.*[101] There remains to consider the very important point of the relations between intellect and will. We have seen that freedom is formally in the will alone. How, then, is the free will determined by the intellectual judgment? Some answer that there must precede in reason a definite practical judgment, an *imperium.* Until reason judges determinately, the will cannot elect; otherwise it would tend to an unknown object which is impossible.[102]

Suarez replies that if this were the case, if judgment were a necessary cause of free acts, the will would not be free. The judgment is either necessary or free. If it is necessary there is

antecedens actualem concursum . . . alia consistens in . . . concursu. Prior parum nota est in metaphysica. . . . Tamen in Theologia est certa . . . respectu alterius actus propter quem datur illa motio comparatur per modum principii . . . illa data adhuc potest voluntas non operari. . . . Neque hoc est contra efficaciam divinae motionis . . . tum quia id non provenit ex impotentia sed ex sapientia, providentia . . . tum etiam quia quando ipse vult etiam facit efficaciter ut voluntas infallibiliter consentiat. . . . Per se et absolute non repugnat, stante hac motione, non moveri voluntatem (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, nn. 13-14).

[99] Posterior motio est magis nota lumine naturali quia physice est magis necessaria ad actionem creaturae (*Ibid.*, n. 13; cfr. also n. 15).

[100] *Ibid.*, n. 16.

[101] *Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, sects. 6-7.

[102] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 1.

no actual freedom in the intellect nor in the voluntary act which follows; if the judgment is free it is so either elicitively or imperatively (by imperation of the will). It cannot be elicitively free since the intellect is not a formally free power. Neither can it be free imperatively for then either we have an infinite regress of will moving intellect and intellect moving will, which is impossible; or else the will is not determined in every act by the intellect, and this denies the original proposition. He concludes that the will is not determined in all its free acts by an intellectual judgment, and that no subsequent judgment determines the will to any act except in virtue of a previous free volition.[103]

The position that will determines intellect efficiently and that intellect determines the will finally, is quite unacceptable to Suarez. It is: a) unfounded and unnecessary; b) hardly understandable; c) impossible. In proof of the charge of its impossiblity he reasons that in every vital act the sufficient application of the object antecedes the act, for it is impossible that this application come from the act to which it is ordered. But rational judgment is required for volitional acts because that judgment is the application of the object. Therefore the judgment cannot proceed efficiently from the act because that judgment precedes the act of will.

The major premise is shown by induction: among all natural agents it is impossible that an agent which requires a patient in order to act does not suppose absolutely the application of the patient to such an act, for the agent is impotent except as to applied matter. The minor premise is proved by this that nothing is willed which is not already known. If one answers that judgment is required for volition not merely as an application of the object but as an efficient principle with the will, Suarez says that his case is stronger. The judgment cannot then be from the volitional act as from its efficient principle,

[103] Si . . . illo judicio posito voluntas non potest non consentire illi ergo voluntas . . . non est potentia libera (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Voluntatem non determinari in omnibus suis actibus liberis a judicio intellectus . . . (et) nunquam sic determinari nisi in virtute alicujus prioris volitionis liberae (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

since judgment is the efficient co-principle of the volitional act.[104] The Suarezian position is shown *a priori*: " The intellectual judgment moves the will only through the medium of the proposed object. But the object proposed does not always induce necessity in the will, nor determine the will to one thing. Therefore, such determination from the judgment is neither necessary nor possible." The major premise is clear from this consideration that the intellect cannot be an efficient principle: a) this would destroy freedom in the will; b) it would be contrary to the intellect's mode of acting; c) only the will can move the other powers as to exercise. Even the *imperium* of reason of itself moves only objectively. If it seems at times to move efficiently this is in virtue of a previous act of the will, as when the will intends a certain end, or elects this means, the intellect judges that it is to be done. The will is determined, however, by its own act, not by the *imperium* as such.

The minor is admitted by all, for it is the same thing to say that the will is not necessitated by something other than itself as to say it is not determined to one by that other. But it is certain the will is not necessitated by all objects; neither, therefore, is it determined by all. Only in heaven is there determination to one object as to exercise; that determination is from the infinite goodness of God clearly seen.[105]

Suarez presumes as the root misconception of those who oppose him the position that the judgment must determine the will to one thing. To say the intellect must first judge what is to be elected is ambiguous. If the meaining is that intellect must first judge what goodness, what utility, this means or this election has, the statement is true. If it means that it must first judge " this is to be elected " it is false, for that would be

[104] In omni actu vitali sufficiens applicatio objecti necessarii ad actum simpliciter . . . antecedit talem actum . . . sed judicium rationis requiritur ad actum voluntatis ut applicans objectum; ergo impossible est ut judicium rations . . . effective proveniat ab eodem actu (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[105] Judicium intellectus non movet voluntatem nisi medio objecto quod proponit; sed objectum propositum non semper infert necessitatem voluntati aut determinat illam ad unum. . . . Nam perinde est dicere voluntatem non necessitari ab alio quod non determinari ad unum ab illo (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-9).

repugnant to the will's liberty. It is enough that the object be judged eligible, i. e., that it is sufficiently good, that it can be loved.[106] We cannot say that God before He freely loves some creature judges: "This creature must be loved, or chosen." That would imply that something other than God is necessary to Him. What God does judge antecedently is that this thing is convenient and eligible. The same thing is to be understood of the created will. Once the intellect has judged a particular means to be eligible, even though it judges at the same time that another means is also useful, the will can choose one and it is not necessary for the intellect to judge beforehand that that one must be chosen, or that it is better than the one not chosen.[107] When the intellect sees that certain means are equally apt the will chooses one of them, precisely because it is free. This is true of God; it is true also of men. In Suarezian doctrine, such an election comes only from free voluntary determination. When the means are judged as unequal, the will, more probably, is not necessarily determined to the better means by reason of the judgment. God could have made better things than He did make, but He chose not to. If the will is, in virtue of a previous intention, determined to choosing the more useful means (because that is necessary to attaining the end) that determination is from the will's intention, not from the rational judgment.[108]

If it is true that the will can choose something contrary to the judgment of reason, how, Suarez asks, can one admit the common teaching of philosophers and theologians that there

[106] "Necessarium esse ut intellectus prius judicat quid eligendum sit" ambigua esse: . . . si vero est sensus prius esse judicandum absolute . . . hoc esse eligendum falsa est propositio. . . . Sufficit ergo illud judicium quo medium hoc judicatur utile et . . . aptum ut eligi possit (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[107] Ergo si judicet intellectus hoc medium esse utile vel eligibile, etiamsi simul judicet aliud esse utile potest voluntas unum eligere, neque est necesse ut intellectus prius de altero determinate judicet esse eligendum, imo neque esse eligibilius alio (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[108] Posse esse judicia de mediis aequalibus: et tune voluntas nec . . . necessario est suspensa, sed haec est ejus libertas ut unum possit eligere, et aliud omittere . . . quando objecta vel media judicantur inaequalia censeo probabilius . . . non determinari voluntatem necessario ad id quod est melius, ex vi judicii (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

cannot be a defect in the will unless it exist first in the judgment? [109] Scotus answered that there can be a moral defect with no defect preexisting in the reason. Others answer that whoever does evil always has a practical judgment which is conformed to some predisposition, a judgment that " this is to be done " supposing the disposition. Suarez rejects this on the ground that the intellect, prior to election, need have no such judgment. The judgment " this must be done " has place only when there is a *necessary* connection between the object and some preceding affection.[110]

To arrive at the real answer Suarez employs the distinctions between antecedent and subsequent judgment (or disposition, or intellectual defect) and that between absolute (physical) and moral necessity.

To do evil it is not absolutely necessary, according to Suarez, that an error of judgment precede. This follows from the principle that no judgment is, of itself, sufficient to determine the will. Morally speaking, however, the will never is ensnared unless a defect in judgment precede, at least the defect which is inconsideration. It is not even morally necessary, however, that the judgment be formally comparative; e. g., " this is to be preferred to that," or that it be formally of an object as something which must be done. It is enough that it judge that this object is, here and now, convenient.[111]

It is probable, he thinks, that from the free consent of the will about things to be done there follows, of necessity, in the intellect the practical judgment by which it is judged absolutely " This is to be done " in the sense that this judgment signifies: a) the necessary following of one thing from another; and b) a man's absolute resolution about the operation to be placed or the object already willed. If this is so, then, sinners are

[109] *Ibid.*, sect. 7, n. 1.

[110] Nunquam satis probatur esse necessarium hoc judicium ita absolutum . . . non esse necessarium judicium de objecto amando sed de amabili (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[111] Non existimo absolute necessarium ad operandum malum per voluntatem ut praecedat defectus erroris in judicio . . . (quia) nullum judicium intellectus per se sufficit ad determinandam voluntatem (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Moraliter loquendo, nunquam voluntatem labi quin praecedat in intellectu aliquis defectus (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

always in error, but by a consequent error. The necessity for such a judgment is evident, for as soon as man consents to something he must notify himself of that consent and, in some cases, approve it. This consequent judgment takes the form of *imperium* when the object chosen requires the use of the executive faculties.[112]

5. *The Necessary Acts of the Human Will.*[113] So much for the relation of intellect and will. We must now consider this difficulty: how can the will be called free, since it is not free in its principal acts? Here two questions are involved: 1) can the will elicit some acts freely, and others necessarily? 2) if it can, which acts are exercised freely, which necessarily? [114]

In answer to the first question Suarez admits that the will can love some things freely others necessarily. The divine will loves God necessarily, other things freely. Proportionately the same is true of the created will. One act cannot, under one aspect and at one time, be both free and necessary; but it is not repugnant that one potency be the principle of different acts, some of which proceed necessarily and some freely, supposing that those acts are concerned with different objects or through different media. Substituting the term " natural " for " necessary " we can say that certain operations are natural to the will, i. e., they are from an inclination of the will as it is a nature determined to one thing, for the will truly is a nature. Even such operation, however, is preceded by knowledge.[115]

To the question, which voluntary operations are necessary, the usual answer is that man is free as to election of means, but not as to the intention of the end. This answer, in Suarez' view, needs both modification and explanation. The end can be proximate (my private good loved for its own sake, e. g., health) or ultimate (either some determined thing or beatitude taken in general) .[116] Considering the will operating according to its own

[112] Probabile esse consensu libero voluntatis . . . sequi in intellectu judicium illud practicum . . . quo simpliciter judicatur hoc esse agendum (*Ibid.*, n. 12).
[113] *Ibid.*, sect 8. [114] *Ibid.*, n. 1. [115] *Ibid.*, nn. 2-6.
[116] Voluntatem solum esse liberam in electione mediorum non vero in amore vel intentione finis (*Ibid.*, n. 7). Sed haec sententia moderatione indiget et declara-

nature, and especially in this life, it has no act which is simply necessary as to exercise. This is the opinion of St. Thomas and of Thomists generally, according to Suarez; but he adds that St. Thomas arrived at the truth by false reasoning.[117]

The position that the first act following the use of reason is necessary as to exercise is quite mistaken. The will can never be necessitated as to exercise unless the object, for its part, sufficiently concurs to that necessitation and subjects the will to itself. The object proposed through the first cognitional act, however, is often a particular thing which cannot concur to the necessitating of the will.[118] Neither is this act necessary as to specification, for it need not be about a universal good. The fact is, this act in question can be evil. That the cognitional act, in this instance, is necessary proves nothing with regard to the will. The will is never necessitated unless the object, and even the act, are proposed as altogether necessary (something which cannot happen in this life).[119]

To an end proposed to a man as something universally good, the will is necessitated as to specification. No man can hate such a thing, although he can refuse to do anything about it. With regard to particular ends the will is free even as to specification, for in such good defects, or inconvenience, or difficulty, can be found.[120] St. Thomas' statement [121] that such things as being, knowledge, etc., are willed naturally does not mean for Suarez that they are willed with necessity of specification; rather it refers to the mode of operating naturally

tione . . . supponatur distinctio duplicis finis scilicet proximi . . . et ultimi (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[117] In hoc sensu dicimus primo, voluntatem nullum habere actum simpliciter necessarium quoad exercitium sive circa finem sive circa media (*Ibid.*, n. 9). Suarez here cites *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 2.

[118] Falsum esse quod Cajetanus ait, nempe primum actum voluntatis in homine jam utente ratione esse necessarium quoad exercitium (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[119] Addo illum primum actum . . . non esse necessarium . . . quoad specificationem . . . hic primus actus in humana voluntate potest esse et bonus et malus moraliter (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[120] Circa finem sub universalis boni ratione propositum voluntas feratur necessario quoad specificationem (*Ibid.*, n. 15).

[121] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 1.

(that is, to be moved by a certain propensity of nature with which natural propensity liberty is compatible), and not to necessity of operating. Nevertheless (Suarez adds), with respect to these goods some necessity of specification can be admitted.[122]

Freedom is most properly exercised in electing means, since in that act the faculty is more fully moving itself than in intending an end. Still, there is freedom in intending the end, even though the intention proceeds from a natural inclination. The very intention of ultimate happiness as here and now exercised is a virtual election by which that act is elected as a means to beginning or to attaining happiness. Hence it participates freedom.[123]

Section IV. The Free Acts

1. *The Nature of "Free Use."*[124] We have seen the Suarezian teaching on the nature of liberty, its characteristics, its subject, its relation to divine movement and divine freedom, to created intelligence, and to created necessary acts. We have also seen that freedom to be real requires not only the free faculty but the free use of that faculty as well. With that use we shall now concern ourselves.

Suarez indicates that the very use of free will consists in indifference. He appeals to the Council of Trent,[125] for the Council, as we have seen, declares liberty is in the power of indifference. The use, therefore, of liberty is the use of that power. If a man is incapable of the use of this power then he lacks the indifferent power. Man, then, is naturally capable of the free use of the free faculty and in the exercise of human

[122] D. Thomam ibi non loqui de necessitate ulla etiam quoad specificationem, sed de modo operandi naturaliter (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, n. 18).

[123] Liberatem voluntatis evidentius et perfectius exerceri in electione mediorum . . . ad intentionem finis fertur voluntas et sola aliqua inclinatione naturali, quamvis libere feratur (*Ibid.*, nn. 19-20).

[124] Cf. *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1-4.

[125] Trent, Sess. 6, can. 5 (Denz., n. 815), cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797), and can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

actions he retains this use; otherwise all his acts are outside his nature.[126] It is certain that there is in us liberty such that in the very instant in which we freely operate, the potency retains its indifference.[127] An act in which the power is determined is not free for, Suarez repeats, the act of the will does not have the note of freedom immediately, but from the faculty which actually exercises freedom in the very act. If either power (of acting or of not acting) is not proximately expedited for act the act is not free.[128] The free act of willing can be impeded (though the potency remains free) because: a) God's concursus is not given; or b) because the object is not proposed. In neither case is the consequent non-act free.[129] The free act of not-willing, on the other hand, cannot be impeded by the object (for the object can move the will only insofar as the will is born to be moved by it), but it can be impeded by God, Whose infinite power can overcome the creature's finite capacity for both willing and not-willing.[130]

2. *God's Causality With Regard to Free Acts in General*
Every act depends immediately on God, Who gives being not only to the faculty, but to the operation as well. God acts in our acts, even with immediacy of supposit as well as with immediacy of power. The effect comes forth by one and the same act from God and from the creature; the very act of will is one act flowing immediately and *per se* not only from us but also from God

[126] (Si) homo ex natura sua incapax est usus libertatis a nobis expositae . . . sequitur non solum carere hominem usu libero suorum actuum sed etiam carere interna facultate (*Opus. Primum*, cap. 1, nn. 6-7).

[127] Sit ergo primum hujus materiae fundamentum certissimum dari in nobis talem libertatem quae in ipso usu humanorum actuum indifferentiam . . . habeat . . . quod ipse usus sit cum indifferentia quam retinet potentia etiam in ipso instanti in quo libere operatur (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[128] *Ibid.*, cap. 2, n. 5.

[129] Potest autem illa facultas quoad potestatem volendi impediri vel ex parte objecti per ignorantiam vel inconsiderationem . . . vel ex parte potentiae si fingamus privari omni concursu (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[130] Quoad potestatem nolendi vel non volendi non potest impediri usus libertatis ex parte objecti . . . potest tamen impediri ab aliqua exteriori causa . . . quia in voluntate libera duplex sit potestas ad volendum scilicet et non volendum neutra eorum et infinitae virtutis; ergo in utraque potest superari a Deo (*Ibid.*, nn. 11-12).

and this, Suarez adds, is the teaching of St. Thomas.[131] God causes this action immediately through His will or power, not through some other action in the creature, for to act another action is given. Through one and the same action God, together with the will, influences the act or the term of action.[132]

For Suarez, God's concursus is not previous to, or distinct from, the human act, for it is the act of the second cause; it is the act as of God acting and concurring with that cause—and nothing can be previous to itself. Since concursus is the very act, it is concerned not with the principle of the act but with its effect, it gives the principle (in our case the will) nothing. In the case of transient actions that is clear since they are not received into the agent anyway, and confer nothing on the agent. It is true also of immanent acts, such as those of the will. Concursus regards the will not as it is a principle of such an act but as it is a subject about which such an act is concerned. Hence concursus confers on the will nothing by which it is aided, inclined, or strengthened to acting, because through this action the will is not constituted in first act, but in second act, and therefore it supposes in the will whatever is necessary to acting.[133]

A classic objection is that this action is an effect of divine action, and therefore through the divine action something previous is done to the will by which it is aided in eliciting its act. The consequence is proved by this, that action cannot be the

[131] Suarez cites *III cont. Gent.*, cap. 70 and *Summa Theol.*, I, Q. 105, a. 5.

[132] Influit Deus immediate in opera libera voluntatis nostrae . . . tam divina virtus quam substantia seu suppositum per seipsum proxime et immediate influit . . . effectum una et eadem actione a Deo et creatura tanquam a causa prima et secunda prodire . . . (Deus) non potest autem esse causa actionis per aliam actionem quae in creatura sit sed immediate per suam voluntatem vel potentiam; quia ad actionem non est actio . . . per eadem actionem influit Deum cum volunate in actum seu terminum illius actionis (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, cap. 4, nn. 3-5).

[133] Generalem concursum sic . . . non esse aliquid distinctum vel praevium ad actionem causae secundae . . . quia ostensum est hunc concursum esse eamdem actionem causae secundae . . . eadem actio non potest esse praevia ad seipsam. . . . Concursus non versatur circa voluntatem ut est principium talis actions sed ut est subjectum . . . concursus nihil voluntati confert quo ad agendum juvetur, etc. (*Ibid*)., n. 6).

immediate cause of action.[134] Suarez answers by a distinction. The divine act can be two-fold: *ad intra* or *ad extra*. An act *ad intra*, not properly an action, is an act immanent in God which is not as a means to a term to be produced externally, but rather is to that term as a principle of acting, or as applying the divine omnipotence. An act *ad extra* is an action received into a creature and is the proper means (*via*) to the effect and term of the action of the created cause. It is the dependence by which the effect depends on God as on its first cause.

Suarez, taking divine act as an act *ad intra*, says that the action of the creature is an effect of divine action, but the consequence is to be denied, for action taken in this sense (immanent) can be a principle of action properly so called (transient). Taking divine action as act *ad extra* the act of the created will is not an effect of divine action; it is rather an effect of the divine will and power. The created action depends not on the action of God, but on God Himself and His power immediately, just as it depends on the created will. God's act *ad extra* is not prior to the action of the creature for it is the very same thing as that act of the creature. However, it is prior by nobility.[135]

Granted God's influxus in the effect, is there needed in addition some influx in the second cause itself? [136] Some answer in the affirmative; some previous entity is required in the second cause to move or determine it. Two schools advance this answer: 1) those who say God moves the will through a true action in it by imprinting on it something by which it is forally determined to such an action; 2) those who maintain God moves the will not by imprinting something intrinsic but rather by an extrinsic quasi-effective motion based on the natural sub-

[134] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[135] In illo (sensu, i.e. actus ad intra) verum est antecedens sc. actionem creaturae esse effectum divinae actionis . . . in hoc autem sensu negatur consequentia . . . hoc modo utendo nomine actionis posset actio ab actione manare . . . loquendo de actione ad extra, negandum est antecedens . . . non pendet actio creaturae ab actione Dei sed . . . ab ipso Deo ejusque voluntate et potentia . . . in hoc sensu actio Dei non est prior actine creaturae . . . prioritate causalitatis . . . in re sit omnino eadem actio (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-8).

[136] *Ibid.*, cap. 5-6.

ordination and sympathetic response of the lower cause to God. The first school teaches that the will cannot act without such motion, but given it, the will acts necessarily, but by necessity of consequence and of supposition. The will, this school maintains, cannot resist such determination; by it, it is formally determined prior to operating to do one thing; the voluntary act is from the will effectively but the determination is actively from God alone. Yet this school argues that liberty is not destroyed by such motion, for God moves strongly, but also sweetly and proportionately. Suarez sees a difficulty in reconciling the " sweetly " with this school's notion of strongly, but the followers of this school urge all to believe what cannot be understood.[137]

Suarez answers that the will in order to act freely, does not need any special help of God (distinct from the will's act itself) by which it is given something previous to its act in addition to its permanent active power.[138] He states that this is the teaching of all theologians except Thomists, and even of some of them; he also says that it is according to the mind of St. Thomas, who teaches that in all created agents only two things are required for act, the agent's own power and God's motion.[139] By the latter, concursus in the Suarez' sense must be understood, else three things are required.

From reason, Suarez argues against a previous motion showing, as we have already seen, that the essential subordination of second causes to the first cause is amply safeguarded by simultaneous concursus. Why require another divine action? It is required to attain the effect of the creature neither immediately nor mediately (as a previous condition), therefore, it is not required at all. It cannot be required immediately, for God immediately influences the effect through simultaneous concursus. If required mediately it influences not the effect but the second cause itself as an application, motion, compli-

[137] *Ibid.*, cap. 5, nn. 3-5.

[138] Voluntatem liberam ad suum actum liberum efficiendum non indigere speciali influxu Dei distincto ab ipso actu . . . quo ei aliquid ad actionem praevium conferatur, distinctum etiam ab ejus virtute activa permanente, naturali vel infusa (*Ibid.*, cap. 6, n. 1).

[139] *Ibid.*, n. 2. Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I-II, Q. 109, aa. 1-3.

ment, or determination of this cause.[140] Now none of these is necessary. An application to act surely is not necessary since there is sufficient application through the proposition of the object. Supposing all other requirements to act as given, just how could pre-motion apply to the will, since on the supposition it has its object already presented through the judgment of reason? The only thing left is that the act itself be the term of the motion, but this application is imagined to be prior to that act.[141]

Neither is a motion required by the will previous to its act. Motion requires a term, but this motion has none that Suarez can determine. It cannot be the act of the second agent, for if it were and the will passively receives this motion then only God would be active in producing the act. The only other possibility is a fluid quality, produced in the agent, but a quality, which, as we shall see, is purposeless. We should note, however, that the Aristotelian maxim, " whatever is moved is moved by something other than itself," adduced in proof of this pre-motion means simply that created agents are moved insofar as they receive from another their power of acting (which is continually conserved in them), and application of that power to the object. It does not mean that they receive a motion of that power.[142]

The created will needs, in the third place, no complement in order to act. It is impossible for it to receive such a complement unless outside the ordinary course its act is intensified,

[140] Ille (concursus i.e. simultaneous) etiam satis est ut causa secunda sit subordinata primae non per accidens sed per se et essentialiter (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[141] Postquam voluntas habens praesens objectum per judicium rationis . . . inquiritur quid sit necessarium ex parte Dei. . . . Dices terminum (hujus applicationis) esse actionem causae secundae . . . sed . . . applicatio dicitur esse aliquid in causa secunda praevium ad actionem (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[142] Eodem enim modo inquirendum est quem intrinsecum terminum habeat haec motio . . . non est . . . immediate ad actionem causae secundae . . . (quia) fieret actionem ipsius voluntatis . . . a solo Deo fieri et voluntatem solum passive ad ipsam concurrere. . . . Axioma illud (omne quod movetur ab alio movetur) in hoc habere verum quod agens creatum non agit nisi virtutem agendi ab alio accipiat, etc. . . . At vero post receptam et conservatam virtutem et factam applicationem passi vel materiae sufficientem, sit necessaria nova motio in agente ut agat, neque est verum neque ab Aristotele alicubi in hoc sensu traditum (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-11).

extended as to objects, etc. Every power by nature is surely adequate to its own act. Fire is adequate to produce heat; no fluid quality is needed to help it to do so. Again, supposing such a quality as necessary and given it in the will, God's simultaneous concursus is still necessary. Given both motions, the will either needs yet another pre-motion, or it does not. If it does, then the process must proceed to infinity. If it does not, then the first pre-motion is not needed, either, for: 1) on the supposition some second cause (that, namely, to which the quality is already added) does not need pre-motion, hence second causes do not by nature require it; 2) if, from the form of the agent plus this quality, the second agent's power is complete why could not God give creatures permanent powers equal to this combination of power plus quality? Certainly that would not be contrary to the efficacy of the divine power, and would show God to be even more liberal in communicating His power to creatures. One cannot argue that this quality is incommunicable as something innate to the second cause, for even now the second cause has, in a stable and permanent way, its powers of acting, but has it from the actual influx of the first cause which gives and conserves it. This complement could likewise be given permanently and not merely transiently. Since, whether permanent or transient, it comes from God, we can hardly understand what a transient quality can accomplish that a permanent quality cannot achieve.[143]

In the fourth place, no excitation of second causes is necessary, at least not because of the subordination of second causes to the first cause. In some agents excitation is required but for

[143] Non solum superfluum sed etiam impossible videtur aliquid sub ea ratione compleri sub qua jam completum est; sed causa secunda (in ordine causae secundae) supponitur completam virtutem habere (*Ibid.*, n. 13). . . . Quis (inquam) credat virtutem solis ad illuminandum in ordine causae secundae incompletam esse? Aut visum optime dispositum et perfecte informatum specie adhuc indigere alio extrinseco complemento? (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Si (causa secunda cum complemento sub discussione) non indiget alio auxilio . . . idem dici poterat de ipsa secunda causa ut praecise constituta sua naturali virtute agendi . . . tum quia jam damus quamdam causam secundam quae non requirit alium concursum . . . tum quia . . . an non potuit Deus dare creaturae virtutem . . . ita perfectam ut haberet ex se totam illam efficacitatem? (Ibid., n. 16) . . . ergo ex hac parte nulla est major repugnantia in communicanda hac virtute permanente quam sit in virtute fluente (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

other reasons; in those cases it is achieved by other second causes (as an odoriferous body emits its odor only when heated). The proponents of this "exciting quality" cannot explain its nature, or agree on its subject.[144]

In general, Suarez summarizes, all arguments for a previous perfecting quality are to be rejected. The argument that the second cause always acts as an instrument of the first cause and therefore needs a transient motion or completing of its power does not prove. In the first place, it is not universally true that instruments need this motion. Heat can be an instrument of fire or even of the soul in producing a new substantial form; yet it does not act in virtue of pre-motion received into it as is *per se* evident. The same is true of an image in the imagination acting as an instrument in the production of an intelligible species. The usual instances cited as exemplifying the necessity of pre-motion in instruments are artistic instruments. But in them a special motion is required not precisely because they are instruments but because of changes of place required for their operation—but that is not true of all instruments. Secondly, this argument from instrumental causes does not conclude simply because second causes, properly speaking, are not instrumental but principal causes. They are said to be instrumental with respect to God by a certain comparison and to emphasize their imperfection and dependence on God.[145]

There remains finally the question of predetermination.[146] Here Suarez' purpose is to show: 1) that second causes in general do not need to receive determination from the first cause to act; and 2) that the nature of some causes, as free, does not demand it either.

Second causes in general do not require predetermination.

[144] Haec excitatio a causa prima . . . etiam est sine fundamento adinventa (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[145] Illa generalis propositio de instrumentis assumpta . . . de motu recepto in instrumento, non est in universum vera. . . . Neque argumentum quod in hac re fieri solet de instrumentis artis est efficax . . . quia tota actio horum instrumentorum fit, vel deferenda aliquod corpus per varia loca . . . vel compellendo aliud a suo loco . . . Deinde . . . causae secundae non sunt proprie . . . instrumenta sed causae principales in suo ordine (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[146] *Ibid.*, cap. 7.

Surely secondary natural agents by their very forms or natural properties are determined to one thing, and have no intrinsic indifferences; how could fire, for instance, need something in addition to its nature to determine it to heat things rather than to freeze them? If one objects that some natural agents, the sun, for instance, are capable of many effects and must be determined to this one rather than to that, the answer is that the point under discussion is overlooked in the objection. Such determination as that does not pertain to the subordination of second causes to the first cause. Physically speaking, such determination is always made by the assistance and concurrence of other second causes, efficient or material, with which or about which these "indetermined" second causes act.[147] One can conceive a case (though it does not exist) in which determination through second causes would be impossible. Then either no effect would follow or else God would determine the cause, not because of its subjection to Him, but because of its peculiar need for it pertains to the general providence of the first cause that He assist those second causes which are in need. In such cases the determination could be brought about by some previous reality added to the cause, but it need not necessarily be brought about in that way.[148]

The objection, "second causes need to be determined to produce this individual effect" is of no real weight. The determination to this individual effect comes either from the peculiar dispositions of the subject, the conditions and circumstances surrounding the operation, or from the will of God alone. This latter implies no predetermination imprinted on the second cause, for the determination of divine concursus is sufficient to account for it. The determination to an individual effect, if it is a special reality, must act either by impeding the power to other individual effects, which is incredible, or by adding some-

[147] (Causae naturaliter agentes) . . . ex vi suarum formarum sunt determinatae ad unum . . . ergo non indigent nova forma aut novo impulsu quo determinentur (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[148] Pertinet enim ad generalem providentiam causae primae ut secundis indigentibus subveniat. . . . In eo casu licet non repugnet determinationem fieri per aliquid praevium superadditum causae . . . non tamen est hic modus necessarius (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

thing to the power which efficiently draws the second cause. Applied to free causes this would clearly destroy liberty. If one applies it to natural causes it is a matter of small importance, though it does seem to be an unnecessary multiplication of realities since the same effect can be achieved by limiting simultaneous concursus to this individual.[149]

The nature of some second causes, as free, does not require predetermination either.[150] The usual argument for this predetermination is simple enough: A definite effect cannot proceed from an indifferent and undetermined cause.

But the will, given everything necessary on the part of the object, the intellect, and the will's own power, is indifferent to this or that effect. Therefore, before it definitely elicits an act it must be determined by God.

The determination cannot be from any other second cause, since none has efficiency over the will. If the objection is raised: "This proves that even God can do nothing unless He is first determined by another," the proponents of predetermination answer that God is so perfect He determines Himself without being determined by anything above Him, and that is something which is true only of God. If the created will determines itself in the same way it is not in that respect, subject to God.[151]

Suarez' criticism is that this opinion supposes the indifference of the human will to be passive and negative rather than active and positive. It receives determination prior to its act and so does not determine itself, but is passive; likewise it is indifferent in the sense that it is capable of either determination but actually has neither, and so is negative. Suarez repeats that this position leads to a denial not only of free acts, but even of man's free faculty.[152]

[149] Negamus . . . hanc determinationem fieri a causa prima per aliquam actionem praeviam circa causam secundam, aut ei aliquam rem imprimendo . . . quia sola determinatio divini concursus sufficit ad hanc determinationem . . . aliter igitur potest haec praedeterminatio excogitari per modum additionis et augmenti virtutis activae. . . . Necesse est quod talis determinatio tollat libertatem quoad specificationem. . . . De causis naturalibus si quis ita sentire voluerit parum nostra refert (*Ibid.*, nn. 4-6).

[150] *Ibid.*, cap. 8.

[151] *Ibid.*, nn. 1-2.

[152] Supponunt qui ita argumentantur totam nostrae voluntatis indifferentiam pas-

The Suarezian position is that a faculty, which is positively and actively indifferent, as the master of its act can, of its own intrinsic power, determine itself to its act. The proposition: "An indifferent power cannot of itself produce a determined effect," would be true of a power which is indifferent by reason of some imperfection in itself or of some defect in the conditions necessary for its act, but hardly of a power indifferent from its very perfection.[153]

Self-determination is not repugnant, for to be indifferent in first act and determined through second acts is not repugnant as is clear from the examples of God's will. One act does not necessarily involve the negation of the other as it is not repugnant for primary matter to indifferent in passive potency and to be actuated or determined through one formal act. Neither does it involve any infinite power, since this active power, the will, can be participated from a superior power and in dependence on it. God's infinitely perfect liberty is distinguished from ours in this: He is essentially free and no potentiality, composition, or imperfection is involved in the use of His freedom.[154]

Arguing positively, Suarez says that determination of the will not only need not be, but cannot be, from any agent extrinsic to the will, or from any reality previous to the act of the will, for the determination of the will is formally and physically the very act of will. What else can it be? Certainly it is something intrinsic to a man. It cannot be in the intel-

sivam esse et non activam et negativam potius quam positivam . . . (In hac positione) indifferentia tantum passiva est ad recipiendum nimirum hanc vel illam determinationem. . . . Non erit indifferens positive per actum eminentem seu virtualem . . . inde aperte sequitur voluntatem non esse liberam (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

[153] Potentiae quae de se est positive et active indifferens tanquam dominum sui actus potens est sua intrinseca virtute cum generali concursu primae causae sese ad suum actum determinare (*Ibid.*, n. 5) . . . illa propositio: Potentia indifferens non potest ex se producere determinatum effectum . . . esset vera in causa indifferente ex imperfectione virtutis, vel ex defectu conditionis requisitae ad agendum, non autem in causa indifferente ex perfecta et eminente virtute (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[154] Hujusmodi facultas et modus agendi nec in sese involvit repugnantiam . . . quia unus actus non includit necessario negationem alterius sicut materiam primam. . . . Nec est cur requirat infinitam perfectionem aut virtutem . . . quia potest esse participata a superiori virtute (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

lect, for that faculty can move the will only objectively. Surely it is not in the lower faculties. If the determination is anything at all, then, it must be in the will. Since it is there it can only be the act for it cannot be a habit or something in the order of first act, since the will of itself is sufficiently constituted in first act. There is no medium between first and second act, so the determination can be only second act. Again, a thing is voluntary only if it: a) is the voluntary act; or b) supposes a voluntary act. Now determination of the will does not suppose a prior voluntary act; if it is to be voluntary at all it must be the act of the will.[155]

Suarez explains that the will does not act because it is determined from outside (*aliunde*) but rather it wills because of this that it determines itself, but in such wise that the causal note indicates the formal not the efficient cause. In the line of efficient causality, for the will to be determined is the same thing as for it to effect its volition or nolition. In the line of formal cause, however, it remains determined because it continues to be affected by this act of will rather than by another. In this sense there is no repugnance in saying that the will is determined because it wills, although it is not determined except by willing, because there is here implied the formal cause, not the efficient. Most properly, however and without any equivocation the will is said to determine itself by willing, and to will by determining itself. From this it is clear how the will can be both indifferent and determined. It is not determined in first act, but can be formally determined by second act, and when it is determined in second act it cannot, as to that state be at the same time indifferent, though it retains its indifferent faculty.[156] Physical predetermination destroys indifference both

[155] Voluntatem . . . determinari nihil aliud est quam velle; ergo non potest esse ab extrinseco agente sine ipsa nec potest esse aliquid praevium ad ipsum velle, quod sit causa efficiens ejus. . . . Si ergo determinatio est aliquid oportet ut sit in ipsa voluntate . . . talis determinatio nihil aliud esse potest praeter actum secundum; neque cogitari potest medium inter actum primum et secundum (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

[156] Quo fit ut . . . non ideo voluntas velit quia aliunde est determinata sed potius ideo velit quia seipsam determinat ita tamen ut in ea causali nota indicetur causa formalis, non efficiens . . . in hoc sensu non est repugnantia in illa locutione:

of specification and of exercise, and therefore is incompatible with liberty.

Suarez considers first the freedom of specification.[157] The use of liberty implies a two-fold power: 1) the power to omit the act while retaining the power to place it; and 2) the power to place the act while retaining the power to omit it. Now, then, if this predetermination is necessary for operation the will cannot move without that influx. So long, therefore, as God does not give the determination to the will, it is not in the power of the will to operate. The motion and determination are free with regard to God, but not with regard to man. Moral responsibility for not acting is thus impossible when man receives no determination, or when man is determined to volition the fact that he does not choose the object cannot be attributed to him.[158]

Some escape this conclusion by arguing that without this determination the will can act, though it never shall. The answer of Suarez is that, on the supposition, the will is in fact insufficient to determine itself; therefore it cannot in any true sense act without this determining factor. If the determination is the ultimate complement of the will, the will's power without it is remote and physical, not proximate and moral, such as liberty requires.[159]

Others try to defend determination by saying that it is in man's power to get this determination. Hence if he lacks it, the lack is imputable to him. Now if it is in man's power it is subject to his will; his will therefore can either do something

Voluntas determinatur quia vult quamvis non determinetur nisi volendo . . . sine ulla aequivocatione dicitur voluntas sese determinare volendo et velle, sese determinando (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[157] *Ibid.*, cap. 9.

[158] Si determinatio illa est . . . necessaria . . . ergo sine illo influxu non potest moveri voluntas . . . ergo nunquam ipsum velle est in potestate ejus nisi prius Deus . . . determinationem tribuat quod solum est in ejus potestate et arbitrio. Unde ipsi Deo libera esse poterit hominis motio et determinatio, non autem ipsi homini (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Interrogo an in eo casu sit illi voluntati moraliter tribuendum quod nihil voluerit. Certe id affirmari non potest (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[159] Si non habetur nec haberi potest omnis potestas quae voluntati attribuitur erit mere physica et remota non autem proxima et moralis quae ad usum liberum et culpam necessaria est (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

to get it, or it can do nothing. If the latter, it is not in his power at all. If he can do something to get it how shall we account for the act done to get it? Either he needs predetermination to that act or he does not. If he does, we go tripping along *ad infinitum*, or else come at last to some determination which is altogether from outside a man, and how the act proceeding under it could be in the will's power is inconceivable. If a man does not need predetermination to the act by which he wins predetermination, then the will does not (simply speaking) require predetermination by reasons of its subordination to the first cause. To say the will does nothing positive but merely allows itself to be determined settles nothing. By allowing itself, it can be doing nothing, for to do anything it already needs (on the supposition) determination; or if the " allowing " is something the will must already be determined to it and that previous determination is in God's hands alone.[160]

In summary, if determination is in God's power alone the will is passive as regards it; and a passive power cannot be a free power. To introduce some kind of disposition and say that through its mediation the will has power over its determination does not help for two reasons: 1) we must account for that disposition; and 2) it is ridiculous to require a disposition in man for all the natural concursus of the first cause and for all acts of will, even trifling ones.[161]

Suarez shows, secondly, that physical determination militates against freedom of exercise,[162] because determination implies a

[160] Quomodo erit in potestate illius hominis habere illam determinationem a Deo . . . ? Aut enim aliquid potest facere voluntas quo obtineat a Deo illam determinationem, vel nihil agere potest. Si nihil facere potest, ergo non est in potestate ejus habere illam. . . . Si autem aliquid potest libere facere, . . . si requiritur determinatio (ad illud volendum) vel proceditur in infinitum vel sistendum erit in aliqua determinatione quae omnino ab extrinseco veniat. . . . Si non requiritur illa determinatio ad primum opus . . . concluditur voluntatem indifferentem et nondum determinatam ab extrinseco agente posse se libere determinare . . . (et) illam determinationm non esse per se necessariam ad operandum (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[161] Voluntas autem dicitur concurrere passive . . . potentia passiva non satis est ad liberam potestatem. Ridiculum est . . . ad actus omnes volendi etiam circa res minimas dispositionem ex parte hominis requirere, praeter ipsammet cooperationem liberam (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[162] *Ibid.*, capp. 10-11.

form impressed on the will which with the will completes the proximate principle of the voluntary act. It is: a) determination because it not only inclines to one thing as to specification but also altogether determines the will to the exercise of the act (otherwise it is not real determination but only a modification, which, like charity, or any other habit, inclines us to one thing); b) *physical* determination because: i) it is a physical cause of the act which is physically in the will; ii) to distinguish it from moral determination, such as persuasion. Now such physical determination means the act cannot be free as to exercise (nor as to specification either, as a consequence) for the will is not free with respect to this determining reality. It is not free to receive it (for the will is passive as to receiving it) nor, having received it, to use it or not, for given it, the will can no longer not-operate. Always one part of the power required for indifference and liberty is impeded; hence, freedom is taken away. The common answers to this difficulty (that the will can not-operate in the divided sense, or that it is of itself indifferent even though with this determination it cannot not-operate, and such indifference is enough to preserve freedom) are inadequate. The first answer diverts consideration from the use of liberty, which is the question, to the free faculty. Even there, those who use this answer are mistaken, for in fact determination such as they suppose destroys even the freedom of the power. The second answer implies liberty is a passive power, which is simply to be denied.[163]

Suarez interprets the council of Trent [164] itself to teach that

[163] Determinatio physica dicitur esse forma quaedam voluntati impressa quae cum illa complet principium proximum actus . . . dicitur . . . esse determinatio voluntatis . . . quia omnino determinat illam ad exercitium actus (*Ibid.*, cap. 10, n. 1). Ex tali determinatione sequitur actum non esse liberum quoad exercitium . . . neque . . . quoad specificationem . . . quia respectu illius determinationis voluntas nostra non est libera; nam ad illam recipiendam . . . mere passive se habet; post receptam autem illam necessario prodit in opus . . . semper ergo habet (voluntas) impeditam alteram partem illius potestatis . . . et ita tollitur usus libertatis (*Ibid.*, n. 2). Prima enim responsio ab usu ad facultatem liberam divertit . . . Secunda . . . solum ponit libertatem in passiva indifferentia quod est illam funditus destruere (*Ibid.*, nn. 3-4).

[164] Suarez quotes Trent, sess. 6, cap. 5 (Denz., n. 797) and can. 4 (Denz., n. 814).

God does not predetermine us, for the Council says of God's motion that the will can cast it off (*quippe qui illam abijicere potest*) and again that the will can dissent from that motion (*posse dissentire si velit*). The Council is certainly speaking of prevenient motion and in the composed sense, for no one can cast off what he does not have or which is not offered to him. According to the Council, then, it is required for liberty that in the composed sense the will under God's motion can not-act.[165]

Some authors, faced with this argument, Suarez continues, concede that given God's motion the will can resist and not-operate, but infallibly it never uses this power, and this is sufficient, they say, for efficacious motion from God and also for safeguarding freedom in man. This is in open contradiction to their original propositions, such as "given God's motion the will can not not-operate," and "given motion it is necessary to operate," propositions which they confirm by appealing to St. Thomas' dictum: "If God moves the will to something it is impossible for the will not to act."[166] St. Thomas simply cannot be understood to be speaking of the previous motion in the place cited; he is speaking of God's cooperative motion which, as we have seen, includes the very act. Since that motion includes act, it is clearly impossible that under it there be no acts.[167]

[165] Est certum Concilium loqui de motione Dei praeveniente nostram voluntatem . . . certum est loqui Concilium in sensu composito . . . quia nemo dicitur abjicere nisi id quod habet aut quod ei offertur . . . juxta Concilii doctrinam . . . etiam in sensu composito necesse est ut maneat in voluntate potestas resistendi (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[166] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3um. Suarez both here (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 6) and in the Metaphysics (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. 19, sect. 4, n. 1) quotes St. Thomas as saying this though the words he quotes as St. Thomas' differ slightly in the two places cited. The Leonine and Faucher editions of St. Thomas read: "Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid incompossibile est huic positioni quod voluntas ad illud non movetur. Non tamen est impossible simpliciter. Unde non sequitur quod a Deo ex necessitate moveatur." The Piana edition reads: "Si Deus movet voluntatem ad aliquid impossibile est poni quod voluntas ad illud non moveatur." The *Codex Vaticanus* 733 reads similarly: "impossible eat hoc poni quod, etc." The Vienna edition of 1478 and several codices (*Palatinus* 353; *Vaticanus* 732; *Vaticanus* 736) read not "incompossibile" but "impossibile." However, every edition we have seen adds "non tamen est impossibile simpliciter."

[167] Locutus est (S. Thomas) de motione cooperativa quae, facta compositione,

If God efficiently moves us, we cannot resist;[168] therefore, we are not free. Again, we can ask whether or not this predetermination is subject to man's will in its use. If it is, it is not determination but inclination to act, something in the order of first act which leaves the will indifferent. If its use is not subject to the will, then second act flows by natural necessity; the will cannot not-operate.[169]

Suppose that the created will by its very nature requires this determination, then creatures have no free acts, and moreover lack any free faculty. For the will without the extrinsic determination is not proximately apt to choose anything. Therefore the faculty does not by its nature demand the free use of operating (for it cannot of its very nature demand two repugnant conditions for operation). Therefore it is not free, for free powers do demand free use. Moreover, the will can only be passively indifferent if it needs determination; and a passively indifferent thing (like the hand) is not free.[170]

Suarez begins then to expose his own opinion on how God's concursus does, in fact, fall on our free acts, and in exposing how, without resorting to predetermination, our wills' subordination to God can sufficiently and exactly be preserved he gives, he says, the best possible argument against determination.[171]

Now it is clear that whatever God operates He operates through His will, for God's omnipotence is an attribute rationally distinct from His will. His omnipotence operates nothing unless the intellect precedes as directing, and the will as applying. Now God can influence man's free act in two ways:

includit actum ipsum. At praedicti auctores illum interpretantur de hac motione praevia (*Opus., Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 6).

[168] *Ibid.*, n. 7. Suarez cites Romans ix: "Voluntas ejus quis resistet?" and *Esther* xiii: "Non est qui possit tuae resistere voluntati."

[169] Si ergo primum (i. e. si illa determinatio subditur usui libero voluntatis) . . . illam non esse determinationem ad opus . . . sed esse ad modum cujusdam habitus . . . qui de se ad unum actum inclinat (*Ibid.*, n. 8). Si . . . eligatur . . . hanc praemotionem esse inseparabilem ab actu secundo ex natura sua . . . dicendum est actum secundum naturali necessitate ab illa manare (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[170] Dicunt hanc determinationem esse necessariam ex intrinseca natura creatae voluntatis; ergo sine illa non est voluntas apta proxime ad aliquid volendum . . . ergo neque ex natura sua est facultas libera (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[171] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

1) by willing absolutely that such an act be placed by such a will at this time, and in this way. Such an act of will antecedes God's foreknowledge of the effect as future; it determines the will; 2) God can will by an act which is conditional, not absolute, that this act be placed by the created will. The condition is " if the created will determines itself to eliciting this act "; God, under the same condition wills to concur in the act, expecting, so to speak, the influx of the created will, for God wishes to accommodate Himself to us in such a way as not to injure our free will. In virtue of this divine will, God's omnipotence remains applied (*applicata*) to flow into the act of the human will, without any new act on God's part. This latter mode is the one Suarez accepts.[172]

His arguments for it are: 1) it involves no repugnance. We see from experience that the sun, for instance, concurs in a general way with each of the secondary causes which depend on it; 2) it is most apt. The power of the will is above that of all other natural agents, and is not bound to any one thing. It is necessary that God's concursus have the same eminent, universal, and abstract character. Determination, says Suarez, is too restrictive for the will. Any concursus other than this would be repugnant to man's freedom, for it would imply that man would be indifferent in first act and yet determined in first act, a clear contradiction since determination and non-indifference are the same thing.[173]

Appealing to Scripture in support of this kind of premotion,

[172] *Ibid.*, nn. 4-6. Duobus modis posse intelligi divinam voluntatem velle influere in actum liberum humanae voluntatis: primus . . . simpliciter et absolute volendo ut talis actus a tali voluntate fiat . . . et hunc modum hactenus impugnavimus. Alius . . . est Deum non absolute, sed quasi sub conditione velle ut hic actus fiat a voluntate creata . . . et sub eadem conditione velle influere . . . expectando . . . influxum creatae voluntatis. . . . Ex vi autem hujus divinae voluntatis, ita manat applicata divina omnipotentia ad influendum in actum humanae voluntatis, ut hac influente. . . . Deus etiam influat (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[173] Cum potestas liberae voluntatis sit veluti superior et eminentior caeteris naturalibus agentibus . . . necesse est ut hic concursus cum eadem eminentia, abstractione et universalitate (ut sic dicam) tribuatur (*Ibid.*, n. 7). In hoc involvitur contradictio quod . . . eadem potentia . . . agat determinata et non determinata . . . indifferens et determinata ab alio in actu primo, i. e. non indifferens nam haec duo idem sunt (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

Suarez sees in such passages as: " God left man in the hand of his own counsel," [174] an indication that after God's concursus there is yet room for man's deliberation, which would not be true if concursus determined man. Scripture, it is to be noted, is speaking of a proximate and moral power, and of God's indifferent concursus proposed and offered. Support of his position is common among Scholastics, Suarez thinks. St. Thomas does not expressly teach it, but on the other hand " he nowhere affirms that God of Himself and by His efficacious will alone determined to one act the concursus to be given the human will by determining the will to it." [175] The Angelic Doctor says without distinction that the knowledge of future things in their causes is conjectural.[176] Were he of the opinion that God efficaciously predetermines our wills he would have held that God knows our future acts in the predetermination of His will. As it is, he derives the certitude of God's knowledge of such things from their presence to eternity. Again he teaches that God's general concursus does not consist in determining the will to one thing, but that God of Himself confers concursus which is indifferent and ordered to the general object of the will, namely good. " Without this universal motion man can will nothing," which clearly implies that God's motion as God's is indifferent; with this general concursus the will is determined through reason and liberty.[177] St. Thomas says explicitly that by grace God sometimes moves certain people, but he does not say that He ever predetermines anyone. St. Thomas clearly teaches that God so moves our wills that He " does not deter-

[174] *Eccles.* xv. *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 9.

[175] Divus ergo Thomas . . . nullibi affirmat Deum ex se et sola sua efficaci voluntate ad unum actum determinasse eum concursum quem erat exhibiturus voluntati humanae praedeterminando eam ad illum (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[176] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 14, a. 13. Actually St. Thomas says there that God knows contingent things as they are *actual*, i. e. He must know them in some other way than they are in their secondary causes, as contingent.

[177] I-II, q. 9, a. 6, ad 3um. The universal motion spoken of by St. Thomas is given to the will as a nature, to move it as a nature. To subsequent free motions man determines himself through reason as St. Thomas points out. The fact that the will needs a universal motion with regard to a universal object does not militate against the fact that the *liberum arbitrium* needs a determining motion for God provides for each thing according to its nature.

mine them necessarily to one thing." [178] Suarez cites other places in St. Thomas,[179] but the three mentioned above contain his strongest points.[180]

The objections against such concursus Suarez reduces to four capital difficulties: [181] 1) It supposes that God applies His will and power to concurring with the creature in a confused, general way, which is imperfect; 2) it implies that God influences the created act in a blind, ignorant way unless He concurs before hand and so knows what the creature will do under concursus; 3) the creature determines God to operating this act rather than that, which is absurd for the higher determines the lower and not vice versa; 4) God would cooperate as a natural agent according to the need of the second cause, and by a transient action which passes into the second cause, and all of that would indicate very imperfect causation.[182]

The general answer to these objections is simple; God knows everything which second causes can do, with this or that concursus. Even more wonderfully, God foreknows not only what they can do but even what they would do if they were procreated with this particular help or occasion to do such or such a thing. This mediate knowledge is very properly attributed to God, as the Fathers and the Holy Scriptures testify. The fact that it is difficult for us to understand is no valid argument against it. Given this knowledge in God, then, His will destines things to their ends and selects for them means suitable to their natures.[183]

From this Suarez proceeds to answer the objections in par-

[178] This is the very crux of the matter. God moves us, not violently; God determines us, without necessitating us.

[179] For example he appeals to *Q. D. de Verit.*, q. 5, a. 5, ad 1um; *Q. D. de Pot.*, q. 3, a. 7, ad 13um; *III Cont. Gent.*, c. 73, etc.

[180] *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, nn. 10-11.

[181] *Ibid.*, cap. 15.

[182] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

[183] (Divina cognitio) repraesentat quidquid per causas secundas, et voluntates creatas cum hoc vel illo auxilio et concursu fieri potest. . . . Sed quod mirabilius est non solum cognoscit Deus anteriore scientia . . . quid omnes voluntates possint facere sed etiam quid facient si cum hoc auxilio vel occasione ad hoc vel illud volendum procreentur. . . . Hac ergo supposita scientia in Deo accedit divina voluntas quae res singulares in suos fines destinat, et media eligit (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

ticular. To the first, there is no confusion in the way in which God applies His will and power to concurring, for God foreseeing the results of His concursus offers His help for this individual act. This is not predetermination, for God, by a similar act, offers the will concursus sufficient for the other acts of which the will is capable. Nor is the effective act of giving concursus absolute; an implicit condition is always included "if the will consents." [184]

To the second objection he answers that God is not ignorant of the result of His concursus before giving it, for by mediate science He already knows the will's act.[185] To the third objection he notes the determination of the first cause can be understood in a two-fold way: a) the application by which God orders His omnipotence to helping the second cause, and concurring with it; b) the determined created action proceeding from the divine will and power, cooperating with the human will.

The first of these is from the free determination of the Divine will; the human will is not its cause. However, some aspects of this determination can be accounted for by the objects or the human will, since by its very nature it demands this mode of operating.[186] The second, the determined action, receives its determination from the created cause; not that this creature is the sole effective cause of its determination, but in that cause is found the proper and proximate reason for the determination. It is the proximate cause which determines the action to this species, this time, etc. All this argues not to imperfection in God, but to very great perfection, since He has

[184] Deus enim distinctissime praevidens omnes hos actus . . . distincte ac definitive vult ad hunc vel illum, et sic de caeteris, praebere concursum seu offerre quantum in ipso est . . . tamen quia Deus etiam praevidet quem actum illa voluntas effectum sit . . . Deus . . . concursum offerat, ideo Deus determinate . . . vult cum illa concurrere ad talem actum . . . nec illum absolute velit sed cum dependentia ejusdem actus a proxima causa . . . et includendo in se implicitam conditionem: Si ipsa consentire voluerit (*Ibid.*, n. 3).

[185] *Ibid.*, n. 4.

[186] Ex parte autem objecti vel humanae voluntatis reddi potest nonnulla ratio hujus determinationis nimirum quia ex natura sua postulat hunc operandi modum (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

devised such a way of safeguarding created free causality. In the instant in which God, as first cause, actually influences, He is understood to have previously (by a priority of nature) a determination by which His will is ready to concur in this or that act. His will is indifferent only by a universal and absolute indifference, and determined (conditionally) to cooperating with the created cause, so that if the latter acts, God necessarily acts by a necessity of supposition. Now the created will in the instant in question is altogether undetermined. There is absolutely no necessity about its influxus; the act begins solely from its indifference of liberty, when and as its wills. For this reason, the determinateness is assigned to it as to its proximate root, though divine concursus is clearly necessary that liberty effectively cause the determinateness. According to causality, neither first nor second cause has any priority of nature, for neither acts on the other, but each acts on the effect; neither applies the other or causes it to do something by reason of this concursus. The first cause can be called prior in causing, inasmuch as it gives and conserves the being of the second cause, effects the conditions or motions preceding the action, concurs in a more outstanding way, and so forth.[187]

To the fourth objection Suarez teaches that God does act necessarily, but the absolute necessity that His power act is based on a supposition; viz., the previous determination of His will to act. To say God's action is transient is of no great importance; the cardinal point is that God causes that act immediately and hence the created action is an act of God, for action is a thing as it proceeds from its cause, or the dependence

[187] Verissimum est actionem illam accipere determinationem suam a proxima causa seu voluntate humana . . . quod humana voluntas sit propria et proxima ratio illius determinationis. . . . Proxima vero causa . . . suo influxu determinat actionem ad hanc speciem, ad hoc tempus, etc. (*Ibid.*, n. 5). Deus . . . solum est indifferens universali quadam et absoluta indifferentia; determinatus tamen quasi sub conditione ad cooperandum creaturae . . . creata voluntas in illo priori naturae est omnino indeterminata et nullam habet necessitatem influendi . . . et ideo in eam tanquam in radicem proximam haec determinatio revocatur (*Ibid.*, n. 6). Si prioritas naturae sumatur proprie secundum causalitatem . . . neutra harum causarum priusquam alia influit; quia neutra influit in aliam . . . et neutra applicat aliam aut facit illam facere ex vi hujus concursus (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

of an effect on the agent, and the created action has this respect to God. That God have transient action in His effects argues no imperfection in Him but places in creatures perfection presupposed in God.[188]

There remains one really important difficulty.[189] From Suarez' thesis it seems to follow that God does not have a perfect providence with regard to our free acts, that He does not predefine them by an absolute and efficacious decree of His will before He sees that those acts should be placed by our will with His concursus. The objection seems very strong, for if one answers by saying that God does, by His absolute decree, predefine our acts, it follows then He efficaciously moves us to the defined acts and this seems to be the very same thing as the predetermination Suarez has argued against at such length.[190] Here then is a dilemma.

The answer requires some preliminary discussion. By predefinition Suarez means " a certain eternal decree of the divine will by which it absolutely establishes that something be done in time." This decree " precedes foreknowledge of the future act " and by it God absolutely decrees the act, and therefore ordains the means through which it shall be brought about.[191]

This predefinition is not contrary to our liberty. It is incredible and unworthy of God that God could not predefine our acts. To say that He cannot is to limit His power too greatly and to suppose that all free acts are outside His efficacious intention. We can distinguish a two-fold physical predefinition: internal, which God establishes in His own will, not that through it He immediately affects or predetermines the second cause, but only that in Himself He has a defined and absolute intention of some end and by reason of it He applies apt means so that the thing is infallibly brought about as it has been predefined. The second is external, which reaches out to the external effect with such efficiency that it physically determines

[188] *Ibid.*, n. 8. [189] *Ibid.*, cap. 16. [190] *Ibid.*, n. 1.

[191] Quoddam aeternum decretum divinae voluntatis quo absolute statuit ut aliquid fiat in tempore . . . proprie dicit decretum antecedens praescientiam futuri actus, quo Deus absolute decrevit ut (homo) haberet illum (actum) et ideo ordinavit media per quae fieret (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

the human will to its act. The first of these we shall simply call predefinition; the second predetermination.[192]

This predefinition is reasonable, Suarez points out, since, supposing God's determination that such and such an effect take place, it is certainly to be brought about by God's power in that one way which infallibly insures the result. God will do neither more nor less than is necessary. Since a predetermination of the human will would take away the very freedom through which, on the supposition, God has determined that the effect should proceed, He does not give so efficacious a motion as that. Neither does He just preordain a series of causes with which He sees the decreed act will be placed by us. With regard to our good acts, He can also preordain the very act.

This predefinition does not destroy freedom of exercise, as predetermination does. The latter is certainly unnecessary since a moral motion plus science by which God sees that, given these circumstances, the rational appetite will consent to this act is sufficient. God predetermines us by an act which is like an intention and of itself produces nothing external, since God's will operates through His omnipotence and not, immediately, of itself. Since it neither imperates nor uses the created will it brings no physical predetermination to bear on it. The fact that the means to the end are somehow contained in God's intention of the end argues nothing against the case; predefining the act through such a means does not predetermine but moves the will in a fitting and efficacious way, which God sees is so accommodated to this will that it will infallibly be attracted to consenting.[193]

[192] In hac divina praedefinitione . . . distinguere nos possumus quamdam esse praedifinitionem internam quam Deus in sua voluntate statuit, non ut per eam immutet causam secundam immediate, aut illam determinet . . . sed solum ut in sese definitam et absolutam intentionem habeat alicujus finis . . . aliam vero esse aut cogitare posse praedefinitionem . . . quae cum tali tantaque efficacia . . . exeat ut voluntatem humanam physice determinet. . . . Priorem vocabimus praefinitionem seu praedefinitionem; posteriorem vere, praedeterminationem (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[193] Ex vi illius decreti solum (Deus) applicat suam potentiam ut illo modo efficiat . . . quia ad intentum finem obtinendum infallibiliter sufficiat. . . . Contingere potest ut . . . praedeterminatio physica repugnet cum illo decreto, ut in

The differences between such predefinition and Thomists' predetermination are many: 1) predefinition is also a will of this means which means move the free will contingently, though infallibly from God's foreknowledge; predetermination requires no means other than the efficacy of the very determination which, determining the will, overpowers it;[194] 2) predefinition defines the act with regard to the mode in which the second cause operates, so that its object is the act as it is to be done by determination of the free will itself; the object of predetermination is not only the act but also its mode, i. e., the physical determination through God's efficacious motion; 3) predefinition abstractly considered (prescinding from the application of the accommodated means) is neither immediately active *ad extra* nor applicative of divine power (though the predefinition in reality is the same as the determining of the means, the mind can make the precision); while predetermination is of itself active; 4) by predefinition God's ordinary concursus is not changed, but the will so governed that it infallibly uses it; predetermination so changes concursus that the latter uses the will rather than the other way round.[195]

That predefinition, on the other hand, leaves us free as to exercise is clear; it merely applies a means by which the will is infallibly attracted, though it can still not-operate. Of course the human consent is certain from divine foreknowledge. The connection between predefinition and the execution of act is founded precisely in this divine foreknowledge plus providence, attracting by moral motion, and not in the physical efficacy of a decree determining the will to one thing. Suarez notes that:

actibus liberis praefinitis contingit; et tum . . . ex tali praedefinitione . . . repugnabit sequi; quia impediret libertatem, quae simul cum actu praedefinita erat. . . . Sufficit alia motio (i. e. alia a praemotione) moralis cum communi concursu adjuncta conditionata scientia. . . . Praedefinitio non imperat illi (voluntati humanae) nec utitur illa (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-9).

[194] (Praedeterminatio) non requirit aliud medium quam suam efficacitatem, qua secum rapit voluntatem, determinando illam (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

[195] Praedefinitio abstracte concepta . . . non sit immediate activa ad extra nec applicativa potentiae divinae donec intelligatur determinata ad tale medium . . . praedeterminans voluntas per seipsam est activa vel applicativa potentiae divinae ad vim . . . ex vi (praedeterminationis) necesse est variari concursum Dei talemque praestari ut ille potius voluntate utatur quam voluntas illo (*Ibid.*, n. 10).

1) predefinition is not, simply speaking, antecedent to the use of liberty; it supposes preknowledge of it as a future conditional thing and falls on that free consent as it is to be induced through the means which, as God foresees, will infallibly bring it about; and 2) given it the will can, simply speaking, not-act. This power is not a power to resist God's will, for: a) God's will does not immediately move the human will; b) He sees the act to be placed in such a way that it can be impeded. What would be repugnant is not that God foreknow both that I shall do this and also my power not to do it, but that this be predefined and not take place. There is no potency for the latter. This repugnance, Suarez adds, comes not only from the causality and power of the supposition but from this that the foreknowledge supposes this future use of freedom, granted the conditions. The necessity, then, is only that when a thing is, it be.[196]

Predefinition leaves freedom of specification unharmed. Many of our acts are not predefined, yet we have ordinary concursus for them. The latter does not suppose the definition, nor is it given through predefinition, because such definition is not required by reason of the subordination of second to first cause.[197]

2. *God's Causality with Regard to Free Acts.* We consider now the various kinds of human acts; they can be either natural or supernatural. Natural acts, again, are either good or bad, a distinction which has no place with regard to supernatural actions since all evil voluntary actions can be placed by the natural power of the will. We shall now consider natural acts and evil acts, then good acts.[198]

[196] Praedefinitio . . . applicat medium quo ita moveatur liberum arbitrium ut revera possit non operari . . . quamvis ex divina praescientia certus sit et infallibilis consensus liberi arbitrii . . . in priori praedefinitione fundatur connexio (cum actu) et necessaria consecutio in divina praescientia, adjuncta providentia, morali modo attrahente . . . praedefinitio haec non est simpliciter antecedens usum libertatis, quia supponit praescientia ejus . . . sed supponens aliquo modo usum libertatis, cui sese accomodat (*Ibid.*, nn. 11-13).

[197] Esse plures actus humanos ad quos Deus, . . . concurrit, etsi eos non praedefiniat. . . . Concursus generalis non datur per hanc praedefinitionem neque ad illum est necessaria (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[198] *Ibid.*, Liber II, Introductio.

It is certain in the first place that God does predetermine the will, or in any way incline it to this formal element of sin. Suarez thinks it *de fide*, certain that God does not excite us, or move us by moral motion to morally bad acts. St. James implies this.[199] Again, the Council of Trent defined: "If anyone shall say that it is not in the power of man to make his ways evil, but that God operates evil works just as He does good works, not only permissively but also properly and *per se*; so that Judas' betrayal is no less His work than the calling of Paul, let him be anathema."[200] The Council speaks of "evil works" making no fine distinction between the work formally and materially regarded. It outlaws the opinion that God operates such things and does not say, for example, "save in a material way." To argue that God causes sins materially but not formally is therefore unjustified. He would not only give His concursus, He would even determine it to this act; what more could be required for Him to be its cause? To say God is the cause of material sin and not of the formal sin is meaningless. If God so determines man to act in these circumstances it is impossible that the act be anything but a sin, as, for example, to determine Judas to betray Christ with his knowledge of, and attitude to, Christ, and his dispositions, would have been precisely to determine him to sin.[201]

It is even true that God never moves our wills by this moral motion (exaltations, persuasions) to any act, even though it be indifferent or good in itself, with the positive intention that man take from it the occasion of doing evil, that is, of eliciting another act which man could elicit only evilly. While this is

[199] "For God is not a tempter of evils and he tempteth no man" (*James*, i, 13). Cfr. *Opus. Primum*, Liber II, cap. 2, nn. 5-6.

[200] Sess. 6, cap. 6 (Denz., n. 816).

[201] Neque hic (in verbis Concilii) locus relinquitur distinctioni de materiali et formali. . . . Imo cum posito materiali necessario consequatur formale . . . nunquam hoc est in potestate libera voluntatis (*Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 22). (In suppositione praedeterminationis) Deus est directe et per se causa illius malae voluntatis . . . ex intentione sua praedeterminante influxum suum ad talem volitionem . . . quid ergo amplius requiri potest ut vere ac proprie dicatur causa illius peccati (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Quid enim est Deum esse causam materialis peccati et non formalis? (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

not so expressly of faith as the first proposition, it seems sufficiently certain that the contrary is erroneous. Such an intention is intrinsically evil and therefore is repugnant to the divine goodness. Again, if God could directly intend an evil and He could immediately move us (morally) to it for that would be no worse than intending evil. Now we cannot conceive God in His goodness soliciting us to sin, therefore neither does He intend our sins.[202]

God does not move us morally to sin; Suarez goes further and says that even predefinition to evil acts is repugnant. He argues from Scripture, for example, "*Non Deus volens iniquitatem tu es.*" [203] The Second Council of Orange declares: "Not only do we not believe that some are predestined to evil by the divine power but also, if there are those who wish to believe so great an evil, we, with all detestation, call them anathema." [204] Since predestination and predefinition differ only in name, the teaching of the Church is clear.[205] He also argues from reason: it is evident that God cannot intend evil.[206] When Scripture seems to speak of God exciting men to particular sins it must be understood as either a negation of concursus or as an excitation to sins through a positive, good operation which will be the occasion of ruin, which ruin God foresees and permits, though He does not intend it.[207]

Even more certainly, Suarez concludes, predetermination to sin by God is impossible. What God can do in using evil wills is to have presented to them some object so that the will, of itself actually determined to evil, tends to this object. Even this, however, is regularly done, Suarez thinks, not by God immediately but through the devils whom God orders to apply certain objects rather than others. This, of course, is to order a lesser evil, for it limits the diabolic powers. Even as to sin which is punishment for a previous sin God gives only permission. The reason is that while punishment is good, evil cannot be done that good may come of it; God is not even a true cause

[202] *Ibid.*, cap. 8, nn. 1-2.
[203] Psalm V.
[204] III de Praedestinatione (Denz. # 200).
[205] *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, cap. 4, nn. 1-3.
[206] *Ibid.*, nn. 9-12.
[207] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

of the hardening of sinners, certainly not through any positive action and direct intention of this effect. This hardening is sinful for it is an inhering in evil, a voluntary impenitence and resistance to God's call. Such things are attributable to God permissively only. He hardens hearts, blinds minds, and deserts men only insofar as He, as punishment for previous sins, does not give the grace by which these things could be avoided. The occasions by which such conditions are brought about God permits or causes not as they are occasions of evil, but as good things from which God foresees evil will result; but that event is due only to human malice.[208]

Yet God has providence of evil acts in particular. This does not mean that God provides that sins be, in the sense that He decrees, intends, or procures them. Yet sins fall under divine providence, and providence is concerned about them in some way. God gives the necessary concursus, not that they be but that they can be, in order that freedom be safeguarded in all respects. Knowing from all eternity that they will be, God ordains them, providentially, to punishment or to some other effect.[209]

Of our good acts, God is, simply speaking, the author. He not only concurs in them as he does in sins, He intends them *per se*; for their sake He gives to the will a very powerful propensity to that which is right and reasonable. To good acts, all laws and precepts, all rewards and punishments, are ordered. God directly and *per se* influences as to the good; He provides that such acts be, and procures their being placed. That God by an absolute decree, previous (in nature) to His foreknowledge of future things, predefines these good actions is not a matter of faith nor is it a theological conclusion. Theologians

[208] Constat voluntatem hominis non praedeterminari physice ad actum malum a voluntate Dei efficaci (*Ibid.*, cap. 8, n. 5). Potius dicendum est Deum applicare voluntatem ad minus malum quam ad malum . . . atque hoc ipsum (ut ego existimo), regulariter non fit a Deo immediate sed per angelos . . . malos (*Ibid.*, n. 7). Deum obdurare . . . quia in poenam praecedentium delictorum nec dat gratiam qua cor emolliat, nec lumen (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-10).

[209] Verissimum est Deum habere providentiam malorum actuum in particulari. . . . Nam Deus providet auxilium seu concursum necessarium ad actum malum non quidem ut ille fiat sed ut fieri possit (Ibid., n. 10).

hold various opinions on the matter. More probably, Suarez thinks, some good acts are so defined and others are not, depending on God's good pleasure and the things He intends.[210]

The question of the predefinition of indifferent human acts does not really arise, since divine providence is concerned with individual acts. No individual act is ever indifferent; it is good or bad—good from a good end and bad either from a bad end, or no end at all, for an act specifically indifferent, ordered to no end is by that fact sinful. God is, therefore, not its author; He neither predefines it nor excites to it. He can however, move us to indifferent acts for a good end, and we can place the act and never intend the end. In that case the act is from God, though its indifference or uselessness is not from Him. It does not seem repugnant to Suarez that God could move us to a specifically indifferent act through which He intends an end, yet not move us to will that end. In general, however, he thinks it better to say that God moves us only to good acts; that any acts be indifferent He merely permits and influences through His ordinary concursus.[211]

We come now to the question of supernatural acts and the special help required for them.[212] It is clear that a gratuitous and supernatural aid for such acts is required.[213] This aid (actual grace) admits of many divisions;[214] for Suarez' purpose however, the most important is the distinction between that named sufficient and that named efficacious.[215]

Sufficient grace he describes as that which prescinds from any actual effecting and includes its negation. The efficacious

[210] Horum (actuum bonorum) simpliciter auctor est Deus . . . propter illos dedit voluntati potissimam propensionem naturalem ad id quod honestum est . . . an vero Deus praefiniat absoluto decreto praescientiam futurorum antecedenter ut hi actus boni . . . naturales fiant non est res ad fidem pertinens. . . . (Aliqui dicunt) quosdam praefiniri, quosdam non item. . . . Quem dicendi modum ut probabiliorem eligimus (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[211] Individuo nullus est actus indifferens. . . . Potest autem interdum Deus movere ad talem actum faciendum propter bonum finem et homo suo arbitrio eligere actum et omittere finem a Deo intentum (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[212] *Ibid.*, Liber III.

[213] *Ibid.*, cap. 2.

[214] *Ibid.*, capp. 4-5.

[215] *Ibid.*, cap. 6.

is always sufficient; but a sufficient cause need not be efficient; e. g., if it is sufficient in one line of causality and the necessary cause in some other line is wanting. For us, sufficient aid is that which is enough (*satis*) for effecting (*ad efficiendum*) a supernatural act, but yet does not produce it, not because the aid is insufficient, but because of the will's freedom.[216]

That such sufficient grace is given to men is of faith. God Himself testifies that He has done all that was sufficient for the salvation and conversion of sinners. "What is there that I ought to do more to my vineyard, that I have not done to it?"[217] The Fathers and the Councils of the Church also witness to this.[218]

Just what sufficient grace is, is disputed. Some say it is sufficient so that man can act, but not sufficient to this that man *act*.[219] This is rejected by Suarez who argues that with regard to a sufficient aid, two elements must be distinguished: 1) what is formally given; 2) the term or end of the aid given. What is formally given to man through sufficient grace is the power to act; but its end is the act. Sufficient grace is sufficient for the power (*ad posse*) if the formula is understood of the formal effect, not if understood as the term. Potency is not given for the sake of power, but for the sake of operation. Any sufficient grace is sufficient for operation. As man is commanded to do things and not merely to be able to do them, so the help given him is sufficient that he accomplish them (if he wills to) and not merely that he be able to do so. Any principle that is, simply speaking, sufficient must have all the power necessary for the *act*. If something more is needed where is the sufficiency? This is to be understood, of course, of aid which is approximately sufficient for acts.

[216] Sufficiens gratia praescindit ab actuali effectione ejusque negationem includit . . . quidquid est efficax esse etiam sufficiens; potest vero e converso causa esse sufficiens et non efficax, i. e. actu efficiens . . . erit ergo auxilium sufficiens quod satis est ad efficiendum supernaturalem actum illum tamen non facit, non ex insufficientia auxilii sed ex libertate voluntatis (*Ibid.*, n. 1).

[217] *Isaias* v, 4.

[218] Council of Orange, can. 25 (Denz. nn. 198-200); Trent, sess. 6, c. 5 (Denz. n. 797) and c. 13 (Denz. n. 805); cfr. *Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6, nn. 2-5.

[219] *Ibid.*, n. 3.

A man who does not actually have all the aids necessary as principles is yet said, sometimes, to have sufficient grace. This is meant in a remote and potential sense. That it be true even in that sense, however, a man must be able to do something to obtain that aid which is proximately necessary, by praying, for example, and doing all he can. God will not be deaf to such a man. A difficulty here arises in relation to infidels and Christians who have fallen into serious sin. They seem altogether unable to arise from their condition, so how have they sufficient grace for conversion, Suarez answers that as long as the infidel remains untouched by *gratia excitans* he does not actually have sufficient help, and his not placing supernatural acts is not imputable to him. In other ways, however, he can be said to have sufficient grace in universal causes (the preaching of the Church, Redemption of Christ) or because God illuminates everyone, even him who does nothing worthy of the illumination. As to the Christian sinner, he has sufficient help for he has God ready to aid him as often as his will, excited by faith, applies itself to his conversion.[220] It is clear, then, that the nature of sufficient grace does not demand that man actually receive it into himself as concursus. The latter is given only in the very operation; and it is not the very ratio

[220] Quod formaliter datur per auxilium sufficiens est posse; terminus vero seu finis propter quem datur est velle seu perficere. Cum ergo dicitur auxilium sufficiens dari ad posse . . . si intelligatur quasi de formali effectu auxilii, verissimum est; . . . si autem intelligatur de fine . . . falsum est; nam potentia . . . datur . . . propter operari; imo non potest dare primum sine secundo (*Ibid.*, n. 3). Est igitur de ratione auxilii sufficientis ut ad operandum sufficiens est . . . quodcumque auxilium detur, si ultra illud est necessarium aliud per modum principii alterum non poterit esse sufficiens simpliciter, sed ad summum in aliquo genere (*Ibid.*, n 4). . . . Contingit enim hominem non actu habere omnia haec auxilia necessaria . . . et nihilominus dici habere auxilium sufficiens; sed illud intelligendum est remote et in potentia. . . . Ut vero hoc etiam sensu habeat homo auxilium sufficiens necesse est ut sit in potestate ejus aliquid facere ad obtinendum illud auxilium quod proxime sufficit (*Ibid.*, n. 5). (Respectu infidelis) quamdiu hic motus (auxilii excitantis) actu non *fit* in homine non habere hominem auxilium sufficiens in actu . . . neque . . . in potestate sua intrinseca . . . fidelem peccatorem habere sufficiens auxilium adjuvans . . . quia habet Deum paratum ad juvandum illum quotiescumque liberum ejus arbitrium per fidem excitatum sese ad suam conversionem applicaverit (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

of sufficient help that it actually operate. It is in man's power that sufficient help become concursus; for when man applies himself to operation, God enters in.[221]

The existence of efficacious help is certain; "No one can come to me unless the Father Who sent me draw him."[222] What this efficacious aid is, is disputed. Heretics say it is a divine motion which necessitates the will, without which the will cannot act; they deny any merely sufficient aid. On the other extreme, some Catholics say divine aid is called efficacious from the effect; no grace is *ex se* efficacious, but all grace is called either efficacious or sufficient depending on whether man wills to cooperate or not. Since this opinion is difficult to reconcile with the words of Scripture and with those of St. Augustine, Suarez adopts the view that grace is called efficacious because it offers to the will most efficacious powers. Concursus cannot properly be called efficacious help for it is not so much efficacious as the very effecting; in it, sufficiency and efficacy cannot be distinguished, and it always has the very same conjunction with the effect. Only help which is a principle of operation admits a division into sufficient and efficacious. Suarez describes efficacious grace, then, as that principle of grace which has peculiar force and efficacy to induce the human will to consent.[223]

Since efficacious aid is given in order that a man will one thing determinately, its efficacy seems to consist in a certain power to determine the will to this act. Some theologians teach that the efficacy consists in this power to determine, in a physical way, as we have seen earlier with regard to God's

[221] Concluditur non esse quidem de ratione auxilii . . . sufficientis ut homo actu et in se recipiat . . . concursus, quia non est de ratione sufficientis principii ut actu operetur; illud autem auxilium non datur nisi in ipsa actuali operatione . . . voluntate nostra applicante se ad opus statim ac Deus influit (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[222] *John* vi.

[223] Nunc ut probabilius et verius statuimus auxilium non dici efficax quia facit, sed etiam quia vires praebet efficacissimas voluntati . . . hoc nomen . . . non proprie attribuatur illi auxilio quod est per modum concursus. . . . Solum ergo datur illa divisio (sufficiens et efficax) de auxilio per modum principii. Est ergo auxilium efficax illud gratiae principium quod peculiarem vim et efficaciam habet ad inducendam humanam voluntatem, ut consentiat (*Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6, n. 8).

motion in the natural order. This is rejected by Suarez for two reasons: a) it is opposed to the sufficiency of grace and hence also to liberty of specification; b) it is opposed to liberty of exercise.[224]

It is opposed to the sufficiency of God's other help. Sufficient grace is truly sufficient if the will chooses to cooperate; hence physical determination is unnecessary. On the other hand, if physical determination is necessary for supernatural acts, it follows that the unconverted do not have a grace even sufficient for conversion. Even Protestants see this point and deny any sufficient grace; it is all efficacious for them.[225]

To answer that sufficient grace gives ability to act (*posse velle*) but determination is necessary only to the actual operation is no answer. By the teaching of the defenders of physical determination the efficacious motion is the ultimate complement of the power in which it inheres; it is therefore necessary to it that it have the ability to act. Any aid short of determination is, then, not sufficient, for the principle of the act would remain incomplete.[226]

Some of Suarez' opponents, he says, seeing the force of this argument, say that it is in the power of a man who has sufficient grace to have efficacious grace too, if he does not resist; man never lacks efficacious grace except by his own free sin. While in itself it is true that whatever is necessary to man's salvation is somehow in his power, the principle can hardly be consistently enunciated by defenders of determination. This efficacious aid is said to be a supernatural entity which God causes in us without us, for it is not our vital act but a power previous to act. Since it is infused it does not

[224] *Ibid.*, capp. 8-9.

[225] Auxilium quod dicitur sufficiens est vere et realiter ad hoc sufficiens si liberum arbitrium . . . cooperari velit. Si hujusmodi auxilium hoc sensu efficax ut physice . . . praedeterminans sit simpliciter necessarium, . . . sequitur eos, qui non convertuntur, non habere sufficiens auxilium ut convertantur (*Ibid.*, cap. 8, n. 1).

[226] . . . dicti auctores docent auxilium hoc efficax esse . . . veluti complementum ultimum virtutis necessariae ad agendum; ergo non solum est necessarium . . . ut voluntas velit, sed etiam ut velle possit . . . ergo . . . auxilium quod hoc non includit non potest dici sufficiens etiam ad posse (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

depend on us. It can be said to depend on our wills only by reason of some disposition in us, given which, God grants that aid, and only then. Yet that there be such a disposition Suarez thinks impossible.[227]

The supposed disposition could be imagined to be either positive or negative; there are no further possibilities. Both are repugnant. The positive could only be a good act and indeed a supernatural one (since a natural act is not a sufficient disposition and especially not an ultimate and necessitating disposition to grace), yet it is unheard of that to contrition, say, or to the first will to believe, such an ultimate disposition is necessary Again, for this preparatory good and supernatural act divine determination is necessary, therefore another earlier disposition must have been in man to receive that predetermination and so *ad infinitum*. If one wishes to defend predetermination one cannot maintain that free consent making it efficacious is in man's power, for the possibility of a negative disposition is advanced by practically no one.[228]

Predetermining grace is opposed to the exercise of freedom. Suarez speaks of *gratia excitans* here, reasoning that if it is true that this grace, which more than other precedes our wills, does not predetermine us, it is certainly true of other graces. His argument from reason is simple *Gratia excitans* moves man to consent only by illuminating him (objectively) or by touching his affections through certain imperfect and indeliberate motions of fear, affection, or joy. Neither of these ways of moving the will is sufficient to determine it physically. There-

[227] . . . hoc ipsum principium quod in hac responsione confitetur non potest cum ipsa sua assertione consistere . . . hoc auxilium efficax dicitur esse qualitas seu entitas quaedam supernaturalis quam Deus efficit in nobis sine nobis; ergo quod nobis infundatur talis qualitas non pendet a nobis . . . ut a cooperante illam entitatem (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[228] Positiva dispositio esse tantum potest per actum . . . qui debet esse bonus (non naturalis) . . . hoc est inauditum scilicet, quod ad contritionem v. g. sit necessaria alia ultima dispositio; et multo minus verisimile erit id dicere de attritione, vel de prima voluntate credendi . . . addo . . . ad priorem actum . . . necessarium esse divinam praedeterminationem . . . Praedeterminatio ergo ad illum actum non erit in potestate hominis; alioquin . . . infinite proceditur (*Ibid.*, nn. 7-8).

fore *gratia excitans* does not predetermine us. The minor premise will bear some comment. The first part is clear: outside the beatific vision no particular object determines the will, especially not as to exercise of the act. Besides, an intellectual judgment can physically determine the will only by reason of a prior free act from which the determining act necessarily follows. By the second part of the minor premise (that the touching the appetitive part of man through imperfect motions of fear, joy, etc., does not determine the will physically) Suarez shows that these motions are imperfect, certain velleities only which cannot of their own force determine the will to give absolute consent. The will is never determined by one act to place another unless there is a necessary connection between them.[229]

The next appeal is to the Council of Trent which says that man can assent or dissent when God touches his heart through the illumination of the Holy Ghost; in other words, he is not determined by it. But the Council previously calls this same illumination *gratia excitans*. Therefore, *gratia excitans* does not determine us.[230] Note that the Council speaks in a general way of *gratia excitans*. To say the declaration means that exciting grace gives power to act, though with that grace alone such an act will never be placed, is unjustified, among other reasons because the Council is speaking of a true potency which often is reduced to act. Therefore, it speaks rather of act than of potency when it says man can consent if he wills to do so; it speaks of an excitation by which man is converted. Such a movement is always called efficacious. Some answer, "Well, the Council says man can resist. But even where the will is determined, it can resist though it does not, of course." To this Suarez replies that in the composed sense (that is, given

[229] . . . extra visionem beatificam nullum particulare objectum determinat voluntatem, praesertim quoad exercitium actus . . . illi motus . . . in suo ordine sunt imperfecti . . . ergo ex intrinseca illorum vi non potest voluntas physice determinari ad plenum et absolutum consensum praestandum (*Ibid.*, cap. 9, n. 8).

[230] (Concilium) definit, tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, quod paulo antea excitantem gratiam vocaverat, posse hominem . . . dissentire (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

the determining grace), the will can not simultaneously dissent (on the supposition that grace determines) for what determines a thing does not leave it undetermined.

If the opposition admits that in the composed sense the will can not-consent, well and good; all Suarez intends is that grace of itself by its own power does not necessarily induce consent. But if one says: "man can dissent but never will," he is mistaken. Man not only does not do contradictory things, he can not do them. If, then, he necessarily consents by reason of this grace he cannot join dissent with that grace. The lesser cannot overcome nor impede the greater. But efficacious grace (on the hypothesis) is greater than the will since it necessarily induces its act. Therefore, the will does not and can not impede it. One might say: "As the Council declares, given grace one can dissent, but only in the divided sense, i. e., without that grace it could dissent." But the point is, Suarez replies, the Council says he who has the call (and refuses it) is the one who dissents, not he who lacks the divine call. It is, therefore, speaking of the composed, not of the divided, sense. Again, without the grace one does not dissent; rather one does not consent, i. e., there is a negation of any act, not the placing of a negative act. Liberty in this divided sense is common to all agents; to place human freedom in such liberty is to deny the specific reality of human liberty.[231]

In order to operate supernaturally it is not required that *gratia excitans* bring even a moral predetermination, i. e., a certain vehement propensity which, leaving in the faculty a

[231] . . . Concilium loquitur de vera . . . potentia quae in actum saepe reducitur, . . . imo potius de actu quam de potentia agendi loquitur . . . potentiam ad consentiendum determinatam posse dissentire (sensu composito) . . . est aperta repugnantia et contradictio; nam forma physice determinare potentiam . . . nihil aliud est quam ex vi sua . . . necessario secum afferre seu conjunctum habere consensum . . . quod simul sit consensus et dissensus . . . est impossibile . . . homo non solum nunquam efficit contradictoria, sed nec facere potest. . . . Item vis inferior non solum nunquam vincit superiorem sed neque vincere potest . . . sed illa gratia efficax dicitur . . . tam potens ut necessario inducat suum actum; ergo voluntas creata . . . illam . . . neque impedire potest . . . non dicitur (a Concilio) dissentire qui caret vocatione, sed qui illam habet et respuit . . . plane facit sensum compositum (*Ibid.*, nn. 3-4).

real power to resist, yet usually or even always leads to the effect. The reason this is not required Suarez thinks is clear; if it were necessary for the effect, then it alone is sufficient grace, and ordinary grace lacks something required to produce the effect. Hence those who do not believe all the articles of faith when they are called to faith are not sufficiently called, a proposition Catholics dare not concede. If moral determination is in any way required physically or morally then most men in sinning are not fully free or fully culpable; for most men are not so determined (since determination works its effect practically always). Since man needs no determination to act naturally neither does he need it to act supernaturally.[232]

This is not to deny the possibility of moral determination. When man acts with a very evident judgment that this act is expedient and its contrary unfitting he is so determined. The devil can so vehemently induce men to evil acts that, morally speaking, they cannot refrain from consent without God's grace; even more surely, then, God can predetermine us morally to good. Just what predetermination of this kind is, in each case, is hard to decide. There is a certain minimum divine call which is, simply speaking, necessary that man be converted if he wish it. God can give more than this minimum by communicating a greater light, exciting a more intense act or drawing the will more strongly in other ways. Yet the will sometimes remains equally indifferent and the effect equally contingent to both possibilities; sometimes, again, the man's conversion is more difficult, but often the will, because of the efficacy of the call, or the abundance of the grace, is rendered (as if in first act) more inclined to consent. Then we say the will is morally determined; it can be so determined more or less.[233]

[232] Necessaria non sit (praedeterminatio moralis) ad . . . supernaturalem actum humanum . . . quia alias nulla gratia excitans quae non efficeret in homine hanc moralem determinationem esset in suo ordine auxilium sufficiens. . . . Voluntas moraliter praedeterminata . . . aut nunquam . . . aut vix et raro dissentit (*Ibid.*, cap. 10, n. 1).

[233] Ad actus malos potest daemon tam vehementer inducere hominem . . . ut nisi gratia Dei juvetur moraliter non possit sese continere quin consentiat; ergo multo magis potest Deus . . . ita illuminare hominem et affectum ejus inclinare ut

This determination admits even of a grade, Suarez thinks, in which the connection between grace and free consent is a moral infallibility which can, simply speaking, be said never to fail. God so comprehends the will that He can infallibly make it consent. Even the devil and other men can do this, so why not God? Yet the infallibility is not absolute, since liberty still remains and so it is not impossible that the effect be not produced.[234]

What then is efficacious grace? Besides *gratia excitans* the will needs *gratia adjuvans.* The latter affects the act in a physical way more than *gratia excitans* does. This assisting grace is called *cooperating* insofar as, *together with the will,* it is a principle of eliciting the act; insofar as it precedes the act by priority of nature it is called prevenient grace; insofar as it is infused by God alone it is called operating grace.[235]

Suarez' first point is that there is inhering in us no kind of assisting grace, operating or cooperating, i e., something which is neither a habit nor an act, though for the first supernatural acts which precede the habits he admits as probable a kind of fluid first act, though it does not determine us.[236] The opinion that there is in us a determining aid which is neither habit, nor act, he sees as without foundation in the Fathers, the Councils, or St. Thomas.[237] Neither the subordination of second cause to first, nor the indifference of the will requires extrinsic deter-

moraliter eum . . . determinat . . . potest autem Deus uberiorem et majorem (vocationem) conferre . . . quibus voluntas magis alliciatur (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[234] . . . censeo posse perveniri in hac determinatione ad moralem infallibilitatem quae simpliciter dici possit nunquam deficere . . . quia Deus comprehendit capacitatem et inclinationem humanae voluntatis . . . daemon sua tentatione potest ita hominem opprimere ut infallibiliter sequatur consensus nisi gratia Dei subveniat . . . unus homo potest efficacissime illum (alterum) pertrahere . . . quid ergo non poterit facere Deus? (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[235] *Ibid.*, cap. 12, n. 1.

[236] Opinio quae ad eliciendos primos actus supernaturales qui non eliciuntur ab habitibus ponit aliquam gratiam adjuvantem et inhaerentem voluntati per modum actus primi fluentis probabilis est, dummodo talis actus . . . in auxilio sufficiente includatur et absque physica praedeterminatione ponatur (*Ibid.*, n. 2).

[237] Suarez cites *Summa Theol.* I-II, q. 3, a. 2 as supporting the teaching "nullam esse gratiam per modum actus primi nisi habitum." Cf. *Opus. Primum, loc. cit.*, n. 3.

mination; the Councils and the Fathers have never founded the necessity of grace on the indifference of the will, but rather on the weakness of fallen man, or on the deficiency of his powers. Granted, for example, a will informed by charity and granted the object sufficiently proposed, man has a sufficient principle of loving God, given concursus proportioned to the grace. Such expressions as: " God makes us will (*Deus facit ut velimus*)," " God operates the act of will in us (*operatur in nobis velle*)," and others of like import Suarez interprets to mean that grace excites, morally rules, and directs our steps. Our cooperation and free consent are required for such works, though God is the principal cooperator.[238]

His second point is that, even admitting this kind of grace, one can not hold that it physically predetermines the will prior to the second act of the will: the efficiency of grace cannot be found in any such characteristic as that. And why not? Because such determination would destroy the freedom through actual indifference; Suarez appeals here to reasons given earlier and adds that this predetermination to one thing is in a proximate cause inasmuch as this cause is constituted in first act. But necessity in acting is precisely determination to one thing in the cause, inasmuch as the cause is constituted in first act. Man, therefore, by such determination would be constituted as a necessary and not as a free agent. The major premise is clear: the determination is something prior to second act, its cause, which constitutes the will as completely ready to act. It is, then, first act. The minor is evident from the very terms.[239] One cannot argue that, granted this determined entity

[238] Ex subordinatione causae secundae ad primam non esse necessariam talem virtutem fluentem. . . . Haec omnia (locutiones Sacrae Scripturae) dicta sunt ratione gratiae excitantis et moraliter regentis; . . . quatenus vero nostra cooperatio et liber consensus requiritur, tribuuntur Deo ut principali cooperatori (*Ibid.*, nn. 4-5).

[239] Illa deductio eodem modo in his actibus supernaturalibus facienda est, qua eam supra . . . in communi fecimus de actibus liberis voluntatis . . . praedeterminationem ad unum (si est) esse in causa proxima quatenus constituta in actu primo ad efficiendum; nihil autem est aliud necessitas in agendo nisi determinatio ad unum in causa, quatenus est in actu primo constituta; ergo per illam determinationem constituitur homo in ratione agentis necessarii et non liberi (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

in the will, the will is yet free, because of its greater power; this determination, on the supposition, is superior to, and overcomes, the indeterminateness of the will. God's infinite power can quasi-force the will but a created being, such as this grace is said to be cannot do so.[240]

Suarez argues that the Council of Trent was clearly opposed to this doctrine of determination; the answer that Trent speaks only of *gratia excitans* and not of assisting grace (*gratia adjuvans*) he rejects. He maintains that the Council felt and taught implicitly that: 1) the power to resist any motion prior to act is of the very nature of liberty; 2) no antecedent motion can so determine the free will as not to leave in it the power to resist the motion. The Council says: " Nor does man do nothing at all receiving that inspiration; indeed, he can refuse it." Now the word " do " here means to do something which proceeds from one's own will and reason, i. e., freely. The will, then, in assenting to grace is not merely passively determined to one thing. The Council says: " The free will moved and excited by God," etc.; since " motion " is used broadly it comprehends any divine motion which precedes man's consent, even *gratia adjuvans*. Implicitly, then, the Council taught that any motion which does not destroy liberty leaves the power of resistance in the will, a power, Suarez adds, which premotion denies (in the composed sense, of course, and as the will is proximately disposed for act).[241]

To Suarez it is clear that no supernatural aid given to man as a principle of consent to an act physically predetermines him to that consent. But what of concursus itself he asks. It is quite evident that it does not predetermine the will, either; for while concursus in itself can determine the will formally, it

[240] Omitto vix posse intelligi qualis est illa entitas quae inhaerens voluntati ita sit illi superior . . . ut vincat et superet indifferentiam ejus . . . ut ipsum (objectum) non possit non efficaciter . . . determinare voluntatem . . . non ergo facile intelligitur quomodo possit eam quasi agere. . . . Deus enim propter infinitam vim activam . . . habet hanc vim (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[241] Ergo implicite docet (Concilium) hanc potestatem (resistendi) semper relinqui in omni motione antecedente, quae libertatem non tollit; ergo e contrario praemotio, quae hanc potestatem aufert impedit libertatem (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-12).

cannot do so without the will. This concursus is the voluntary act itself; it cannot be, therefore, unless the will is operating. Action surely does not predetermine the agent to acting, but formally constitutes him as acting in second act.[242]

Even considering concursus in its root, i. e., in the divine will, Suarez continues, it is true that it does not predetermine the will. Concursus so considered is conceived as an act of God *ad intra*, which supposes no preknowledge of man's cooperation, an act which proceeds from God's absolute and efficacious will by which He efficaciously determines the created will to consent to a determined supernatural act, not by impressing on the human will any reality prior to act, but only by drawing it. Suarez applies here what he has already said of the impossibility of such determination in the natural order. What was said there applies here; this position denies the reality of free acts.[243] He adds, however, the following considerations.

If such an act of God's will is necessary in order that man can act then man can not act in a supernatural way when he does not so act. When he does not act he is not determined by God's will to act; therefore, power to act is lacking.[244] It solves nothing to say that man has it in his power infallibly to receive this determination by negatively allowing himself to be moved by God. This negative disposition is a negation of something positive, i. e., of a voluntary act which is in the will's power, for as a free disposition, it supposes that its opposite is possible to the will. That act would be either good or bad. If bad, it would follow that when a man sufficiently excited (by *gratia excitans*) to make an act of faith, does not commit some other sin infallibly he will be determined by God

[242] Auxilium igitur hoc prout in homine recipitur potest quidem formaliter determinare voluntatem, non tamen sine illa; . . . nec determinare illam potest prout nunc loquimur . . . quia auxilium non est nisi ipsamet actio voluntatis quae principalius a Deo est (*Ibid.*, cap. 13, nn. 1-2).

[243] *Ibid.*, nn. 3-4.

[244] Aperte sequitur (ex hac opinione) non esse in potestate hominis supernaturaliter operari, quando actu non operatur. Probatur, quia cum homo non operatur non determinatur per voluntatem Dei praedeterminantem; ergo . . . neque est in potestate hominis facere (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

to believe. This conclusion is contrary to our faith, for one to whom the faith is sufficiently proposed can, in fact, will not to believe. If the act were good it follows that God would determine this man to believe for the precise reason that the man does not place a good act, which is ridiculous. Again, as any act of man's is because God premoves him, so the negative disposition is because God does not premove him. Thus the very negation is not free but necessary. In the third place it is absurd that the ultimate disposition to God's most efficacious supernatural help should be the lack of some natural act, even more absurd than supposing the disposition to be a positive, though only natural, act.[245]

The truth, according to Suarez, is that God wills the acts of men's wills as conditional; i. e., He does influence on the condition that the human will cooperate. But what is efficacious grace if it is not physical predetermination? The word " efficacious " can be taken in three different ways, as naming: 1) any power or faculty of acting, especially one having some special energy, even though the power is not acting; in this sense, sufficient grace is truly efficacious; 2) a power of acting as actually conjoined to its action; in this signification grace can not be said to be efficacious without the consent and free determination of our will; 3) a grace which not only can effect and does effect, but is effective in such a way that it always infallibly has the actual effecting joined to it.[246]

Efficacious grace in this third and proper sense does not formally include concursus; if it did it would in no wise differ from efficacious grace taken in the second sense of actual conjunction with the effect. Formally this aid is a principle of

[245] Erit ergo alicujus actus. . . . Vel ergo ille actus est bonus vel malus: si bonus sequitur determinare Deum voluntatem . . . hominis . . . quia non operatur alium actum bonum, quod ridiculum est; si vero sit actus malus, ergo, quoties ille homo . . . sufficienter excitatur . . . non committit aliud peccatum infallibiliter determinabitur a Deo ut velit; consequens autem est falsum et contra doctrinam fidei (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-8).

[246] Tertio modo potest gratia appellari efficax non solum quia effectiva est, neque solum quia actu efficit; sed quia ita est effectiva ut semper habeat infallibiliter conjunctam actualem effectionem (*Ibid.*, cap. 14, n. 4).

operation, not an operation. Infallibly it brings on the act and consequently (not formally) it has the conjoined actual help which is concursus and even the cooperation of the will. As St. Augustine saw, it consists in a certain calling, which pertains to operative grace. Its efficacy, for St. Augustine, consists in two things: 1) that God gives it from the firm intention of converting or saving men, an efficacious election; 2) that God calls man at such a time and in such a way as is accommodated to the effect intended by God, viz., man's conversion. Hence, St. Augustine names this call " congruous." [247]

In what does this congruity consist? Some have thought " it consists in a certain proportion which exists between such an illumination or inspiration effected in such a way by God in a man of such complexion, nature and condition; for God most accurately comprehending all these things in any man if his heart is touched in this way he is softened and consents." [248] While it is true that God's efficacious call sometimes consists in something specially accommodated to the man which God operates in the man (as the call of St. Paul), yet that is not required for a call to be efficacious; otherwise, those not called with this special call, would not have a sufficient call. Again, mere congruity is not sufficient for efficacy, for it induces of itself only moral certitude that the act will follow, whereas truly efficacious help must be so infallible that the non-position of the act is repugnant and contradictory.[249]

[247] In gratia efficaci non debeat formaliter includi auxilium illud quod est per modum concursus. . . . Igitur gratia efficax formaliter constituenda est in aliquo auxilio quod sit per modum principii . . . et consequenter etiam habet conjunctum actuale auxilium quod est . . . concursus (*Ibid.*, n. 4). Consistit efficacia hujus . . . gratiae (ex doctrina S. Augustini) in duobus. Primum est quod a Deo datur ex proposito . . . convertendi vel salvandi hominem . . . secundo necessarium est . . . ut Deus tali tempore et modo hominem vocet qui accomodatus sit ad effectum . . . atque hinc Augustinus . . . hanc vocationem congruam appellat (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[248] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[249] Licet verum sit saepe vocationem efficacem fieri hoc singulari modo . . . tamen neque id requiri potest ut necessarium ad vocationis efficaciam . . .; quia alias qui non ita vocaretur non haberet vocationem sufficientem neque etiam illa congruitas satis est ad illam efficaciam (quae) tanta esse debet ut implicet contradictionem aliquando deficere (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

The efficacy of God's call consists in this that " God, in His infinite wisdom seeing what each cause or will shall do in every event and occasion, if placed in it, also knows when and to which vocation each will shall give assent if it (the call) is given (to the will). Whence, when He wills to convert a man He wills also to call him at that time and in that way in which He knows he will consent, and such a vocation is called efficacious because although of itself it does not have an infallible effect, yet inasmuch as it is subject to such divine knowledge infallibly it shall have it " (the effect). The efficacious grace can be with or without the special congruity; its efficacy is moral, not physical, and is to be sought not in the vocation itself but rather as it proceeds from God and is under His direction. It implies not necessity (which regards the cause), but certitude and infallibility, which look to foreknowledge. The will shall never resist it, though it can, since foreknowledge does not remove the power of doing the opposite of what is foreknown.[250]

Suarez' arguments from reason for the convenience of this doctrine, are: 1) the efficacy of grace can be explained in no other convenient way; 2) this doctrine is most apt in conciliating freedom with grace. We have already seen that. He adds, however, that the efficacy ought to be proportioned to the causality of the call, which is moral; hence the efficacy should be understood in a moral sense, too. To liberty moral persuasion is by no means repugnant; nor is infallibility, since that quality is not from a cause but from the supposition of a future thing as a true and knowable object.

Nor does this explanation of the efficacy of grace deny the

[250] Efficaciam hujus vocationis in hoc consistere quod Deus, infinita sua sapientia, praevidens quid unaquaeque causa seu voluntas in omni eventu et occasione operatura sit, si in ea constituatur, etiam cognoscit quando et cui vocationi sit unaquaeque voluntas assensum praebitura si ei detur. Unde quando vult hominem convertere vult etiam illum vocare illo tempore et modo quo novit illum consensurum, et talis vocatio appellatur efficax quia licet ex se non habeat infallibilem effectum tamen ut subest tali scientiae divinae infallibiliter est illam habitura. Unde hanc efficaciam . . . neque esse spectandam in ipsa vocatione secundum se . . . sed prout progreditur a Deo et est sub intentione ac scientia . . . ejus (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

sufficiency of the grace in those who are not converted, for the non-conversion can come from their will alone. It is to be noted that efficacious and sufficient grace do not differ in this that the former has any reality, or motion, or quality which a non-efficacious call has not.[251] There is a difference on God's part in that He foresees the effect in one and not in the other; but man has the power "to make God foresee that he will consent to the call"; so it is in his power to have an efficacious call. What determines that this man be called by God at a time when God foresees that the call will be respected? The will of God is the only answer. Nor can one say, "But on this theory there might be some one whom God foresees will never cooperate with grace; such a man could never be called efficaciously by God." God's infinite power and wisdom can find a way to reach every one, by extraordinary means at least. If one insists that it could happen that man resist every call (though, morally speaking, it never happens), we must admit it; metaphysically or logically speaking there is no inconvenience in this proposition.[252] Divine omnipotence is safeguarded by this fact that God could efficaciously convert such a man by impeding the use of his freedom.

[251] Neque etiam (repugnat libertati) infallibilitas quae oritur ex praescientia, quia illa ut sic non est ex causa, seu ex suppositione antecedente, sed ex suppositione ipsius rei futurae in ratione objecti veri et cognoscibilis (*Ibid.*, n. 12). Gratia efficax praeveniens usum liberi arbitrii prout a nobis explicata est nullam rem, qualitatem aut motionem necessario requirit, quae non possit includere vocatio non efficax (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[252] Ex parte autem Dei antecedit praescientia effectus in uno et non in alio; tamen haec ipsa differentia non est ex solo Deo sed etiam ex libero arbitrio; nam in potestate hominis . . . est facere ut Deus praesciverit ipsum consensurum vocationi . . . atque ita est in potestate ejus habere efficacem vocationem (*Ibid.*, n. 14). Cum infinita sit Dei potentia et sapientia, qua novit omnia auxilia et omnes modos quibus potest voluntatem hominis ad aliquid inclinare, impossible est quin aliquem praevideat, quo tandem homo consenturus est si ei applicetur. . . . Quod si quis . . . contendat totam hanc impossibilitatem solum esse moralem, atque adeo non implicare contradictionem quod oppositum accidat . . . ideoque simpliciter admittendum esse posse ita accidere, metaphysice seu logice loquendo respondetur totum hoc verum esse . . . inde nihil sequitur contra divinam omnipotentiam sed solum sequitur voluntatem vere ac proprie manere liberam . . . (Deus) posset illam (voluntatem creatam) convertere quo vellet, impediendo libertatis usum (*Ibid.*, n. 16).

Let us now summarize. The doctrine which maintains that efficacious grace is efficacious by reason of a reality which physically determines the created will to act denies, Suarez repeats, the sufficiency of grace in those who *de facto* are not converted. Such efficacious grace is necessary in order to act; therefore, if one does not receive it he lacks something which is altogether necessary in order to operate. It follows that God expects the impossible (since He fails to give some men the help necessary to meet His demands) and that either omission of these good acts is not imputable to men, or else that God blames men for not doing the impossible.[253]

The answer " without efficacious grace man has grace which is sufficient, sufficient to be able to act, though not sufficient to act " Suarez refutes for 1) God orders us to do things, not to be able to do them; hence He ought to give grace sufficient not for " ability to do" but for the doing; 2) He wills not only that man can be saved but that he be actually saved, as St. Paul says; hence He gives men grace sufficient actually to save them; 3) the Thomists' idea of sufficient grace is not even sufficient for " power to act "; it leaves the faculty not proximately expedited for act but only remotely and physically empowered. The distinction is, moreover, without basis in any of the Fathers or older theologians.[254]

To answer, on the other hand, " It is in a man's own power to have efficacious grace such as we describe, and if a man does not have it, it is his own fault," simply opens up further difficulties. The grace can be in man's power only by reason of some prior act or disposition. What of that act or disposition? It cannot be natural; that is Pelagianism. Suppose, then, it is supernatural; is efficacious grace needed to have it? If it is we

[253] Doctrinam hanc (de efficacia praedeterminante) prout in illa sententia explicata est non posse in concordiam redigi cum hoc principio . . . dari hominibus qui nolunt . . . auxilium sufficiens . . . ad agendum. Itemque sequitur Deum praecipere homini impossibilia (*Opus. Tertium*, nn. 15-17).

[254] Deus non praecipit homini ut possit operari sed ut operetur. . . . Deus non tantum vult ut homo possit salvari sed ut salvus fiat . . . ergo ad hoc dat auxilium sufficiens . . . qui nec habet nec habere potest quae necessaria sunt ad operandum non solum non habet auxilium ut faciat sed nec etiam ut possit moraliter et proxime loquendo (*Ibid.*, n. 21).

can go on to infinity; if it is not, then why is such determining grace needed for any other act? [255]

Secondly, predetermining grace is opposed to liberty. Under such grace the non-position of the act is impossible; the placing of the act then is not free since, as Trent says, the use of freedom requires the power of dissenting from the divine motion. And the words are meant in the composed sense, since one cannot throw off something he does not have. Moreover, the will is merely passive in receiving the motion, and the passive is not free. Yet this does not imply that God cannot predefine our supernatural acts and induce the will in a moral way. The will by the mere fact of being subordinated to the First Cause does not need grace. Even for the Fathers the necessity of grace arises from other fonts, e. g., the repugnance of the appetite, the deficiency of our powers, and their lack of proportion to the true end of man and the means to it.[256]

From predetermination follows the absurd conclusion that God premoves and predetermines the will to evil, for the will is quite as indifferent to evil acts as to good, and just as subordinated to the First Cause in effecting evil as in effecting good. Thomists, according to Suarez, should conclude that God efficaciously determines and moves us to evil, that without this determination one cannot consent to evil, but given it one can not not-consent. If God's efficacious motion to good depends as to its distribution on God's will, so does His motion to bad objects.[257]

[255] Naturalis esse non potest . . . si autem est supernaturalis interrogo an ad illum sit necessarium auxilium efficax praedeterminans necne; nam si necessarium est . . . ad alteram dispositionem procedendum erit . . . etiamsi in infinitum procedatur . . . si . . . non est necessarium . . . idem dicendum erit de quolibet alio actu (*Ibid.*)

[256] Dicitur . . . voluntatemque nostram . . . ab eo (auxilio) ita determinari ad unum actum, et ad exercitium illius . . . ut impossibile sit voluntatem . . . non operari ac consentire; ex quo manifeste fit illum consensum non esse liberum (*Ibid.*, n. 25). Nunquam reperitur in sanctis Patribus quod fundent necessitatem gratiae . . . neque in sola subordinatione causae secundae ad primam (*Ibid.*, n. 29).

[257] Videtur . . . sequi Deum esse auctorem mali actus vere ac proprie non permittendo solum sed etiam praemovendo . . . quia voluntas ex se tam est indifferens ad malos actus efficiendos sicut ad bonos, et in eorum effectione tam subordinate primae causae . . . ex duobus hominibus hunc facit (Deus) consentire (in actum malum), illum dissentire, solum quia vult (*Ibid.*, n. 24).

To say to all this, " Yes, God moves us to evil, but to evil materially taken, not formally," is not acceptable to Suarez. The two elements are inseparable; the intention of the agent tends to this human act from which the deformity of the act cannot be separated, and God's will must bear on such an act absolutely (on the supposition), and not merely conditionally. Those who argue from Our Lord's words: " No one can come to me unless the Father draws him," to physical determination should conclude that Judas could not have betrayed Christ unless the Father had drawn him to will it. If this and similar passages mean that our wills can do nothing without God's general motion, then nothing can be drawn from them about the excellence of supernatural acts and grace itself.[258]

On the conciliation of this notion of grace with God's efficacy, Suarez first lays down certain propositions; then he shows their conformity with man's freedom. The propositions are: 1) Man by the unaided power of his free will and without the assistance of divine grace can work no supernatural good, no pious deed conducive to attaining eternal life, nor can man even keep the natural law over a long period of time without grace. 2) Grace not only assists man, but excites him; it precedes man's operation and excites him to act well. This beginning of our salvation is worked in us, without any merit of ours and without our free cooperation, or any disposition. This " calling " is *gratia operans*, through which God alone operates in us that we should will, but to the willing itself we do cooperate.[259] 3) Though God's call does not have its effect in all who are called, yet, even for those who do not answer, the call is sufficient in such a way that it is truly in their power to answer. We have seen the reasons for this already, and at some length. We should bear in mind that, since we are speaking of moral

[258] Nonnulli auctores . . . se . . . exponere vel potius eludere Scripturas et Conciliorum definitiones adhibita distinctione de actu malo pro formali vel pro materiali . . . ac si separabile sit, moraliter loquendo formale a materiali quando intentio agentis definite . . . tendit ad ipsum actum humanum, a quo inseparabilis est deformitas . . . et ita illum (Deus) vult ut non velit quasi conditionate et dependenter a voluntate creata sed absolute nolendo (*Ibid.*, nn. 35-36).

[259] *Ibid.*, nn. 37-38.

acts, which require man's activity, an exterior call (the proposition of truths, let us say) is not truly sufficient; the Holy Ghost must interiorly inspire and excite a man. That assisting grace be sufficient it is necessary that it include whatever assisting grace is. If one maintains that it is first act, or a principle of act, one must maintain that sufficient *gratia adjuvans* includes that total reality, for it is truly necessary in order that a man can will and do what he is called upon to will and do. If he does not have the totality of assisting grace, the lack of his consent is not to be attributed to him. Since the actual concursus of grace is in a man only when he is, in fact, acting, it can not be included, in the same way, in the sufficient call given a man who is not acting. Yet for the sufficiency of that call the concursus must be so offered by God that it is in man's power to have it if he wishes.[260]

Besides the sufficient call nothing further, simply speaking, is necessary to actual operation except the actual concursus of grace which God infuses in the very act. The call constitutes man in a first act sufficient to give consent; he needs only a proportionate concursus which must be in his own power. If something further were necessary it would be a principle of, or necessary condition for, the act: one lacking it would not be sufficiently disposed.[261] 5) Aid which is efficacious in that it

[260] . . . ut vocatio sit sufficiens non satis est exterior doctrina sed oportet ut. . . . Spiritus Sanctus interius operetur et hominem excitet . . . hoc modo dicimus vocationem sufficientem includere omnem gratiam excitantem interiorem simpliciter necessariam ad volendum (*Ibid.*, n. 40). Rursus ex parte gratiae adjuvantis intelligi potest necessarium vel aliquod auxilium quod sit per modum principii . . . seu per modum actus primi . . . vel . . . ipsemet concursus actualis Dei . . . ut vocatio sit sufficiens necesse est ut includat omnem adjuvantem gratiam quae per modum principii necessaria est ad illum actum (*Ibid.*, n. 41). Si vero de concursu gratiae sermo sit . . . non potest hoc modo includi in vocatione sufficiente quam habet is qui non operatur: necessarium vero est ut hic concursus cum ipsa vocatione sufficiente ita offeratur . . . ut sit in hominis potestate illum habere si voluerit (*Ibid.*, n. 42).

[261] . . . ultra vocationem sufficientem . . . nihil esse simpliciter necessarium ad actualiter operandum praeter actualem gratiae concursum quo Deus . . . influit in actum ipsum . . . nobis constat post vocationem expectare Deum ut homo aperiat et consentiat; supponitur ergo . . . hominem esse jam constitutum in actu primo sufficientem ad consensum . . . et solum indigere concursu proportionato (*Ibid.*,

actually operates consent in a man does not necessarily require (besides sufficient exciting and assisting grace) anything else except that aid of grace which consists in actual proportionate concursus. In other words, over and above sufficient grace, efficacious aid does not necessarily add anything except concursus and the operation itself, though, from God's bounty, it can include more copious exciting helps.[262]

6) Though efficacious grace, physically speaking, does not necessarily place anything in man over and above sufficient grace, yet on God's part it does add a special benefit and a certain moral ratio which consists in this that God from His special and efficacious proposition offers this call to man at that time and in that mode which He knows is accommodated to man so that he shall consent, though he is able not to consent. The fundament of this moral congruity is God's wisdom and knowledge. He knows beforehand what each of us should do under any set of circumstances. Any efficacy which is more than moral would make grace an affecting grace (*gratia efficiens*) rather than efficacious (*efficax*). The certitude and infallibility of this moral efficacy is from God's science.[263]

Last of all, Suarez shows the conciliation of this efficacious grace with men's freedom. Since there is no doubt that the explanation given safeguards liberty it will suffice to show that it also safeguards the necessity and efficacious working of divine grace.

This opinion attributes the beginning of faith and salvation

n. 43). Si aliquid aliud esset necessarium illud deberet esse praevium ad actum. . . . Unde fit ut homo illa re carens, . . . adhuc sit impotens, et consequenter nondum habeat auxilium simpliciter sufficiens (*Ibid.*, n. 44).

[262] . . . concludimus auxilium efficax ut actu operetur consensum liberum . . . ultra sufficiens excitans et adjuvans et actualem ejus cooperationem cum voluntate nihil necessario requirere . . . praeter illud auxilium gratiae quod in actuali concursu proportionato consistit (*Ibid.*, n. 46).

[263] Quamvis gratia efficax physice et re ipsa nihil ex necessitate ponat in homine ultra sufficientem tamen ex parte Dei auxilium efficax . . . addere speciale beneficium . . . et motionem . . . quae in hoc consistit quod Deus ei (homini) praebet illam vocationem et in illo tempore et modo prout novit accomodatam ut cum illa homo . . . cum effectu consentiat. . . . Constituenda igitur est in illa congruitate morali quam Deus infinita sua sapientia praenovit et benigna misericordia (*Ibid.*, n. 48).

to grace, i. e., to a divine call which is the work of God alone, not due to nature in any way and given to men without any merit of theirs.[264] Besides the call there is required an assisting or cooperating grace by reason of which man's free consent is principally from grace, not only as operating, but also as cooperating grace. To cooperating grace man's free consent must be added, for it is in man's power to impede the effect of grace or to bring about that effect. The will of itself alone can do the impeding since that consists only in defect, but to bring about the effect it needs grace. Because of this, if the will resists grace it deserves punishment; if it cooperates, it deserves praise and glory.[265] God is said to give not only the power of operating but also the will, by reason of the efficacious call. He is said to operate in us in this sense, that we will because, in the order of moral cause, He alone draws us by preventing (*pralienientis*) and inducing us, though in giving consent man has integral freedom. Thus though God alone operates this in us that we will God alone does not operate the willing but He, with us, operates it (*ipsum velle*). He is a principal, but not the total, cause. By reason of His more principal influxus He is said to bring about the willing and the doing (*dicitur operari velle et perficere*).[266]

This explanation enables one clearly to understand in what the high and profound mystery of divine election consists, according to Suarez. God gives a fitting, a congruous call to whom He will; at times He gives to one a call which shall not be congruous to him, and denies the one which would be congruous, as Christ's famous words about Tyre and Sidon show. A call which would have been efficacious to Tyre and Sidon

[264] *Ibid.*, n. 53.

[265] Ultra vocationem hanc requirimus adjuvantem seu cooperantem gratiam ratione cujus ipsa conversio . . . principaliter etiam est a gratia . . . in (voluntatis nostrae) potestate est impedire effectum gratiae, et illum efficere; sed illud prius per se solo potest praestare, quia in defectu tantum consistit (*Ibid.*, nn. 54-55).

[266] Deus dicitur dare . . . etiam voluntatem . . . quia nimirum in eo genere causae moralis, praevenientis suadentis et inducentis solus Deus est qui docet interius et trahit hominem . . . licet Deus solus operetur ut velimus, non tamen Deus solus operatur ipsum velle sed nobiscum illud operatur et est principalis non tamen totalis causa ejus (*Ibid.*, n. 56).

was denied them and given to the Jews to whom it was not efficacious.[267] Though the efficiency of the grace as to its effect (man's consent) does not exist without man, yet the very distribution of the call (i. e., that an accommodated call is given to one and not to another) is from God's will alone. So to the question, " Can it be that with equal divine assistance one man is converted and another is not? " The answer is clear. If we are speaking of prevenient aids which are principles of free supernatural consent, the answer is yes, for one man can resist aid which is even greater than that which touches the other who is converted. Yet he who actually is converted exceeds in the actual concursus and influx of grace.[268]

It can be objected that merit seems to precede the distribution for the vocation is efficacious in one man because it is foreseen that it will operate in him; it is not efficacious in another because it will not operate in him. But it will not operate in the first man unless he freely consents; it will not operate in the second because he will oppose it. In this, then, is some merit or some ratio on the part of the free will. The objection is confirmed by this that unless this is maintained then it is not in our power to have a congruous and efficacious call; a difficulty which Suarez advanced, himself, against the Thomistic position.[269]

Suarez answers that God elects one whom He foresees will consent not because he will consent (which would imply merit, and would therefore be repugnant to grace) but in order that he consent (which implies an end intrinsically included in the grace). The very purpose of God's preparing help for His elect is efficaciously to induce them to certain works. There is nothing which merits reward until God calls a man to consent; there is no reason for such a call on man's part. The conclusion: " It is not in man's power to have an efficacious call,"

[267] *Mt.* xi.

[268] . . . interdum dat uni vocationem quae illi congrua futura non est negat autem illi cui futura esset accomodata, si ei data fuisset; sicut Christus de Tyro et Sidone dixit . . . ipsa distributio vocationis, quod huic detur accomodata potius quam illi solius est voluntatis divinae (*Opus. Tertium,* n. 57).

[269] *Ibid.,* nn. 62-63.

does not follow. Man can operate with the call he has; if he does, it will be efficacious in him. Since, absolutely speaking, the will by divine grace can bring about that no call be invalid and without effect, even the help which, in fact, is inefficacious is still sufficient.[270]

* * *

So much then for the doctrine of Suarez about human freedom and its movement under God. Even from a cursory reading of that doctrine one is aware of vast differences between it and the Thomistic account of the same reality, and aware, most of all, of very great differences between Suarez' teaching about God's part in a free human act and the Thomists' teaching on the same point. One suspects that what is involved here is different notions about the very nature of the will as a potency. Thomists say that man's will must be pre-moved and pre-determined by God; Suarez says that no such premotion or predetermination is necessary. How then did Suarez conceive this potency which is the will, and how did he conceive its relation to its own act? To know that, we must know in the first place what Suarez though of potency and act in general, just as to know what St. Thomas meant by his teaching on temperance we must know what he taught about virtues and habits in general. Really to penetrate what Suarez understands by this free faculty and its act we must know what he understood by faculties, or potencies, and their acts in general.

It is impossible to find in one place in Suarez a complete and adequate exposition of his teaching about potency and act, but we can find a full exposition of his notions of potency and act in several diverse orders, and of course, many indications of those notions throughout his works. We therefore shall not arbitrarily reduce all of Suarez' teaching to a few propositions

[270] Non sequitur Deum elegisse eum quem praevidit consensurum, si eum sic vocaret, quia consensurus erat, sed ut consentiret . . . illud prius dicit habitudinem et rationem causae meritoriae quae gratiae repugnat, posterius vero dicit solum habitudinem finis quae in ipsa gratia intrinsece includitur nec vero hinc fit non esse in potestate hominis vocationem efficacem, quia in potestate ejus est facere et operari cum ea vocatione quam habet quod si faciat et velit, illa erit in eo efficax (*Ibid.*, nn. 64-65).

expressed in our own terms but rather shall expose Suarez' teaching in each of the major fields in which the doctrine of potency and act is fundamental. Only then, after we have really seen Suarez' own teaching, shall we look for a proper way of expressing any basic unity of concept that may be found in it, and that may throw light on his more particular teaching on human freedom and its acts. We shall, so to say, let Suarez speak for himself and shall simply indicate his teaching in this order.

Chapter II

THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

Section I. Potency and Act in the Order of Being

1. *The Metaphysical Order: Created Essence and Existence.* In discussing the essence and existence of things one is talking about their very being; Suarez begins, therefore, by pointing out what " to be " can mean. It can be taken in four ways: as the being of (1) essence, (2) existence, (3) subsistence and (4) the truth of a proposition. The first, if we distinguish it from being of existence, adds nothing real to created essence; " being of essence " does not imply something real having being outside its causes. " Being of existence," however, means actual being outside its causes by which a created thing is outside nothing. " Being of subsistence " is, unlike being of existence, proper to substances. It is distinct and separable from the substantial existence of a created nature; it does not constitute the nature in the ratio of actual entity as existence does. The " being of the truth of a proposition " is not of itself something real and intrinsic but is objective in the intellect composing.[271]

The fundamental question is the relationship between being of essence and being of existence; are they one reality or really distinct? Suarez' own solution is written large in the very first section of his discussion of this question; created essence and existence are not really distinct, and the foundation of this opinion is that nothing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself. If created essence and existence are distinct, by the very fact that each is really distinct as being from being

[271] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. xxi, sect. 1, n. 2.

each has this that it is a being and distinct. Consequently neither can formally and intrinsically *be* through the other.[272] But a penetration of that requires some preliminary discussion.

Being can be considered in two states: (1) in potency and (2) in act. A created essence *in potency* of itself, and before it is made through God's free, efficient act, is *nothing*. It is not a real thing having being distinct from God's being. What is not made by God (and these things are not yet made) is either God or it is nothing. It follows that being-in-act and being-in-potency are immediately and formally distinct as being and non-being, simply. Being in potency bespeaks no positive state or mode of being but includes, besides denomination from the agent's power, a negation of the things having actually come forth from potency. So, a thing ceases to be in potency when it is created.[273]

It follows that being-in-act, or an essence-in-act does not add existence to essence-in-potency; the latter is nothing and to nothing one cannot, properly, add anything. Even if one means that essence-in-act can add a distinct existence to an essence which is already an actual being but is potency with respect to existence one is involved in difficulties, for it follows that an actual essence differs from a potential formally and precisely not in the act of being but rather in its very essential entity.

[272] Et sic affirmat haec sententia existentiam et essentiam non distingui in re ipsa . . . Et hanc sententiam sic explicatam existimo esse omnino veram. Ejusque fundamentum breviter est quia non potest res aliqua intrinsece ac formaliter constitui in ratione entis realis et actualis per aliud distinctum ab ipsa, quia hoc ipso quod distinguitur unum ab alio tanquam ens ab ente utrumque habet quod sit ens, ut condistinctum ab alio, et consequenter non per illud formaliter et intrinsece (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[273] Essentiam creaturae seu creaturam de se et priusquam a Deo fiat nullum habere in se verum esse reale . . . essentiam . . . omnino esse nihil (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, nn. 1-3). Principium . . . statuendum est nimirum in rebus creatis ens in potentia et in actu immediate et formaliter distingui tanquam ens et non ens simpliciter . . . quod illud esse in potentia seu illa potentia objectiva non possit esse res aliqua vera et positiva in se ipsa . . . est evidens . . . Relinquitur ergo ens in potentia ut sic non dicere statum aut modum positivum entis sed potius praeter denominationem a potentia agentis includere negationem . . . cum res creatur, desinit esse in potentia (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, nn. 1-4).

A being in objective potency is nothing; so, necessarily, any actual entity formally differs from the potential through that which constitutes the former in its genus of actual entity—in this case, the very essential being of an actual essence.[274]

It is clear that a real essence which in itself *is* something actually distinct from its cause is intrinsically constituted by some real actual being, for all real entity must be constituted by real being.[275] Yet this constitution is not through the composition of such being with such entity but through identity for (1) an actual essence differs from a potential essence immediately through its very entity. Therefore through that entity it has actual being and is constituted, and (2) a real essence is distinct from existence either (a) *not* really, and in that case, clearly it has no being distinct from existence by which it is made actual or (b) in *nature*, and in that case while the being of an actual essence is distinct from the being of actual existence it is *not* distinct from the actual essence; otherwise we proceed to infinity. Hence the constitution of the actual essence is not through composition with the being which constitutes it.[276]

[274] Observandum est . . . frequenter ab auctoribus dici essentiam in actu addere existentiam ipsi essentiae. Qui modus loquendi juxta sententiam eorum qui affirmant essentiam existentem non distingui ex natura rei a suo esse intelligendus est necessario de additione secundum rationem . . . quia additio realis non fit proprie nisi enti reali . . . diximus autem essentiam in potentia nihil habere entitatis . . . ex hoc tamen necessario sequitur quamvis essentia actualis non differat a potentiali nisi dum est . . . formaliter tamen ac praecise non differre immediate in actu essendi sed in sua entitate essentiali (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[275] Our division of the remainder of the matter in this section is our own, yet justified. When from Disputation XXXI the parts pertinent to our point had been selected and reassembled under their respective headings, the matter quite naturally fell into four main divisions: (1) what created existence is, and what it is not—the formal cause; (2) what things exist—the material cause; (3) what agents can proximately effect some existences—the efficient cause; and (4) the effects of existence. We have unhesitatingly used a division natural and obvious, yet it is a division to which Suarez would perhaps object. The implications of the term, "The Material Cause of Existence," would seem particularly inaccurate to him. He expressly teaches that existence as such requires no material cause; some existences do require one, but only when the actual essence does (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 8, nn. 4-5). Even the notion of formal cause of existence would seem inappropriate to him (*Ibid.*, n. 6). However, we use these terms in a wider sense than that in which Suarez would deny their acceptability.

[276] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 4, nn. 1-3.

Suarez' next proposition is the fundamental one: this being by which the essence of a creature is formally constituted in the actuality of essence is true existence. He offers these arguments:

(1) For the truth of proposition, " essence is " when in the proposition there is only subject and capula (*locutio de secundo adiacente*) this being, precisely taken, is sufficient. Therefore this being is true existence. The consequence, Suarez adds, is clear for according to the common concept of men " is " in a proposition of this kind (*de secundo adiacente*) does not abstract from time but signifies actually being in nature, which is what we all mean by existence. The antecedent is shown by this that through this being of an actual essence precisely taken such an essence is a being in act and distinct from being-in-potency; by reason of *it* then the essence *is* for to be a being-in-act does not have less ratio of being than is included in the verb " is." [277]

(2) To the being of actual essence convene all those things which are attributed to existence. It is, therefore, true existence. As for the antecedent:

a)	This being is temporal not eternal	= existence is temporal
b)	This being convenes *contingently* to the creature	= existence convenes to a creature so
c)	This being is conserved in the creature by the Creator's efficiency	= existence is proximately conserved through God's efficiency

Thus no condition necessary to existence is unverified of the being of an actual essence unless one says: " One condition is lacking, namely, that it be distinct from the essence." That

[277] Illud esse quo essentia creaturae formaliter constituitur in actualitate essentiae est verum esse existentiae. . . . Hoc esse praecise sumptum satis est ad veritatem hujus locutionis de secundo adjacente. . . . *Essentia est*; ergo illud esse est vera existentia. Consequentia est clara: nam juxta communem significationem . . . hominum *est*, de secundo adjacente, non absolvitur a tempore sed significat actu esse in rerum natura quod omnes intelligimus nomine existentiae (*Ibid.*, n. 4).

begs the point; it is also illogical since a distinction is a result of, not a condition for, being.[278]

(3) Existential being is that by which, formally and immediately, a thing is constituted outside its causes, ceases to be nothing, and begins to be something. But the being by which, formally and immediately, a thing is constituted in the actuality of essence is that by which it is constituted outside its causes, ceases to be nothing, and begins to be something. The major is clear from the immediate and formal opposition between being-in-act and being-in-potency. Actual being is existing (else there would be a medium between possible and existing); hence what constitutes a thing actual in itself and outside its causes constitutes it existing. The minor is almost per se known; through this being an essence is constituted outside its causes and outside possibility. This being of the actual essence if it be understood to remain without any other distinct being (whether that be possible or not) is sufficient to distinguish an actual being from a possible and so constitute it in a new and temporal state and so terminate the action of the agent. This being, then, is existence.[279]

Suarez also puts his argument in these words: In reality it is the same for man to be and for man to be man, if in both propositions " to be " indicates act and not merely aptitude or the truth of a proposition. Likewise it is the same for man to

[278] Huic esse actualis essentiae conveniunt omnia quae tribui solent existentiae . . . ergo est verum esse existentiae . . . nam esse essentiae actualis non est aeternum, sed temporale . . . hoc esse convenit creaturae contingenter . . . huic esse actualis essentiae convenit, ut conferatur creaturae per efficientiam Creatoris. . . . Esset ergo voluntaria petitio principii inter conditiones necessarias ad esse existentiae ponere hujusmodi distinctionem . . . distinctio cum sit negatio vel relatio quaedam non est conditio per se requisita ad esse rei, sed est quid resultans ex tali esse rei (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[279] Esse existentiae nihil aliud est quam illud esse quo formaliter et immediate entitas aliqua constituitur extra causas suas, et desinit esse nihil, ac incipit esse aliquid; sed hujusmodi est hoc esse quo formaliter et immediate constituitur res in actualitate essentiae; ergo est verum esse existentiae. Major videtur esse per se nota. . . . Item . . . ens actu idem est quod existens . . . Minor autem . . . fere est per se nota . . . ostensum est per hoc esse formaliter constitui essentiam extra possibilitatem (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

be man and to be rational or animal etc., for all these, in reality, are the same. Therefore all these predicates are taken from the same actuality and the same thing whether that thing is called actual essence or actual existence (*esse*). In one thing therefore there is only one being by which it is constituted a being-in-act, and that is the being of existence.[280]

More briefly we can phrase the argument: being-in-act is formally the same as existing; but the latter as such is formally constituted only through existence. It is really the same to say that man is as to say that man is man if *is* in both cases bespeaks act.

Negatively Suarez supports his teaching by arguing that a really distinct " being-of-existence " is both superfluous and impossible. It is superfluous, for if there were any necessity or utility for such imagined existence it could be shown by some reasonable and probable argument, and no formal effect can be assigned to this " entity of existence." To say it formally constitutes the essence as existing begs the question. The notion " existing " cannot add any ratio distinct from that of an actual being outside its causes; so there is no existence distinct from the being which constitutes each thing in the actuality of its essence.

It is impossible for it is unnecessary, and nature never postulates the superfluous. Also, where there is no possible formal effect there is no form possible, but there is no formal effect that a distinct existence could give.[281] To the argument that not all actuality comes from existence but that within the very essence

[280] Secundum rem idem est hominem esse et hominem esse hominem si in utraque propositione esse dicat actum et non solam aptitudinem aut veritatem propositionis . . . reipsa idem est hominem esse hominem et esse rationalem vel animal, etc. quia haec omnia in re idem sunt. Quapropter ab eadem actualitate et ab eadem re haec omnia praedicata sumuntur sive illa res vocetur essentia actualis sive esse actuale ejus. . . . Non est est in una re nisi unum esse quo constituitur ens actu, et illud ipsum est esse existentiae (*Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 15).

[281] Omnis alia entitas vel modus realis est superfluus et sine probatione confictus. . . . Et hinc satis etiam constat hujusmodi entitatem vel modum esse superfluum. . . . Quid confert alia existentia? Inferimus hujusmodi entitatem existentiae . . . esse . . . impossibilem . . . quia ubi effectus formalis nullus est vel non est possibilis neque forma est possibilis (*Ibid.*, nn. 10-12).

there is actuality (for the inferior grade is actual with respect to the higher and the form with respect to matter) Suarez answers that the actual can be taken as opposed to (1) objective potency (so taken all actuality does intrinsically and formally come from existence), or (2) receptive potency (and it as so taken in the objection).

The act opposed to objective potency (entitative act) is sometimes really distinct from the act opposed to receptive potency (formal act) for the former, as participated by a receptive potency is really distinct from that potency's formal act. Sometimes however, the entitative act is only rationally distinct from the formal act. For the form to be the act of matter (at least aptitudinally) and actually to be such a thing differ only in concept. Hence (1) actual being distinct from being-in-potency is formally constituted through existence, (2) all formal actuality or actuation as it comes from some partial essence, comes too from a partial existence, for a form does not actuate matter unless it is such an actual entity, and it has this through its existence.[282]

From this teaching that the being of an actual essence *is* existence certain propositions are bound to come. As corollaries we shall treat here Suarez' notions of (1) the distinction between created essence and existence; (2) their composition; and (3) their inseparability.

(1) We certainly conceive created essence and existence as distinct. The question is, what distinction is there, in reality, between the two? Suarez proceeds methodically and discusses and judges three different opinions.

[282] [Actus] potest enim sumi vel ut opponitur potentiae objectivae vel ut respicit potentiam receptivam . . . in priori sensu . . . verissimum est omnem actualitatem entis . . . provenire ab esse existentiae. . . . Objectio autem procedit in posteriori sensu. . . . Actualitas autem prior seu entitativa ita comparatur ad actum . . . formalem ut interdum reipsa distinguantur, interdum sola ratione . . . participatur non solum ab actu formali sed etiam a potentia receptiva cujus entitativa actualitas realiter distinguitur ab actualitate formae; in ipsa autem forma, esse actum materiae, saltem aptitudine et esse tale ens actu sola ratione distinguuntur. . . . Non solum verum est, ens actu . . . constitui formaliter et intrinsece per esse existentiae sed etiam est verum omnem formalem actualitatem . . . sicut provenit ab aliqua essentia . . . ita provenire ab aliqua existentia (*Ibid.*, n. 15).

(a) A real distinction between actual essence and existence is excluded; a created essence constituted in act outside its causes is not really distinguished from existence. Suarez argues: (1) From the authority of Aristotle saying that being joined to things adds nothing to them; it can be gathered from Aristotle himself that this is proportionately true of a thing in potency and act.[283] (2) Such a distinct entity of existence (1) added to an actual essence cannot formally give it the first actuality by which it is separated and distinguished from being in potency (for nothing can be constituted in its very entity through something distinct from itself) and (2) it cannot be necessary under any ratio of cause in order that an essence have its actual entity of essence, as has been shown. The position that existence is a necessary condition is unproven. In any case there are many conditions necessary for a thing to be; all of these conditions would then be existence.[284]

He considers the argument that a formal cause has a two-fold respect: (1) to the *composite*—it intrinsically composes the effect; (2) to the *matter*—for if the form, by informing or actuating the matter, confers to its being it can rightly be called its formal cause; therefore in the same way the entity of existence can be called the formal cause of the essence, and with the essence, it constitutes one existing thing; existence actuates the essence and formally makes it remain in being. To this argument Suarez replies that there is no composite to be composed of essence and a distinct existence. An existing thing and a being in act (an actual essence) are the same; the essence is not potential for existence but it has identical with itself some real existence constituting it outside its causes. Even if existence were a distinct act an actual essence could be conserved without it, by divine power at least (for while God can not supply for

[283] [Aristoteles] ubique ait ens adjunctum rebus nihil eis addere . . . hoc autem cum eadem proportione verum est de re in potentia et in actu (*Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 1).

[284] Talis entitas addita actuali essentiae nec potest illi formaliter conferre primam . . . actualitatem (potentia non constituatur intrinsece et formaliter in sua entitate per alteram, quae est actus) neque etiam potest esse necessaria sub aliqua ratione causae . . . ut essentia habeat suam entitatem actualem essentiae (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

an intrinsically composing formal cause He can supply for the dependence of one composing part on the other) and an entity so conserved is truly existing. Hence whatever this distinct act adds it is not existence, or necessary to the formal effect of existence. By the very fact that we understand an actual entity made by God we conceive it as existing. Since there is nothing false in that objective concept we can conclude that no other superadded thing is necessary for the formal effect of existing.[285]

(b) A modal distinction between essence and existence is not to be admitted, for a modal distinction which is positive on the part of both extremes can only be between a thing and its mode, so that the thing even without the mode is a positive real actual being. Hence an essence without the mode would already be actual, i. e., existing; so the mode cannot constitute it in that actuality. In any case the modally distinct existence would itself be modally distinct from its actual being, and the distinctions could go on to infinity.[286]

(c) In creatures a rational distinction with a foundation in reality is to be admitted between an actual essence and existence, and such a distinction is sufficient for us to say absolutely that it is not of the essence of a creature actually to exist. God alone has entity from Himself (*ex Se*) which includes a negation of having it from another and through efficiency. In this sense the statement " Existence is of the essence of God but not of the essence of creatures " is true; even to have the actual

[285] Concludimus nullum posse assignari constitutum propter quod talis entitas necessaria sit . . . existens . . . et ens actu id est non in potentia, idem omnino sunt . . . essentia illa ut jam est actualis entitas per effectionem suae causae non est in se . . . pura potentia in ordine ad esse sed . . . omnino identice habet aliquod esse reale et actuale quod esse est vera existentia . . . saltem per divinam potentiam posse conservari actualis entitas essentiae sine illo ulteriori alio actu formali . . . si autem Deus conservet essentiam sine actu existentiae distinctae illa entitas seu conservata est vere existens et . . . quidquid illi addi fingitur non potest veram rationem existentiae habere (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-8).

[286] Ipsa essentia praecise concepta . . . esset verum ens actu; ergo . . . non posset intrinsece constitui in tali entitate actuali per illum modum . . . resolvi posset in aliam entitatem et illum modum; et ita procedeur in infinitum donec sistamus in simplici entitate actuali (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-10).

entity of essence is not of the essence of a creature.[287] Yet when we say that it is not of the essence of a creature actually to exist, " creature " is not to be understood as a real created entity, for, as an actual entity, it does demand to exist. As whiteness is of the essence of a white thing, existence is of the essence of an actual thing. The creature can lose existence, but not without being destroyed. Therefore the creature does not have existence " of its essence " in the sense of having it independently of anything else; it does have it " of its essence " in the sense that that phrase means the primary and formal constitutive of a thing.[288]

(2) In view of what Suarez has already written, his answer to the question " of what kind is the composition between created essence and existence? " is easily predictable.[289] We can summarize that answer in these propositions: (1) This composition is called composition only analogously; it is not real but merely rational, since it is not between really distinct terms. (2) It is metaphysical composition since it is common to all creatures. (3) It is not the basis of corruption but abstracts from corruption. (4) Though only composition of reason it has a foundation in creatures, namely that creatures do not have existence from themselves but participate it from another. The fundament then includes imperfection which is repugnant to God; hence this composition is proper to creatures.[290]

[287] Dico . . . in creaturis existentiam et essentiam . . . solum distingui ratione cum aliquo fundamento in re quae distinctio satis erit ut absolute dicamus non esse de essentia creaturae actu existere (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[288] In hoc sensu, sicut albedo est de essentia albi ut album est ita existentia est de essentia creaturae ut res actu creata est . . . prout dicitur esse de essentia id quod est primum et formale constitutivum rei . . . existentia vere dici potest de essentia creaturae in actu constitutae (*Ibid.*, n. 24). Suarez adds that existence convenes contingently to a creature considered absolutely, that is, as it is precised from this that it be created or only creatible, but that it convenes necessarily to a creature taken for an actually created thing, namely, the conditional necessity that a thing be when it is. For Suarez' account of how reason arrives at its distinction between created essence and existence, cf. *Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, n. 15 and ff.

[289] *Ibid.*, sect. 13.

[290] Dicendum est compositionem ex esse et essentia analogice tantum compositionem appellari, quia non est compositio realis sed rationis . . . [quia] hic . . .

It does not follow that created existence, as unreceived in a potency, is therefore unlimited and infinite, for in any class of creatures existence is somehow limited. The existence of accidents is received in the subject; material substantial form is received in matter; matter is limited by its respect to form; a whole composed substance is limited by its parts; angels can be said to be received into the supposite; subsistence is limited since subsistence is only made; the whole supposit is limited because it is composed of limited extremes.[291] Created existence is, in fact received *by*, though not *in*, something for a thing can be unreceived in either of two ways: (1) unreceived both *in* something and *by* something—such a thing is infinite; (2) unreceived *in* something (a subject) but received *by* something —such a thing does not imply infinity since it subsists through composition with subsistence and is not pure act. It must not be thought that because it is participated existence, it is participated by a subject, which is really distinct from it; rather one and the same thing is a reality in a participated way.[292]

A being which is not received by anything, Suarez points out, is limited by itself, by its own nature, for it is of just so much perfection. That existence be limited it is enough that it be received *by* another in *such* a measure of *such* perfection even though it is not properly received in any passive potency. Likewise a created essence (even though it be its own existence)

extrema non sunt in re distincta . . . haec vero est metaphysica . . . haec . . .ex se abstrahit a corruptione vel transmutatione physica (*loc. cit.*, n. 7) . . . in re habeat aliquod fundamentum . . . hoc autem fundamentum non est aliud nisi quia creatura non habet se actu existere (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

[291] Non oportet ut esse creaturae illimitatum sit quamvis sit irreceptum in subjecto (*Ibid.*, nn. 14-15).

[292] dupliciter intelligi esse irreceptum: uno modo quod sit irreceptum tam in aliquo quam ab aliquo . . . et de tali esse recte dicitur esse infinitum . . . Alio vero modo dici potest esse irreceptum in aliquo quamvis sit receptum ab aliquo et hoco modo conceditur esse creatum posse esse irreceptum; . . . Nego tamen inde sequi quod sit . . . infinitum. Tum quia, . . . est subsistens per compositionem . . . cum ipsa subsistentia; tum etiam quia non esset purus actus sed per participationem . . . non est imaginandum quod una res sit quae participat . . . et alia quae participatur . . . sed quia una et eadem res est realitas modo participato et per vim alterius (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

can yet be limited, namely, by its own intrinsic difference. For Suarez it has not yet been proved that an actual thing can be limited only by composition with potency; for an absolute thing which has no potency to terminate it can yet be terminated by reason of this alone, that it has *such* a grade of being. Extrinsically it is limited by God either effectively or as an exemplary cause.[293]

(3) By reason of his fundamental thesis Suarez is forced to conclude to an absolute inseparability of essence and existence.[294]

He teaches briefly:

(a) It is impossible that existence be separated from its essence in such a way that existence is preserved, the essence destroyed. Those who hold for a real distinction teach this too, but they can give no reason why God could not separate the created existence and preserve it alone, for essence is not its cause through intrinsic composition; for such extrinsic causality God can supply.[295]

(b) Even by absolute power it cannot be that a created essence is conserved in nature and outside its causes without any existence. Suarez adds that the defenders of a real distinction can give no adequate reason why God could not conserve one without the other.[296]

(c) Created essence and existence cannot be so separated

[293] [Esse] seipso et ex vi entitatis suae esse limitatum et finitum neque indigere aliquo limitante vel contrahente in re distincto a seipso sed intrinsece natura sua esse tantae perfectionis . . . essentia actualis per seipsam vel per sua intrinseca principia est formaliter limitata (*Ibid.*, nn. 18-19). Nulla enim sufficienti ratione adhuc probatum est rem non posse finiri nisi illo modo [i. e. per potentiam] (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XXX, sect. 2, n. 19).

[294] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 12.

[295] Dico . . . impossibile esse ita separari existentiam ab essentia ut conservertur existentia, destructa essentia. . . . Qui putant existentiam esse rem omnino realiter distinctam ab essentia creata . . . vix possunt sufficienem hujus diciti reddere rationem in ordine ad potentiam Dei absolutam (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-3).

[296] Fieri non potest etiam de potentia absoluta ut essentia creata conservetur in rerum natura et extra causas sine ulla existentia. . . . Cum dicant essentiam et existentiam esse res condistinctas nullam rationem addere possunt cur non possit Deus conservare illam entitatem essentiae nudam (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

that each is really preserved while the union between them is dissolved, for between them there is not union but identity.[297]

(d) By God's absolute power a created existing essence cannot be conserved through some existence other than its own. (According to Suarez all theologians agree to this, for they all affirm that there is in Christ's Sacred Humanity its created and proper existence). The argument is that as an actual essence cannot be conserved without itself, neither can it be conserved without its own existence. The very conservation of the essence is an affection of it; and every affection is a communication of some being which is existence. Here again Suarez sees an indication of the weakness of the theory of a real distinction; for, he asks, if essence and existence were really distinct why could not God supply for existence and conserve the essence without its existence? [298]

(e) Actual existence is separable from a created essence only in such a way that each perishes or is destroyed; and essence deprived of existence is nothing.[299]

Having considered the nature of existence we now come to the question of its subject: What things exist? [300] The principles governing Suarez' answer have already been indicated quite fully, so here we only briefly indicate the conclusion he reached.

(1) To common natures abstractly conceived existence in the singulars (even partial existence) does not convene; for actual existence is repugnant to anything abstract.[301]

(2) To a supposit alone (as distinct from an undeterminated

[297] *Ibid.*, nn. 7-8.

[298] Non potest de potentia Dei absoluta conservari creata essentia existens per alienam existentiam absque propriam. Ita sentiunt omnes Theologi qui affirmant in humanitate Christi esse existentiam creatam et propriam, et non existere formaliter humanitatem illam per existentiam Verbi . . . sicut conservari non potest [essentia creata] sine seipsa, ita etiam nec sine propria existentia . . . [Si essentia et existentia distinguuntur realiter] nulla posset (ut saepe dixi) sufficiens ratio reddi, cur non posset Deus actualem essentiam sine existentia conservare (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-12).

[299] *Ibid.*, nn. 34-37.

[300] *Loc. cit.*, sect. 11.

[301] *Ibid.*, nn. 2-3.

nature) convenes substantial existence which is in every way complete. Yet there is substantial existence which convenes to things not supposits, since suppositality presupposes a nature already actual and therefore existing. Substantial existence then is two-fold: *per se* and complete (composed of the existence of the nature and the existence of the supposit) and incomplete. In the order of nature a nature can, by incomplete existence, exist before the subsistence.[302]

(3) The existence of the nature generally speaking is not an act of the complete essence only but is total or partial, complete or incomplete according as the nature is such. Partial existence convenes to parts of the essence, integral existence to the complete essence, for the parts are themselves actual beings not really distinct from their own existence. Matter and form have partial existences through which the integral existence of the whole is completed.[303]

(4) Accidents, since they have their own essence distinct from the subject, have their own existence.[304]

(5) Modes of things, as subsistence, figure, etc., have their own existence.

It is clear then that in that statement that essence and existence are really identical the existence meant is that through which the essence is constituted in its own proper and precise reality; the essence is not altogether indentical with any other existence.[305]

[302] Recte divisa est existentia: quaedam enim est omnino completa in genere substantiae . . . quae includit non tantum actualitatem essentiae . . . sed etiam modus talis naturae . . . Talis ergo existentia est solius supositi . . . alia vero est existentia substantialis non omnino completa, quia adhuc potest per subsistentiam terminari. . . . Potestque talis natura praeexistere subsistentiae ordine naturae (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-7).

[303] Sicut distinguitur essentia in totalem et partialem seu completam et incompletam ita etiam distinguendam esse existentiam intra illum ordinem. . . . Existentia ergo partialis immediate convenit parti essentiae . . . sequitur ex fundamento posito quod existentia non distinguitur in re ab essentia actuali . . . Item . . . materia prima . . . habet propriam existentiam partialem (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

[304] Dicendum . . . est, formam accidentalem habere suum proprium esse existentiae (*Ibid.*, n. 25).

[305] *Ibid.*, nn. 32-33.

There remains the question of the efficient cause of created existence. We shall confine ourselves to a discussion of the proximate efficient cause and that relative only to things which are generated or come about through a change of some presupposed subject, not with things which are through creation alone. Suarez' doctrine is this:

(1) Secondary causes are true efficient causes of the existence of their effects, according as these effects are from them. His direct arguments are these: (a) By one action is made an existing thing and its existence. But secondary causes do effect their real and existing effects. Therefore. (b) All real efficiency terminates at some existence. But secondary causes are truly efficient causes of something. Therefore. (c) Essence and existence are not really distinct. But secondary causes give to their effects the entity of actual essence. Therefore.[306]

(2) Secondary causes can be principal and not merely instrumental causes of existence. The existence of these effects proceeds from their causes just as their essences do. But the secondary cause is a principal cause with respect to the effect, (i. e., with respect to its essence). Therefore. No cause, Suarez notes, can be both principal and instrumental with respect to one and the same action and term. Even if we suppose a real distinction between created essence and existence the latter does not exceed the power of the second cause.[307]

The position that secondary causes bring about the determination to *such* being, not being itself, Suarez dismisses on the ground this proposition can mean either (a) the secondary cause effects some difference or intrinsic mode in being which

[306] Existentiam quando per generationem fit, a causa proxima fieri ut a propria et principali causa in suo ordine, subordinata (*Ibid.*, sect. 9, n. 5) . . . quia unica et eadem actione fit res existens et existentia ejus sed causae secundae vere efficiunt aliquid. Ergo efficiunt existentias eorum. Secundo quia omnis vera efficientia terminatur ad aliquod esse existentiae . . . sed causae secundae vere efficiunt aliquid. Ergo, etc. (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[307] Existentiae rerum quae generantur et corrumpuntur non solum fiunt a causis secundis ut ab instrumentis sed etiam ut a causis principalibus proximis . . . etiam posita distinctione reali inter existentiam et essentiam non video qua probabilitate possit haec assertio negari (*Ibid.*, nn. 19-20).

determines being, which is impossible because physical action attains a thing itself as it is in itself, and not a mode or a metaphysical difference; or (b) the secondary cause determines being merely on the part of the subject, by preparing a subject which is receptive of this being, not of any other. Two actions are supposed, one of the creature inducing a form according to the being of essence, another an action of God alone conferring being. This (1) multiplies acts uselessly, (2) ignores the fact that some existence must be given through the creature's action since by that action is given some real being making the thing to be outside its causes. The action attributed to God alone is superfluous. Why could not God suspend this action? If we suppose He did the effect would be existing by reason of the action of the creature alone. The action of the creature effects some real being else it is not real action. The real being effected can be either existence or essence. If the former, Suarez' point is conceded; if the latter it is either in potency or in act. If in potency it is nothing made in reality; if in act then there is something temporal and new, therefore something existing.[308]

From the side of the action attributed to God alone, too, Suarez thinks this position unacceptable. That action is either creation or the eduction of an act of existing from the potency of the subject (essence). The first is impossible, for it would follow that every created existence would be subsisting, independent of any receiver; the latter is not to be admitted for such an eduction does not exceed the power or proportion of a created agent.[309]

[308] Vel est sensus quod causa secunda efficit in ipsomet esse aliquam differentiam . . . et hoc est impossible nisi efficiendo totum ipsum esse . . . vel est sensus quod solum ex parte subjecti causae secundae determinant esse praeparando subjectum susceptivum talis esse. . . . Hoc autem falsum esse . . . demonstro. . . . Secundo quia si consideretur praecise illa actio causae secundae . . . necesse est ut propter illam detur aliquod esse existentiae quia per illam datur aliquod esse reale. . . . Non repugnat Deum suspendere omnem aliam actionem quae se solo facturus erat; . . . nihilominus intelligimus ex vi hujus primae actionis rem actu esse genitam (*Ibid.*, nn. 12-13).

[309] Talis actio neque ex modo quo fit neque ex termino ad quem tendit superat vim agentis creati (*Ibid.*, nn. 16-17). Yet Suarez adds that in the effecting of existence and essence there is something proper to God in which He surpasses

A final word about the effects of existence will be helpful to complete our account of the Suarezian teaching about created existence.[310] (1) Actual existence is altogether necessary for exercising material and formal causality. It is required both in the order of time and in the order of nature: (a) in the order of time: for such causality consists in actual and intrinsic composing and in sustaining and actuating. But for these existence is needed; (b) in the order of nature; for existing causality must proceed from an existing cause. Again the actual existence of matter and form is necessary in the instant in which they cause. But it is not necessary as a consequent of its causality (it would then cause itself) so it must be required as antecedent in the order of nature.[311] (2) The existence of matter (and this holds true proportionately for form) is that through which matter, in its genus, causes.[312] (3) What has been said of material and formal causality applies to efficient. The existence of an active form is the ratio or per se principle of its acting, for (a) it is the actual essence of the form which certainly is the principle of acting, and (b) God is, in the highest way, effective because He is being (existence) through His Essence. Created existence therefore can very well be the principle of effecting. To argue that it is finite proves nothing. The essence is finite also.[313]

2. The Physical Order: Primary Matter and Substantial

creatures for with regard to existence: (1) The adequate object of Divine Power is created being as such; that of the created power is this being; 2) God alone gives the total being totally, the creature completes and perfects being already begun; 3) God produces existence from no pre-existing creature; The second cause gives being only from the presupposition of other being. The same excellence and singularity convenes to God in effecting essence (*Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, nn. 21-24).

[310] *Ibid.*, sect. 10.

[311] Existentia actualis est omnino necessaria ad exercendam causalitatem materialem et formalem non solum in duratione temporis sed etiam in antecessione seu ordine naturae (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-11).

[312] Existentia materiae (et idem proportionaliter est de forma) in re ipsa est id per quod materia causat in suo ordine (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[313] Nam quae diximus de materiali et formali causa possunt et debent ad efficientem applicari nam majori ratione in ea locum habent . . . ipsamet existentia formae activae est ipsamet ratio seu principium per se agendi (*Ibid.*, nn. 16, 18).

Form. Since we are interested in matter and form in as much as they are physical potency and act we shall consider them here together under that precise aspect rather than separately according to all that Suarez has to say of them.

Primary matter is the first subject out of which something is made. In general matter is usually divided into three classes: matter *out of which*, matter *in which*, and matter *about which*.[314] Matter is called first both through negation of any prior matter and through respect to second matter. Since matter bespeaks a subject, that is first matter which supposes no previous subject. It is under this aspect that the Aristotelian definition of primary matter (given above) considers matter.[315] Second matter (and a substantial composite is called such with respect to accidents) is that which supposes a prior subject. Even proximate matter, i. e., matter disposed by accidents for a form, is called second matter since the reception of such dispositions precedes in the order of nature, and constitutes the subject proximately capable of such a form.

Substantial form, for Suarez, is a certain incomplete and simple substance which, as the act of matter constitutes with matter the essence of a composed substance. It is a substance; this is the genus of the definition which distinguishes this reality from accidents and from substantial modes. It is simple—to distinguish it from composed substance. It is incomplete—to distinguish it from separated substances (angels). The rest of the definition distinguishes it from that other simple, incomplete substance which is primary matter, Suarez admits, too, that we can call substantial form, as Aristotle did, the act of a physical body.[316]

In exposing the nature of matter Suarez begins by ruling out certain unacceptable notions. Primary matter is not, he indi-

[314] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIII, sect. 1, nn. 1-2.

[315] *I Phys.* 9, 1. 82.

[316] Forma est substantia quaedam simplex et incompleta quae ut actus materiae cum ea constituit essentiam substantiae compositae (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XV, sect. 5, n. 1).

cates, a simple body,[317] nor a complete and integral substance,[318] nor a composite of substantial potency and some incomplete form.[319]

Yet the matter of generable things is essentially constituted in an ultimate species, an ultimate species of matter retained under every form, invariable or at most accommodated to various forms merely through added accidents. It is specific yet communicable to essentially diverse substances so that while the concepts of generable substance is generic it is not such by reason of matter.[320] What kind of entity then does matter of itself have? This much, Suarez is sure, is agreed on: matter actually under a form, and which with the form constitutes a corporeal substance has some entity which is real, substantial, and really distinct from the entity of the form.[321] It is real, for if it were nothing matter would have no real function in nature. Corruption would be a resolution to nothingness, generation a production from nothing. It is substantial; matter essentially composes a substance and substance cannot be composed by nothing; it requires at least incomplete substances. It is really distinct from the entity of form; it is really separable from any particular, determined form. The distinction cannot be merely modal for substantial form is not a mode as is clear from the fact that any form can be conserved in being, by God's absolute power, without matter. Matter, moreover, is perpetual and prior to form; it must, then, have a distinct entity.[322]

[317] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 3, nn. 5-6.

[318] *Ibid.*, nn. 8-11.

[319] *Ibid.*, nn. 12-16. Suarez argues here that (1) nature gives no indication of such a form; (2) such a form could not be composed with subsequent forms since of two actual beings a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made; (3) no form can give "quasi-generic" being without giving specific being as well, for a form is precisely that which is distinct.

[320] Materia prima rerum generabilium . . . essentialiter est constituta in aliqua ultima specie materiae quam retinet sub omni forma, nec variare illam potest sed ad summum per accidentia superaddita potest ad hanc vel illam formam accommodari. . . . Conceptum substantiae generabilis ut sic non esse genericum ratione materiae (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[321] Materiam quae actu est sub forma . . . habere aliquid entitatis realis et substantialis distinctae ab entitate formae (*Ibid.*, sect. 4, n. 2).

[322] *Ibid.*, nn. 3-5.

Granted the entity of matter the question is, does matter, of itself, have entity which is actual? (Here the phrase " of itself " is meant by Suarez to signify a negation of a formal, not of an efficient cause). Suarez gives an account of the Thomistic answer to this question,[323] then sharply differs from it insisting that matter has its own actual entity of essence and of existence not intrinsically from the form, but of itself, though always with an intrinsic regard to form.

Matter created by God and existing in a composite must have some essence, else it is not a real being. But the essence of matter is not constituted intrinsically, in its essential being through form. Therefore of itself it has some essential entity.

The minor premise Suarez upholds with these arguments: (1) Form does not intrinsically constitute matter except by composing it. But matter is essentially a simple not a composed thing. (2) Every simple thing (because simple) must have its own essence through itself. But matter is simple. (3) Matter is essentially incomplete. It cannot therefore be intrinsically constituted through form, for if it were it would be a complete essence.[324] Matter can, in fact, lose one form and acquire another, while preserving numerically the same entity. This essential entity and perfection then is different from that given by the form.[325]

Yet since matter is essentially potency and all potency bespeaks an intrinsic respect to form, matter does not have its own entity of essence without transcendental relation to form. This respect, however, is to form absolutely, not to this or that form; another clear argument, Suarez adds, that matter does

[323] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[324] Materia creata a Deo et in composito existens habet aliquam essentiam realem alioquin non esset ens reale; sed essentia materiae non constituitur intrinsece in suo esse essentiae per formam; ergo per seipsam. . . . Minor probatur quia forma non constituit intrinsece aliquam naturam in suo esse essentiae nisi componendo illam per modum actus; forma autem non componit essentiam materiae . . . quia materia essentialiter est entitas simplex . . . omnis entitas simplex necessario habet per seipsam intrinsece . . . suam entitatem . . . materia essentialiter est entitas incompleta ergo intrinsece non constituitur per formam (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

[325] *Ibid.*, n. 10.

not have its essential entity from the information of a form. Matter, he has already pointed out, has its own species (the ultimate species of matter) even apart from form.[326]

Matter has its own entity of existence. This proposition must follow since in Suarez' theory, existence adds no real thing or real mode to the entity of essence as this latter is actual and outside its causes. By the very fact that a thing is conceived as actual, as outside its causes, it is conceived as existing. This doctrine that matter has its own existence Suarez confirms with these considerations: (1) Matter under a new form has numerically the same entity it had under the old. Consequently it has numerically the same being by which it is constituted in actual existing entity. (2) The subject of generation (matter) since it is not nothing is a created entity. But creation terminates at an actual, existing entity. Therefore the subject of generation (matter) is actual, existing. (3) If matter did not really exist it could not be a real subject. (4) As the essence of a corporeal substance is composed of the partial essence of matter and form, so its existence is composed of the partial existences of matter and form.[327] Yet the existence of matter depends on form and on the information of form, for matter is so imperfect that, unaided, it cannot be.[328] Matter then is through creation; its entity is incorruptible. God can destroy matter only through annihilation.[329]

[326] Haec autem habitudo non est per se primo ad hanc vel illam formam sed ad formam absolute. . . . Quod etiam est clarum argumentum materiam non habere entitatem essentiae ab informatione formae (*Ibid.*, n. 11) . . . responsum est materiam . . . constitutam esse in ultima specie materiae in qua specie non constituitur per eam formam qua informatur (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[327] Materia prima etiam habet in se et per se entitatem seu actualitatem existentiae distinctam ab existentia formae . . . materia eamdem numero entitatem actualem habet sub forma geniti quam habet sub forma corrupti; ergo etiam habet idem numero esse . . . materia ut praesupponitur formae . . . non est omnino nihil; est ergo aliqua entitas creata; ergo entitas actualis et existens . . . sicut ergo essentia substantiae corporeae componitur ex partialibus essentiis materiae et formae ita etiam integra existentia ejusdem substantiae compositur ex partialibus existentiis materiae et formae (*Ibid.*, n. 13).

[328] *Ibid.*, n. 14.

[329] *Ibid.*, nn. 16-17.

What causal influence, then, does form have on this entity of primary matter? [330] Suarez answers that form is not a proper cause of matter, formally giving to it that proper being by which matter exists. Matter, already has its own partial essential entity which entity it retains under all forms. That entity includes its partial existence distinct from all existence coming from a form. Suarez' fundamental reason he has already treated; matter is a real subject; therefore of itself it has actual being.[331]

Matter to be sure is pure potency but this does not exclude that it have its own actual entity.[332] A fuller understanding of this depends on a knowledge of what is meant by saying that matter is pure potency which we shall consider in the next section.

From Suarez' concept of the independent actuality of matter there follow many corollaries. For the sake of indicating how far he was willing to go with this doctrine we shall point out a few that are explicitly and formally taught by Suarez himself.

(1) Primary matter can be conserved without any substantial form at all, not in the ordinary cause of nature but by God's power.[333] From Suarez' principles this must follow since matter of itself has true actuality of being. But even if created essence and existence are really distinct (so that matter would not have existence of itself), Suarez thinks that there would be no reason why God could not give existence to matter alone. By the connatural order existence is in the supposit, admittedly; but by Divine power it could be in one part of the supposit alone, as God can make accidental existence remain in accidents separated from any subject. Matter has a partial, substantial

[330] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8.

[331] Forma, non est propria causa materiae dans illi formaliter proprium esse, quo materia existit . . . quia forma non dat materiae illam partialem entitatem essentialem quam in se habet . . . sed illa entitas includit suam particularem existentiam distinctam ab omni existentia proveniente formaliter a forma (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

[332] Quod enim dicitur pura potentia non excludit actualem entitatem ipsius materiae (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[333] De potentia absoluta potest conservari materia sine ulla forma (*Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 9, n. 1; cf. also disp. XV, sect. 9).

essence; any essence in so far as it is, can be actuated through its act, namely existence. Nothing indicates that the order between substantial form and existence is so essential that it cannot be changed by God.[334]

On Suarez' own principle that essence and existence are really identical his conclusion is even more apparent. Matter has its own partial entity of essence; therefore it has its own partial entity of existence too. Hence it can be conserved by God even without form. Any partial nature is capable of a proportioned existence; in that existence then it can subsist, even alone, through Divine power. The partial existence of matter, Suarez repeats, does not flow from form as from an intrinsic cause, so God can supply for the function of the form and so conserve matter alone. Even if form be a cause of the being of matter it certainly is not a cause which intrinsically composes it; so God's efficient causality can supply for such causality as this. It is not of the ratio of existing matter nor does the essence of matter demand that it have form; matter consists in aptitude for form. Hence it can be actual (entitatively) and yet in potency to formal act.[335]

(2) In the conservation of any body there is a separate action by which the matter is conserved; in the conservation of man there are three actions, one conserving the body, the second the soul, and the third their union. This follows logically enough from the doctrine of matter's actuality. Matter, Suarez thought, is created by one act; a form is induced in it by another

[334] Quamvis teneremus existentiam esse rem distinctam ab essentia nulla reddi posset sufficiens ratio cur non posset Deum illum actum ponere in sola materia . . . per divinam potentiam posset [existentiam] constitui in una parte . . . posset [Deus] conservare esse substantiale in sola forma . . . ergo etiam posset in sola essentia materiae ponere actum existentiae, quia . . . revera est quadam partialis essentia substantialis; quatenus ergo aliqua essentia est, poterit per existentiam actuari; nam existentia est actus essentiae (*Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 9, n. 3).

[335] Ex propriis [principiis] ratio a priori hujus sententiae est quia materia sicut habet suam partialem entitatem essentiae, ita et existentiae; . . . ideo . . . potest Deus . . . materiam sine forma conservare . . . existentia partialis materiae non manat intrinsece a forma . . . non est de ratione partis essentialis actu existentis quod sit forma, vel habeat formam . . . solum consistat in aptitudine ad formam (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

action. These same distinct actions continue as conserving actions.[336]

Matter, then, according to Suarez, has its own entity; yet it is also pure potency. In what sense is this latter statement true? Suarez gives various opinions on this question but his own opinion is basically this: matter once created cannot be said to be in logical or objective potency; while it is pure receptive potency (in its essence it includes no formal act) it yet has entitative act.[337]

To clarify: (1) Matter is not called pure potency with respect to all metaphysical act, for: (a) it can be understood as composed of genus and difference; (b) by nature matter has some goodness, some appetible perfection which means that it has some actuality. (c) it has a partial and proportionate act of subsistence. (2) Matter is not pure potency in such a way that it is not some entitative act, under some aspect. Since it is a real subject it receives something else; and what receives something else is itself something. (3) Matter is called pure potency with respect to act informing and actuating it, and that with respect to act absolutely and simply so called. Since matter itself is simple it does not include the ratio of informing act; whatever there is of entity in primary matter is ordered to the function of receptive potency of substantial form. To call it " pure potency " excludes from it the ratio of complete act, act simply so called, but not the entity and actuality necessary to real potency.[338] (4) Matter is, metaphysically, a composed thing, composed of genus and difference of essence and exist-

[336] In conservatione ignis vel alterius rei similis duae actiones interveniunt . . . in conservatione hominis tres interveniunt actiones. . . . In creatione rei corruptibilis . . . intervenire duas . . . actiones (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, nn. 6-7). Materia non producetur per unam et eamdem actionem qua creatur totum (*Ibid.*, sect. 8, n. 18).

[337] Materia prima quamvis sit pura potentia receptiva atque . . . nullum includit actum formalem, nihilominus . . . recte dicitur esse vel habere actum entitativum (*Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 5, n. 4; cf. also n. 11).

[338] Dicendum est ergo primo materiam non creari puram potentiam respectu omnis actus metaphysici. Dico secundo materia non est ita pura potentia quin sit aliquis actus entitativus secundum quid. . . . Dico tertio materia dicitur esse pura potentia respectu actus informantis seu actuantis, et respectu actus absolute et simpliciter dicti (*Ibid.*, nn. 9-11).

ence, of nature and subsistence, but physically simple. Such composition as it has argues, not to a potency prior to matter but to this, that in matter one ratio is prior to another, though the prior ratio always includes somehow the potentiality of matter.[339] The being of matter can be said to be from form because form in some way terminates its dependence. But Suarez rejects the argument that matter cannot be in act because of two things in act (and form certainly is in act) a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made; for the principle he says is true only of things complete in actual being. Only incomplete actual beings can compose a complete being, for what is not being cannot really compose.[340]

Primary matter then is at one time entirely act and entirely potency, not by reason of any composition but through identity, for receptive potency essentially includes an incomplete, entitative act.[341] It is potency not with respect to the whole substance (since it is actually its own substantial entity) but with respect to the form and to the being of the composite. It is impossible that there be a real receptive potency for the whole latitude and genus of substance, complete and incomplete, for such a potency could not be accidental (accidents suppose a substance) and it cannot be substantial i. e. in potency to itself.[342]

In delineating the mutual inter-play and causality between matter and form, Suarez is not too precise and firm in his own opinion but inclined (as he often is) to fall back on probabilities. Yet the following seems a fair and accurate statement of his views.

[339] Metaphysice vero concedi debet materiam componi ex actu et potentia (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[340] Axioma *ex duobus entibus in actu non fit unum per se* non potest intelligi de quibuscunque entitatibus actualibus; nam potius impossible est ens per se ac completum actu componi nisi ex entibus actualibus incompletis; nam quod nihil est . . . non potest realiter componere. . . . Debet ergo intelligi de entibus in actu completis in suis generibus (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

[341] Materiam totam esse potentiam et totam esse actum, qualem nos explicuimus . . . per identitatem (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[342] Materia non est potentia ad totam latitudinem substantiae. . . . Repugnant enim dari potentiam realem et receptivam respectu totius generis et latitudinis substantiae (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

(1) The being of matter depends on form not as on a proper cause but as on a necessary condition. This is not surprising in view of what Suarez has already said about the separate creation of matter, etc.[343] He supports his view as follows: (a) Matter depends on form in some way for: (x) The matter of corruptible things is not more independent of form than celestial matter. But celestial matter depends on form. (y) Matter does not seem to be more dependent on accidental forms than it is on substantial form. But matter cannot naturally be without accidental form, at least of quantity. (z) Whatever, in physical things always happens in the same way and not in another way seems to be naturally necessary. But it always happens that matter is under some form. This therefore is from natural necessity. But this necessity is not from the form, nor from the extrinsic agent (the efficient cause), therefore it is from the necessity of the matter and its intrinsic need.[344]

(b) Yet this dependence is probably dependence on a necessary condition, not dependence on a proper cause; for the former is both possible and sufficient: (y) *Possible*: for in this way the form or its union depends on certain accidental forms as on necessary dispositions in the way of conservation; for an even greater reason then matter can have such dependence on form as on a necessary condition. Just as matter depends on quantity in this way, so it can depend on form. (z) *Sufficient*: for such dependence as this preserves all that has already been said about the dependence of matter on form; this is an easy, clear mode of dependence.[345] As a matter of fact to understand the dependence of matter on form as dependence on a proper cause is, for Suarez, difficult. It can hardly be reconciled, he says, with the fact that matter is presupposed to form, and to its eduction. Again matter comes about through a true creation and is conserved through the same act. Clearly then, in its becoming it does not depend on form as on a cause for if it did

[343] Quod sit dependentia a posteriori et a conditione necessaria videtur probabiliter persuaderi (*Ibid.*, *disp.* XV, sect. 8, n. 17).

[344] *Ibid.*, nn. 14-15.

[345] *Ibid.*, n. 17.

the created form would concur to the creature act. Since matter becomes without such dependence, it is without such causal dependence on form.[346] Suarez admits however that there are probable arguments for the other side.[347]

(2) Matter and form are, nevertheless, causes of one another, though not altogether in the same way. (a) Matter causes material forms both as to their being and their causality (since their information also depends on matter). (b) Form causes matter; it informs and actuates it. But it is a cause rather of informed matter than of the being of matter for this latter is distinct from the perfection which form brings to it. Matter, on the contrary is a cause of form, simply speaking.

(3) Matter and form are causes to one another of the retention of being, and in this they can be said to cause one another in the same way. Matter through its being causes form; it can be said to be caused by form in as much as it cannot have being without form. Yet there is a difference even in this; matter through its being, directly and per se causes the being of the form; the latter cannot be presupposed to the causal influence of matter, but is caused by it. On the other hand the being of matter must simply be conceived as presupposed to the being of such a form since it is the principle of that material influence without which such a form cannot be made. The being of matter is from form only as from a condition and added actuality without which it cannot naturally be.[348]

A few final words are necessary to determine Suarez' ideas

[346] Juxta alium modum [dependentia a propria causa] difficile intelligitur haec mutua dependentia; nam cum materia simpliciter supponatur formae . . . vix intelligitur quomodo a priori possit materia a forma dependere . . . non pendet in suo fieri a forma ut a vera causa (*Ibid.* n. 18).

[347] *Ibid.*, n. 20.

[348] Materia et forma sunt sibi invicem causae. . . . Haec assertio primo declaratur in materia prima et substantialibus formis materialibus de quibus certum est causari a materia et quoad esse suum, . . . et quoad suam causalitatem. . . . Materia est causa formae simpliciter et secundum esse ejus, forma vero est causa materiae solum quatenus formata est . . . esse materiae solum est a forma pendens ut a conditione et actualitate superaddita. . . . Materia per suum esse directe et per se causat ipsum esse formae (*Ibid.*, disp. XXVIII, sect. 2, nn. 4-5).

of the relation of this matter and form to the composite which results from their union. The question is whether a composed substance is something distinct from its parts and from their union. Suarez' answer is that such a substance is not something really or modally distinct from its essential parts taken together and united, but, at most, rationally distinct from them.[349]

He explains: (1) A composed substance is really distinct from its single parts, not adequately and by its whole self, but through the inclusion of the other part, for the whole includes something really distinct from each part separately taken. Yet this distinction is not greater than that which comes from the inclusion of a distinct thing.[350] (2) A composed substance is different in reality from matter and form taken together, for it includes them and adds something, viz., their real substantial union, which is modally distinct from them, for there can be an aggregation of the parts by merely local propinquity to one another without the substance existing. (3) Yet the total differs from the parts taken as together and united only rationally.[351] (4) Since the whole is a distinct thing from the form and from its union but is not distinct from the total reality of matter form and union collectively taken the composite seems to be a sum of these parts (though Suarez denies that essential parts are integral).[352] (5) Matter, though it includes a transcendental respect to form preserves its own proper entity in any composite and form intervenes as a merely extrinsic cause.[353] The union therefore is brought about through something distinct from the component parts, viz., a substantial mode.[354]

[349] Tota substantia non distinguitur a partibus simul sumptis et unitis realiter aut ex natura rei seu in re ipsa, sed solum ratione (*Ibid.*, disp. XXXVI, sect. 3, n. 9).

[350] *Ibid.*, n. 7.

[351] Substantia composita distinguitur in re ipsa a materia et forma simul . . . sumptis, tanquam includens utramque earum, et addens realem unionem substantialem . . . quae est aliquid in re ipsa distinctum ab eis (*Ibid.*, nn. 8-9).

[352] Non vero recte inferre partes integrales esse essentiales vel e converso (*Ibid.*, n. 17).

[353] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 9, n. 5.

[354] It seems that Suarez should have concluded that the union in a composite is

Section II. Potency and Act in the Order of Operation

I. *The Conditions Requisite for Efficient Operation.*[355] We have seen the Suarezian doctrine about potency and act in the order of being. We begin now to see the same teaching in the order of operation. Here again our treatment is two-fold. We shall consider first some of the general conditions requisite for efficient operation, secondly those proximate principles of operation which are potencies (in the predicamental sense) and their relation to act. Accepting the fact of efficiency and even of the truly efficient causality of creatures [356] we shall give here on Suarez' teaching about efficient causality as this bears on his teaching on potency and act, pausing only to clarify what efficiency meant to Suarez.[357]

Suarez repeats Aristotle's definition of the efficient cause as that " whence is the first principle of change and of rest." He sees many flaws in the definition and a need for much explanation, but finally finds it acceptable in the sense that it really means the first principle whence is action or the first principle whence the effect is, through the medium of action, a description which distinguishes this cause from all others.[358] The efficient cause can be. (a) *per se*: that on which the effect directly depends according to that proper being which it has in as much as it is an effect; (b) *per accidens*: not a true cause but it is called one because of some respect to or similarity, or union with a per se cause; [359] (c) *physical*: that which truly and really effects (*influit in effectum*); (d) *moral*: this is two-fold; it can mean a cause which: (y) *acts freely*: so taken it is not altogether distinct from a physical cause; (z) *does not truly effect*, but so acts morally that the effect is imputed to it.

accidental, for he says (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. IV, sect. 3, n. 19) that unity which convenes through something else is accidental.

[355] Cf. *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XVII and XVIII.

[356] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, especially sect. 1.

[357] *Ibid.*, disp. XVII, sect. 1.

[358] Aristoteles causam efficientem . . . definit . . . *unde primum principium est mutationis aut quietis* (*Ibid.*, n. 1; cf. also nn. 4-5).

[359] *Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 2.

This is always a per accidens cause;[360] (e) *principal*: that which flows into the very action through which the effect is produced, by its own principal (even though secondary) power; (f) *instrumental*: which concurs, or is elevated, to making an effect more noble than itself, which is beyond the measure of this agent's perfection and action.[361] (The principal cause needs no elevation to achieve its effect since it has its own intrinsic power which is per se proportioned to the effect. The instrumental cause on the other hand helps achieve the effect only through a power of a lower ratio or perfection than the effect. Its own power is not sufficient or not proportioned to the effect, so in addition to it, it needs an instrumental power from the principal agent.)[362] (g) *first*: which is altogether independent in acting; (h) *second*: is dependent in acting, even if it acts through its own principal power;[363] (i) *equivocal*: produces an effect which is not similar to its own form; (j) *univocal*: operating through the power of its form it makes an effect similar to it.[364]

Given the nature of efficient causality, then, the question of interest to us is whether an efficient cause must be really distinct from the recipient of its causality, whether, in other words a thing can reduce itself from potency to act.[365] Since Suarez' answer to the question lies in the distinctions he makes we must proceed with him step by step.

Suarez lists three propositions as evident and essential pre notes for this matter: (1) It is not necessary that the agent be distinguished as a supposit from the patient which receives. This is clear from examples and from the fact that a thing can move itself if it is distinguished into a part per se moving and a part per se moved. (2) Within a supposite the agent can be distinguished from the patient in various ways, (a) according to different integral parts, (b) according to different substantial and essential parts, (c) one is a faculty of acting, the other of receiving. (3) Suarez distinguishes three kinds of

[360] *Ibid.*, n. 6.
[361] *Ibid.*, n. 16.
[362] *Ibid.*, nn. 17-18.
[363] *Ibid.*, n. 20.
[364] *Ibid.*, n. 21.
[365] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7.

action: (a) natural dimanation, (b) physical and material movements under which are included alteration, augmentation, local motion and, in some ways the local motion of spiritual things, (c) immanent acts of sense powers (cognitive and appetative) and intellectual powers (cognitive and volitional).[366]

In natural dimanation, though it happens that the proximate efficient principle is not distinct from the recipient yet, simply speaking, the effect is reduced to an efficient cause which is distinct from the patient.

The proximate cause is not distinct; for example, consider the faculties of the soul as flowing from the soul. The soul is their principle, but it also receives them, and the distinction in the soul between its ratio as agent and its ratio as receiver is a distinction of reason only. The same is true, Suarez adds, of the substance and properties of angels; but in corporeal things it is not so for almost always, such properties flow from the form and are received into matter, or into the composite by reason of the matter.[367]

Yet the effect is always reduced to a really distinct efficient cause for the property in question flows from the substance or essence not as from a principal agent but as from an instrument of the generator; the effect is attributed to the generator as to its principal cause; and the generator is of course really distinct from the thing generated and from its potencies.[368]

In physical motion and action: Every cause which is efficient through physical motion and transient action is somehow really distinct from the material cause which receives the effect. (a)

[366] Statuendum est non esse necessarium agens distingui supposito a passo recipiente . . . supponendum est in eodem supposito agente in seipsum variis modis posse distingui agens a patiente . . . distinguere oportet varias actiones . . . naturalis dimanatio . . . motus physici ac materiales . . . efficientia per actiones immanentes sensus aut appetitus intellectus aut voluntatis (*Ibid.*, nn. 6-8).

[367] Dico . . . in resultantia naturali quamvis contingat proximum efficiens non esse distinctum a recipiente tamen simpliciter ille effectus reducitur in efficientem causam distinctam a passo. . . . In anima distingui possit ratio agendi et recipiendi . . . potentias . . . tamen . . . illa distinctio rationis tantum sit (*Ibid.*, n. 9).

[368] *Ibid.*, n. 10.

As to *alteration*, Suarez argues by induction that there is found no proper alteration made by an agent in itself "*per se primo*" i. e., according to one and the same part.[369] (b) In augmentation one thing does not act on itself through itself: there is no motion of augmentation except by a previous alteration. Suarez assigns as the a priori reason for this the truth that one thing cannot at the same time and under the same aspect be in act and in potency.

This principle, Suarez points out, can seem invalid, even as applied here, since an agent can have a virtual quality, and lacking the formal act, can act in itself to acquire that formal act.[370] But here the objection is dismissed on the ground that the formal act must be either natural to the agent, or violent, or neither. If the formal modification is natural the agent will always have it, unless violently impeded, but will have it through natural dimination by action principally reduced to the generator. If the quality is violent it is impossible that the agent by a virtual quality should formally reduce itself to a violent state.[371] The third member, the quality, is neither natural nor violent, is impossible, for it cannot be that an agent by its own virtual quality reduce itself to a form which is neither natural nor violent. The quality will find in the subject dispositions which are either repugnant to it (and then the formal act is violent) or it finds no repugnant disposition (and then the formal act is natural).[372] Suarez concludes then that the Aristotelian principle involved here is true even with regard to a virtual act, but with two limitations: (1) Immanent and

[369] *Ibid.*, n. 11.

[370] Non potest esse idem secundum idem simul in actu et in potentia. Cui rationi valde obstat objectio . . . quia procedit haec ratio ad summum de alteratione univoca . . . non vero de alteratione equivoca quae procedit a qualitate virtuali seu superioris rationis. . . . Nam tunc nulla esset contradictio quod eadem pars haberet qualitatem virtualem et careat formali et ideo ageret in se (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

[371] Si qualitas est naturalis semper habebit illam. . . . Si autem illa qualitas sit violenta impossibile est ut eadem res per qualitatem virtualem coloris seipsam formaliter calefaciat calefactione violenta (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

[372] Alteratio autem indifferens, i. e. non violenta, nec naturalis, esse non potest in eo qui habeat qualitatem virtualem ad talem alterationem faciendam (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

vital acts are excluded (what Suarez has said holds only when it is a question of an act which is a principle of physical and merely natural motions); (2) It is to be understood of a thing in its natural state, not in a preternatural one.[373]

(c) As to local motion, a body can be moved only violently, indifferently, or naturally. In the first two cases the motion is clearly from a distinct agent. In the third case Suarez distinguishes two motions, animals moving themselves, or the motion of inanimate things tending to their own place. In both the agent is distinct from the patient; in the case of animals, they are distinct as part from part; the inanimate bodies are moved by their generator.[374]

With regard to the motion of animals there is some difficulty, Suarez admits, since while one part moves another, we cannot admit any infinite process but must arrive at a first moving part which is also moved. In this part then there seems to be no distinction between mover and moved; it seems to be both. The same difficulty, Suarez points out, is to be found in explaining the perpetual motion and quiet of the heart. It seems simply to move itself.[375] After some discussion Suarez concludes that one defensible answer is that the soul as informing the first part moved and moving through itself or through a potency, moves that part, so that the integral part moving and moved is not distinct, but the essential part is.[376] Essentially the same is his final answer to the question of the motion of the heart; it is moved and moves according to the same integral part, so that the motion is not to be attributed to the generator:

[373] Dicendum est illud principium *non potest esse idem simul in potentia et in actu* esse verum etiam de actu virtuali adhibita duplici limitatione. Una est ut sit sermo de actu qui est principium motus physici et mere naturalis ut excludamus actiones immateriales et vitales. . . . Alia est, ut intelligatur de re existente in suo naturali statu (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

[374] *Ibid.*, n. 20.

[375] *Ibid.*, nn. 29-30.

[376] Responderi poterit . . . non distingui partem integrantem per se moventem et per se motam sed solum partem essentialem. Neque id esse inconveniens (*Ibid.*, n. 31).

it is enough that in the one part the rationes of acting and of receiving be diverse.[377]

(d) As to immanent actions, in which we are most of all interested, Suarez teaches that not only are the principles *quod* of acting and receiving not always distinguished, but it is not always necessary even that the principles *quo* be distinguished. The first part is clear: immanent action is received in the very thing operating so it is not necessary that the active supposit be distinct from that which receives, nor that it act and receive according to diverse parts, since (a) often it has no diverse parts, (b) the act is received into the potency which elicits it.

The second part, Suarez argues, is true, because the act remains in the eliciting potency: so nothing prohibits that there be no distinction even in the proximate principle *quo* of acting and of receiving.[378] These acts all pertain either to knowledge or appetite. In acts of sense knowledge or appetite it is true that the chief principle *quo* of acting is the soul; the principle of receiving is the body. In intellectual acts, however, the chief principle *quo* of acting is only rationally distinct from that of receiving.

Suarez indicates this difference however, that of cognitive acts the proximate active principle is distinguished from the principal of receiving as the including is distinguished from the included; for the former principle is faculty plus species; the latter is the faculty alone.[379] For appetative acts no species is needed, so the one faculty is the principle *quo* of both acting and receiving. Some argue that the principle of act is faculty

[377] Non existimo inconveniens hunc modum attribuere ipsi animali et asserere secundum eamdem partem integralem movere et moveri; satisque esse quod rationes agendi et recipiendi sint diversae (*Ibid.*, n. 35).

[378] Necesse non est ut suppositum agens [actione immanente] distinctum sit a recipiente neque etiam ut secundum diversas partes agat et recipiat . . . nil vetat quominus etiam in proximo principio quo agente et recipiente illam non inveniatur in re distinctio (*Ibid.*, n. 45).

[379] In his ergo actionibus . . . in parte sensitiva facile distingui potest principium quo principale agendi et recipiendi; nam illud est anima . . . hoc vero est corpus . . . in actionibus cognoscendi . . . principium [proximum] agendi est potentia ut informata specie; principium autem recipiendi est sola potentia (*Ibid.*, nn. 46-47).

plus appetition of the end (which is attributed to the author of nature) and the act of willing means to the end is received in the will *alone*, and so they find even here a distinction between active and receptive principle. But Suarez rejects this and states that the will through itself is the proximate principle both of act and reception. The inconvenient conclusion is of course that, one thing is, under the same aspect, agent and patient; therefore under one aspect, one thing is in act and in potency. But this is no real difficulty for Suarez; he points out that there is no repugnance in this that one faculty be in first act, and in potency to second act for first act does not formally include second act but a power to elicit second act. Hence the faculty can at one time be in virtual act and in formal potency. As by one action a thing can be constituted actually acting and receiving so by one faculty a supposit can be constituted in the ratio of acting and receiving, in potency. There is no inconvenience in one thing's being, under one aspect, both agent and patient if it is taken with proportion, i. e., both in potency or both in act.[380]

From all this Suarez concludes: (1) It is not necessary to, or of the ratio of, an agent cause as such to be distinguished from the patient. (2) Neither is it of the ratio of an efficient cause as such that it be distinguished from the patient according to diverse substantial parts, either essential or integral. When either of these distinctions mentioned (in supposit or in substantial part) is necessary the necessity arises from the peculiar exigencies of this cause not by reason of efficient causality as such.[381] (3) Nor is it necessary to an efficient cause as such that the ratio of acting and of receiving be really distinct either

[380] Fatendum est eamdem omnino potentiam per seipsam esse principium proximum agendi et recipiendi talem actum . . . eamdem facultatem esse in actu primo et in potentia ad actum secundum immanentem nulla est repugnantia quia actus primus non includit formaliter secundum, sed virtutem ad eliciendum illum . . . in hoc sensu non est inconveniens quod idem secundum idem constituatur agens et patiens si cum proportione sumatur (*Ibid.*, n. 51).

[381] Sequitur non esse de necessitate aut ratione causae efficientis ut sic quod distinguatur a patiente secundum diversas partes substantiales sive essentiales sive integrales (*Ibid.*, n. 53).

as to subject or as to entity, integral or partial, for this distinction is sometimes lacking; therefore it is not *per se* and universally necessary by reason of efficiency. The distinction is always necessary in univocal action, and of that action the axiom " One thing cannot be at the same time in potency and act," is true. (4) When the proximate principles of acting and of receiving are not different in subject or integral entity the ratio of agent cause as of immanent action does not require even that they differ as including and included i. e., that the principle of acting include something which the passive principle does not have. In immanent actions which do not require an assimilative process the two principles are not distinguished even in partial entity. This way of acting is consonant with the will both on account of its liberty, and on account of its nature as an appetite. The faculty which receives immanent action, can, by its very self be sufficiently constituted in first act as a sufficient, proximate, effective principle of the same action which it receives.[382] (5) We might add here in large letters a proposition which while it is not enunciated by Suarez in speaking of efficient causality, is basic to his treatment of that causality. It is this ". . . that principle . . . everything which is moved is moved by another has not yet been sufficiently demonstrated in every kind of motion or action; for there are many things which through virtual act seem to move themselves and reduce themselves to formal act as can be seen in the appetite or will and in water reducing itself to its pristine frigidity; the same therefore can happen in local motion . . ." [383]

[382] Sequitur ex dictis non esse de ratione causae efficientis ut sic ut ratio agendi et patiendi sint in re distinctae vel subjecto vel entitate integra aut partiali . . . praetera quod principium proximum agendi et patiendi . . . saltem differant in re aliqua quam includit principium agendi et non patiendi ut sic. . . . Non . . . provenit ex communi ratione agentis ut sic neque etiam ex communi ratione actionis immanentis ut sic . . . in actione immanente quae . . . assimilationem non requirit . . . non oporteat principium agendi esse in partiali etiam entitate distinctum a principio recipiendi (*Ibid.*, n. 54).

[383] Principium illud . . . *omne quod movetur ab alio movetur* adhuc non esse satis demonstratum in omni genere motus vel actionis; nam multa sunt quae per actum virtualem videntur sese movere et reducere ad actum formalem ut in

On the question, of the dissimilarity between agent and patient Suarez says at the outset,[384] that it is a question of the dissimilarity between efficient cause and its recipient at the beginning of the action, not at its end; and it is moreover a question of antecedence of nature, not of time.[385]

An agent cause, Suarez states, can have an effect on the patient only in so far as the latter is dissimilar to the agent, in form or in the term of the action. To substantiate this, Suarez appeals both to the authority of Aristotle [386] and to the following argument from reason. An agent acts in as much as it is in act, and in order to act it requires a patient which is in potency. But what is in potency as such is unlike that which is in *act* as such. Therefore. The major is shown by this that to act is to communicate being, therefore (1) The communicated being must be supposed in the agent, so the agent acts in as much as it is in act; (2) When the agent communicates being it reduces the patient from potency to act, hence the patient, as subjected to such action is supposed as in potency.[387]

The dissimilitude which is *per se* required for action is only such as is found between a habit and its privation, or between a thing constituted in act or existing in potency. The patient must lack the form it is to receive; but positive opposition and contrariety is not necessary by reason of efficient causality as such.

Univocal causes, introducing in the patient a form of the same ratio as that through which the agent acts supposes in the patient a lack of that form, i. e., formal unlikeness.[388] Equivocal causes suppose not formal unlikeness in the patient but unlikeness as the patient is subjected to and perfected by the action. It supposes therefore a lack of that similitude

appetitu seu voluntate videre licet et in aqua reducente se ad pristinam frigiditatem; idem ergo accidere potest in motu locali (*Ibid.*, disp. XXIX, sect. 1, n. 7).

[384] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 9.

[385] *Ibid.*, nn. 5-6.

[386] *I de Generatione*, c. 7, text. 46.

[387] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 9, nn. 7-8.

[388] *Ibid.*, n. 9.

which can be between a form formally taken and another which eminently contains it. This is true in all immanent action, for such action produces something not of the same form as that of the agent, but a proportional thing, i. e., second act consonant with first act, which second act is the perfection of first and contained in it not formally but virtually and eminently.[389]

It is *per se* required for efficiency that the agent have power in the patient and with respect to its capacity. Suarez adds that his resolution does not go against the principle that a thing cannot be dissimilar to itself with respect to one and the same part; for one thing can be in first act and in potency to second act (or in virtual act and formal potency) and so have a certain dissimilitude to itself, a dissimilitude which is not formal but eminent, virtual.

2. *The proximate principles of operation.* Suarez begins this discussion by pointing out that while Aristotle never defined potency as a species he did define each of the kinds of potency; (1) active potency as the principle of changing another in as much as it is other; and (2) passive potency as the principle of being changed by another.[390] Suarez immediately goes into the question as to whether this division of potency into active and passive is adequate and sufficient. He shows that it is (1) from the authority of philosophers; (2) from the nature of potency which as first act bespeaks a regard to second act, and the proximate and immediate second act of any potency can be only either action or passion, because an act can only regard a

[389] Causa equivoca . . . supponit dissimilitudinem inter passum ut actioni supponitur et ut per actionem perficitur . . . supponit in passo carentiam illius similitudinis quae inter formam aliquam formaliter sumptam et aliam quae eminenter continet illam, intercedere potest. . . . Et idem est . . . in actibus immanentibus in quibus semper actio potentiae aequivoca est de quo communiter dici solet, non tam tendere ad producendum simile quam ad producendum proportionale, i. e. actum secundum consentaneum primo, et qui sit perfectio ejus in quo non formaliter sed virtute et eminenter continetur (*Ibid.*).

[390] Definit, dicens *potentiam activam esse principium transmutandi aliud in quantum aliud*; passivam vero, *principium transmutandi ab alio* (*Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 1, n. 1).

potency as either principle from which the act is, or in which and out of which the act is.[391]

Granted the division of potency into active and passive do the two members of the division differ really, or sometimes only rationally? There are, Suarez answers, purely active powers really distinct from passive potencies, all powers, namely, which are *per se* and primarily ordered to acting through transient act, as the principles of such acts complete in their own order. Examples are the active intellect, the motive power of living things, the attractive and impulsive power in some bodies. These potencies are not receptive; they never suffer by receiving their own act (for they are not principles of immanent acts) nor by receiving anything as first act by which, as active powers, they are completed, for they are complete in their own order and require no further act by which they are intrinsically completed for acting. The fact that such faculties sometimes need application, or the motion of another power to exercise acts proves nothing against this, for this motion is not through physical action and passion but through a sympathy of powers of the one and the same soul.[392] As is clear from its task, such a faculty is really distinct from a passive potency for if the latter is active it is so through immanent, not transient, action.[393]

Are there, contrary to such purely active powers others which are purely passive? In the whole latitude of being there are purely passive capacities such as primary matter, but are there any such faculties which constitute a species of quality? Suarez answers that he has not found any quality which is instituted

[391] Actus secundus proximus et immediatus alicujus potentiae non est nisi aut actio aut passio; ergo etiam potentia tantum potest esse aut activa aut passiva (*Ibid.*, n. 6).

[392] Suppono dari aliquas potentias pure activas . . . hae namque potentiae sunt principia agendi, ut constat, et non sunt principia patiendi quia . . . neque etiam patiuntur recipiendo aliquid per modum actus primi quo compleantur in ratione principii agendi; quia . . . sunt principia completa in suo ordine . . . et non requirunt ulteriorem actum quo intrinsece compleantur ad agendum. Nec refert quod hujusmodi facultates interdum indigent applicatione vel motione alterius potentiae . . . haec enim motio non fit per physicam actionem et passionem . . . sed fit per sympathiam potentiarum ejusdem animae (*Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 1).

[393] *Ibid.*, n. 2.

solely for this purpose of only receiving qualities or accidents.[394] He adds that we must not confuse the ratio of material or passive disposition with a receptive potency. The former consists in information with a certain proportion to the effect of some other form but is not a potency receptive of it, as quantity, for example is in its way, a material disposition to substantial form; yet it is not a power receptive of form. Of natural qualities none, Suarez says, seems to be *per se* and primarily a passive power; of vital powers some are passive but not purely passive. There is therefore no potency which is purely passive.[395]

One faculty can be both active and passive, (1) with regard to diverse things, as the passive intellect is active with respect to the act of understanding, and passive with respect to the active intellect; (2) even with regard to itself, for one power can have the power of eliciting its act and yet be the principle of receiving the act it elicits, as immanent acts are received in the faculties which elicit them. The reason is that this quality in as much as it has the actual perfection of such a species can be a power (*virtus*) eminently or virtually containing another act, and formally actuable through this act.[396]

Yet since in reality there is no distinction between the two-fold ratio of such a faculty it is not to be placed in a two-fold species of quality. Both rationes are essential, neither is accidental. The one potency includes in a united way the aspects of being active and passive; *per se* it is each. Suarez notes that such potencies are found only in the cognitive and appetitive orders for only in those orders are there immanent acts.

[394] Ergo vero hactenus non inveni qualitatem aliquam quae solum instituta sit ad hoc munus recipiendi tantum alias qualitates vel accidentia (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[395] Non est autem confundenda ratio materialis seu passivae dispositionis cum potentia proprie receptiva . . . simpliciter loquendo nulla est qualitas essentialiter spectans ad secundam speciem, quae sit pura potentia passiva (*Ibid.*, nn. 5-6).

[396] Verum . . . est eamdem facultatem secundum rem esse simul potentiam activam et passivam respectu ejusdem actus et respectu suiipsius . . . quia illamet qualitas quatenus habet actualem perfectionem talis speciei potest esse virtus eminenter vel virtute continens alium actum et potest esse formaliter actuabilis per eumdem actum (*Ibid.*, n. 14).

Through our inadequate concepts such a thing can be distinguished into active and passive aspects, yet it is, in reality only one thing; for by its ultimate difference as a vital and perfect power it comprehends the ratio of receiving and eliciting. The fact that our concepts can prescind two different respects is not enough to distinguish two species.[397]

Speaking more physically, then, active and passive powers in general are not so distinct in reality that all actuality is excluded from the latter. A passive faculty is receptive of its act even if it also elicits it.[398] This does not argue against Aristotle's definition of such a power as that which is changed by another in as much as it is other; this note of " other " does not exclude the very faculty from concurring. For the note of " other " a formal distinction is enough, a real one is not always necessary. So if a power which receives its act is also the principle of the act there is no difficulty; it can have both aspects in as much as it virtually or eminently contains the act.[399]

Suarez' own definition of potency is this: " a proximate principle of some operation for which [operation] it is, by its nature, instituted and ordained." Operation is understood to include both action and reception so as to include both kinds of potency; or if there is no purely passive potency then operation is to be taken in the sense of act which either (1) comes from a potency (a purely active potency) or (2) remains in the potency (the receptive and active potency). A potency is by its nature ordered to operation.[400]

[397] Existimo nullam esse distinctionem actualem et ex natura rei inter potentiam illam ut activam et passivam, quia illa qualitas essentialiter includit utramque rationem (*Ibid.*, n. 15; cf. also n. 16, 1).

[398] Dicendum est illa duo membra [potentiae activae sc. et passivae] esse in re distincta ita tamen ut a potentia quae passiva dicitur non excludatur in re ipsa omnis activitas . . . potentia vera passiva [dicitur] quae est receptiva sui actus etiamsi illius sit etiam elicitiva (*Ibid.*, n. 18).

[399] Significatur non semper requiri distinctionem in re, sed formalem vel virtualem interdum satis esse, . . . Quod si aliquando illa eadem res est principium activum talis actus non est sub ea ratione sed quatenus illa res virtute aut eminenter continet talem actum (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

[400] Potentia est *principium proximum alicujus operationis ad quam natura sua institutum et ordinatum est* (*Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 2).

The next question to claim our attention is whether there responds to each potency its own act. Suarez in answering immediately points out that it is one thing to compare a thing in potency to a thing in act, and quite another to compare potency to act. The first compares one and the same thing as possible to itself as actually existing; there is here involved only logical or objective potency. We are treating here rather of real potency, active and passive, both as transcendental and predicamental.[401]

To every real potency, both active and passive, then, its own act corresponds but in different ways. To the passive there always corresponds some formal act actuating and perfecting it, and to the active potency there corresponds an action which does not formally actuate it but which flows from it. Suarez proves his dictum about the passive power from its very nature. Such a thing is certainly ordered to receiving. But proper and physical reception consists in the adhesion or union of some formal act; therefore the act of such a power is a formal actualizing thing either aptitudinally or actually (for such a potency need not always be under its act). The act of such a power can be considered according to two aspects distinct in nature, viz., that of actual passion and that of a form in being. Under each aspect it is the formal act of the potency; the two rationes are ordered among themselves as becoming to being.[402]

Since an active potency is ordained not to receive but to act, the act corresponding to it is not as something which informs and is received but which comes from it. Clearly the effect of

[401] Suppono aliud esse comparare rem in potentia ad rem in actu aliud vero esse comparare potentiam ad actum. In priori . . . confertur . . . eadem res passibilis ut passibilis ad seipsam ut actu existentem (*Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 1).

[402] Cuilibet potentiae . . . respondet proprius actus sed diversimode: Nam potentiae passivae correspondet semper aliquis actus formalis actuans et perficiens ipsam; potentiae vero activae ut sic non respondet actus formalis actuans ipsam sed ab ea manans . . . receptio autem propria et physica consistit in adhaesione vel unione alicujus actus formalis . . . potentiae passivae correspondeat proprius actus actuans formaliter. . . . Quod vero sub utraque ratione [actualis passionis sc. et formae in facto esse] sit [actus potentiae passivae] formalis actus potentiae passivae, patet (*Ibid.*, nn. 2-4).

such action is not an act informing the active potency; neither then is the action. While this is most clearly true of transient action it is true also of immanent for while the latter is the formal act of its potency it is not such because it is action, but because it is at the same time the passion of the potency as the latter is passive. The effect, too, of immanent action is the formal act of its potency, not because it is the effect of the power, but rather because it is a form regarding the passive capacity of such a power. Action rather than the effect is the act corresponding to any active potency (one point of difference between it and the passive); for while the action is ordained to the effect the latter does not formally regard the agent with any intrinsic and transcendental respect as action does. In passion even the term does have a transcendental regard to the passive power and actuates it.[403] Not all power then is to act as subject is to form; the act of only a passive power informs and actuates it. Transient action is not in the active potency. In general action as action is not received in an active power as such.[404]

Though to each potency there corresponds an act proportionate to it, the act is always something in reality, essentially and specifically distinct from the potency. The real distinction is clear, for the respect of potency to its act is real. An active potency is an effective principle of its act, and true efficiency can only be between things really distinct. A passive potency on the other hand is the material cause of the act, and the act is its formal cause intrinsically effecting it; these two also must be really distinct. Again, separability is a real sign of real distinction and a potency is separable from its act. Aristotle is

[403] Actus illi [i.e. potentiae activae] correspondens non debet esse per modum receptionis vel informationis sed per modum emanationis tantum . . . ostendemus formaliter id [actionem sc. non esse actum formalem agentis] esse verum de omni actione ut sic, quia licet actio immanens sit formalis actus suae potentiae activae non tamen id habet ex eo quod actio est, sed ex eo quod simul est passio talis potentiae ut passiva est (*Ibid.*, n. 5).

[404] Solus actus potentiae passivae est actus informans et actuans ipsam . . . supponimus . . . actionem ut actionem non recipi in potentia agente ut sic (*Ibid.*, n. 8).

to be interpreted in this sense when he says [405] that potency and act make not many but one; he meant not that they are one and the same but they (i. e. a passive potency and its act) compose one thing. When he says that what was in potency is afterwards in act he does not mean that potency becomes act but that something which lacked act is later constituted under act. It can be understood not of potency and act but of a thing as it is in logical potency and then later in reality.[406] The real distinction is sometimes a real distinction sometimes modal but it is always essential for potency and act are distinguished in reality (*secundum rem*) and have respects which are altogether diverse and opposite.[407] The two are not necessarily of the same genus. Action, the proper immediate act, is of a diverse genus from its principle which is either a substance or a quality. If the effect of an active power is called its act it will be of the same or of a different genus according as the agent is univocal or equivocal. Passive potency transcendentally taken is of the same genus as its act only when it is per se ordered to act. Predicamental passive potency is of the same genus as its act, for it is active through immanent act.

There remains the question of the relative priority of potency and act, which question can be understood with regard to duration, perfection, and definition and knowledge. Suarez again distinguishes a two-fold comparison: (1) the comparison of a thing in logical potency to the thing in the act of existing; (2) the comparison of real potency to real act. In the first way it is clear that act is prior to potency in perfection; for anything it is better to be in act than in potency since without act

[405] Cf. *VIII Metaph.*, c. 6.

[406] Dicendum est quamvis unicuique potentiae respondeat actus illi proportionatus semper tamen esse aliquid in re et in essentia et specie distinctum ab ipsa. . . . Cum Aristoteles . . . ait potentiam et actum non facere multa sed unum non est sensus ipsa esse unum et idem, sed componere unum. . . . Et . . . ait quod prius erat in potentia postea esse in actu, non quia ipsamet potentia receptiva fiat actus sed quia eadem, quae prius carebat actu postea sub illo constituitur (*Disp. Meta.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 5, nn. 10-11).

[407] Distinctionem hanc . . . interdum est proprie et in rigore realis, interdum sufficit modalis (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

there is no real perfection.[408] It is prior also in knowledge for, comparing diverse things, the more actual of them is in itself prior in knowledge; and comparing one thing in potency to itself in act (of existing) is the principle of our knowing each thing. Properly understood it is true even of God for He has all His knowledge primarily and *per se* about a thing actually existing or from an actually existing thing for first and *per se* He knows Himself Who necessarily exists; even possible creatures He knows through Himself and His known power. Act then is also prior in definition since potential being cannot be defined except through actual being or relation to it.

As to duration it is not simply necessary that potential being precede actual being or vice versa, either in one individual or in different individuals of the same species, for an eternal world is not, on every part, impossible. In all things outside God, being in potency does precede; yet, necessarily, being in the virtual or eminent act of God Himself precedes in nature any potential being. Hence in the whole latitude of being act precedes potency, but not in duration; for immediately the act is, other things are possible from its power.[409]

Comparing real potency and act, the act of an active potency is not, *ex genere suo* prior in perfection for to the potency it adds no perfection since it is either (1) action, which is imperfect or (2) the term of the action, which does not exceed the active virtue of the potency (unless this latter be instrumental). From its very genus the potency is more perfect though in a particular case the term might be of equal or even greater perfection. It cannot be urged that the act perfects the potency by the term of action for this term is extrinsic to the active power and not properly its act. It is not more perfect for God's

[408] In priori ergo sensu . . . clarum est actum esse priorem quam potentiam perfectione, quia unicuique rei melius est esse in actu quam in potentia (*Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 2).

[409] In hac comparatione non esse simpliciter necessarium ut esse in potentia praecedat duratione esse in actu neque e converso . . . de facto tamen in omnibus rebus extra Deum esse in potentia praecedere duratione esse in actu . . . necessario esse in actu virtuali seu eminenti ipsius Dei antecedat non tempore sed natura quodlibet esse in potentia (*Ibid.*, n. 7).

power to act than not to act; for a created power transient action is not its formal act but only that which extrinsically names it actually acting. To neither therefore does act give real perfection. Immanent act is the perfection of its potency but in as much as the latter is receptive not active. It is not action as action which perfects it but reception. Hence potency rather perfects action than the other way around.[410]

The action of an active power is not, *per se* speaking prior in knowledge or definition to its potency (except in predicamental potency which, *per se*, is instituted for such action), for potency more eminently contains the action. If the former is perfectly known, the very action can be known. By nature the active potency is simply prior to its act; in duration, the potency is not always necessarily prior (for it can act in its very first instant if there be no resistence and the act does not intrinsically include succession) but it can be since it does not depend on act *per se*. Certainly it cannot be posterior to the act, since it is presupposed to it as a principle.[411]

Of passive power it is also true that it cannot be posterior to its act, that it need not be prior, but that there is no repugnance to its being prior even to any individual act or to its acts taken collectively. In the order of perfection the passive power as such is posterior to its act not because it is always simply a less perfect being but because it is better with the act than without it. Without act it is unformed and actuable hence less perfect than act; yet this aspect does not consider the thing

[410] Dicendum est actum potentiae agentis ut sic, ex suo genere non esse priorem perfectione quam potentiam imo neque tali potentia ut sic addi perfectionem ex eo quod exerceat talem actum. . . . Necesse est ut ex suo genere [potentia] sit perfectior (*Ibid.*, n. 10). Si vero loquamur de actione immanente illa quidem est perfectio formalis ejus potentiae . . . non tam est perfectio ejus ut agens est, quam ut recipiens est. . . . Atque ita fit, ut potentia agens ex ratione sua non perficitur actu suo sed potius ipsa perficiat effective actionem suam et per illam perficiat vel passum vel effectum (*Ibid.*, n. 11).

[411] Dicendum est potentiae activae operationem per se loquendo non esse priorem cognitione aut definitione ipsa potentia sed potius e converso, nisi solum in potentia praedicamentali quae per se primo instituta est ad talem actionem, . . . quia virtus activa ex suo genere est eminentior actione sua (*Ibid.*, n. 12).

simply hence we cannot simply conclude that potency is less perfect, although that is always true in the order of substantial passive potency, for its act gives being simply.[412] As to passive potencies for accidental acts we must distinguish; if the power is not *per se* primarily ordered to such an act there is no universal rule for determining their relative perfection since the perfection of the potency is then measured by its own principles, not by its capacity for such an act. If the power is *per se* ordained to this act it is more perfect than the act for it is also, eminently and equivocally, the active principle. Yet it is better with act than without it because the act of a passive power is its formal perfection which adds to the power a perfection which, of itself, it does not have; not that the simple entity of the power increases in its essential perfection but there is added to it some intrinsic perfection as its complement, which constitutes it in a perfect state.[413] As to the order of knowledge and definition a passive power *per se* instituted for its act is posterior to its act since the act is the specifying principle of the power; the power is for it and therefore defined through it.[414]

[412] Haec vero comparatio tantum est secundum quid; unde ex illa non licet colligere passivam potentiam in sua entitate simpliciter minus perfectam actu suo (*Ibid.*, n. 19).

[413] Posterior autem potentia propria et praedicamentalis . . . ut opinior, semper est perfectior illis (loquor de actibus naturalibus . . .) tanquam principium eminens et aequivocum illorum (*Ibid.*, n. 20).

[414] *Ibid.*, n. 25.

Part II. The Criticism

Chapter III

CRITICISM OF THE METAPHYSICAL BACKGROUND

Section I. Potency and Act in the Order of Being

Having seen the teaching of Suarez on human freedom and on potency and act, we are ready now to begin our analysis and criticism of that teaching. Since our purpose in considering potency and act is only to determine whether it throws further light on Suarez' notions on human freedom, it is clearly reasonable that we should begin our criticism by considering the teaching on potency and act; then, later, we shall see how those teachings enter into the Suarezian treatment of freedom.

The essential thing to be grasped about Suarez' whole treatment of potency and act is its remarkable unity. We have already indicated that the entire treatment can be unified in the principle that a simple reality can of itself be both actual and its own intrinsic limitation of act; conversely, the potential can somehow contain its own act. Is that principle, which obviously has vast implications for the order of operation, and, therefore, for free human acts, truly to be found in Suarez' discussion of (1) potency and act in the order of created being, both metaphysical and (composed) physical and (2) potency and act in the order of operation? Our task here is to reexamine the teachings of Suarez and determine the fact. We shall consider first his discussion of essence and existence, potency and act in the metaphysical order of being.

1. *Potency and Act in the Metaphysical Order.* At the beginning of this discussion [415] Suarez assigns as the founda-

[415] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 1, n. 13.

tion for real identity of essence and existence the principle that nothing can be intrinsically and formally constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself. The very fact of distinction argues that each is independent of the other. Later Suarez repeats essentially the same proposition, saying that nothing can be constituted in its very entity through something distinct from itself.[416] The concept involved in these statements (and Suarez himself identifies that concept as the foundation of his opinion in this crucial matter) is the fundamental simplicity of every being. If a thing can not be formally and intrinsically constituted in the ratio of real actual being through something distinct from itself, then of itself it is (whatever its intrinsic limitations) its own actuality. Here, then, as the very foundation of his teaching on created essence and existence, Suarez enuntiates the very principle we have indicated above, the principle that a simple reality is both its own perfection and intrinsic limitation of that perfection. Given the fact of existence, the same reality which is its own very perfection of being is also of itself that which limits and restricts being to this limited thing. Potency and act are not really distinct principles which through a real composition intrinsically affect one another.

For any Thomist the real identity of these two is unthinkable for many reasons; [417] of these reasons we will consider three.

(1) Any being in which essence and existence are identical is pure act. But pure act is unique whereas creatures are multiple. Therefore, in creatures, essence and existence are distinct. The major is clear because any essence which is its own existence *is* its own being; and the being of existence which it is is actual being unreceived by any distinct and contracting principle and not ordered as potency to any further act; therefore it is purely actual. The minor is also clear because pure act embraces all perfection; and the all perfect can be only one

[416] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 3.

[417] Cf. Del Prado, *De Veritate Fundamentali Philosophiae Christianae*, pp. 29-70.

for if there were two or more no one of them could be all-perfect, for each would lack that actual being by which the other (or others) would be distinct.

(2) If in creatures, essence and existence were identical, there would be among them no grades of nobility, for if that which participates being and the being participated do not differ there can not be in things a diverse participation of being and therefore a diversity of nobility. On the presumption, there is nothing to cause the diversity inasmuch as being, of itself, is simply being and not, in Thomistic thought, also a restriction and limitation of being.

(3) The creature must be composed of a really distinct essence and existence; otherwise it would be infinite, for act, of itself is, in that order in which it is act, unlimited. Now being-of-existence is of itself being; if therefore it is not truly composed with a really distinct and limiting potency it is infinite being. The answer that actual being can be limited intrinsically by itself the Thomist rejects on the ground that perfection of itself is unlimited and unique. Wherever actuality is found in a limited, measured way, or wherever it is found multiplied it must be in union with a limiting or multiplying principle really distinct from itself. Act is that which by its very nature tends to give the plenitude of perfection of that order in which it is act. Whatever by nature, tends to give the full perfection of any order is not also that which limits and multiplies that same plenitude (since multiplication supposes a limitation). In view of this fundamental principle underlying Thomism (potency and act are really distinct principles which so divide being that whatever is is either Pure Act or composed of potency and act as distinct, intrinsic principles), the answer to the arguments of Suarez is easy.[418]

His first argument (the being sufficient for the truth of the proposition "Essence is" is only being of existence) is to be distinguished. Of being which is subsisting and absolute, it is conceded, but of being which is a participated being it is denied,

[418] *Ibid.*, pp. 152-164.

for the Thomist cannot forget St. Thomas' dictum, "Whenever something is predicated of another through participation there must be something there besides that which is participated, and therefore in any creature the creature which has existence is other than its very existence." [419]

The second argument (the characteristics attributed to existence convene to the being of an actual essence) is also to be distinguished. These marks convene to such an essence precisely as it is existing and by reason of its existence, yes; but that they convene by reason of the essence alone is denied, for essences in themselves are eternal, necessary, and as such dependent on God's intellect rather than on His efficiency.

Suarez' third argument proceeds thus: Existential being is that by which a created thing is formally and immediately constituted outside its causes, and by which it ceases to be nothing. But this is that being by which a created thing is constituted in the actuality of essence. Therefore, essence and existence are identical. Again the Thomist distinguishes. To the major he answers that existential being, as an act received in the essence, as an ultimate act inhering in the substance, constitutes a created thing outside its causes and outside nothing, yes; but that existential being as an act without a distinct subject so constitutes a thing is denied. The minor is distinguished in the same sense: this being as an act received in the essence and completing the substance constitutes the creature in its actuality of essence yes; but as an unreceived act, it does not, for not everything that actually is, is, of itself alone, actual. A thing can be actual either because it is act, or because, while potential in itself it participates act, for while there is no medium between possible being and existing being there is a medium between a possible thing and the act of existence namely, the essence which receives that act. Suarez frames his fourth argument in this way: Being in act is formally the same as existing. But an existing thing is formally constituted

[419] Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicatur de altero per participationem oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur; et ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse et ipsum esse ejus (*Quodl.* 2, a. 3).

only through existence, so that it is really the same thing to say " man is " and to say " man is man," if in each case " is " indicates act and not merely aptitude or truth. The major is admitted but the minor is denied, because in everything outside God, the existing thing is not constituted in act by existential being alone since its existence is not *per se stans*, so to speak, but rather adheres to the *substance* which participates and receives it.

Suarez' arguments are perfect indications of his mind for they rest, all of them, on the single concept we have already explicated, the concept that the principle of every being is fundamentally simple. In the first argument, for example, Suarez clearly assumes that all real being is actual existing being, that, in other words, this limited creature is its own actuality. Essentially the same concept underlies the other arguments. The second one asserts the fact that an actual essence is temporal, contingent, and so forth; what is presumed is that what convenes to a nature must convene to it by reason of itself, that the actual being which these notes characterize is identical with the essence. Suarez then is arguing in light of the judgment that this limited essence is also its own actuality. Having postulated such simplicity in things, Suarez was certain to reach this conclusion. The Thomist asks, granted that an essence as actual is temporal, contingent, etc., do these characteristics convene to it precisely by reason of itself, or by reason of its existential actuality? One little phrase at the end of the second argument (distinction is a result not a condition for being) sums up Suarez' thought succinctly. Distinction in the sense of distinction of things clearly supposes being as Suarez says; but the question is how can there be a distinction of actual things unless there be satisfied a prior condition of distinction in the principles of things? Actual being of itself bespeaks only actual being; and actual being is not distinct from itself nor is it, of itself, multiplied and various. We should note here, too, that Suarez writes [420] that by the very fact that

[420] *Disp. Meta., loc. cit.*, n. 8.

we conceive an actual being made by God we conceive it as existing. Since there is nothing false in that concept it follows that no added thing is necessary for the formal effect of existence. One can reach that conclusion from such premises only if one absolutely accepts the proposition that all being is simple; whatever fundamentally convenes to it, convenes to it by reason of one principle.

The third and fourth arguments rest on this same assumption that what constitutes a thing as actual is identical with that which constitutes it this limited thing. What is basic to these arguments is that an existing thing is constituted only through existence (or actuality); that is, this intrinsically limited nature, or this intrinsically limited individual of such a nature, is exclusively through that perfection which is existence. The fundamentally simple reality which is that actual perfection is of itself its own restricting limitations.

Consider, too, Suarez' negative argument for the identity and existence: [421] "Existing" cannot add any ratio distinct from that of an actual being outside its causes; hence there is no existence distinct from the being which constitutes each thing in the actuality of its essence. The very wording of the consequent shows Suarez' conception of all being as itself actual being, for granted a thing to be actual in the order of essence he concludes that that limited actuality is actual existential being.

From the position, then, that created essence and existence are not really distinct (a position which rests, as we have shown, on the principle that all real being is actual of itself even when it is also, of itself, limited and restricted) certain consequential propositions are inevitable. To this class of consequential propositions can be reduced every major point of difference, in this matter of created essence and existence between Suarez and the Thomists.

The first of these (so intimately connected with the position that created essence and existence are identical as to be virtu-

[421] *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

ally contained in it) is the judgment that in the entitative order there is no composite to be made of essence and existence.[422] This patently, rests on the principle that the very actual perfecting principle of acting is also, of itself, the limiting restricting principle, and so no real process is necessary to show the illation. If there is no composite to be formed, then, by rigorous necessity, the thing is entitatively simple; hence, one principle must embrace the two aspects found in the existing creature, namely, the perfection of actually being, and the limitation to being this restricted thing.

Almost equally closely linked with the identification of essence and existence is Suarez' teaching that no created essence can be conserved through an existence other than its own, even through God's power.[423] Thomists teach that the human nature of Christ did in fact exist, not through a connatural human existence, but through the existence of the Word of God, a teaching which supposes (among other things) that since an essence is potential for existence and not its own actuality (of existence) it can, by God's power be actuated by an existential act other than that connatural to it. The Suarezian teaching is a corollary from the identification of essence and existence, as is clear: if a thing is its own existence it cannot have another existence than its own because it cannot be other than itself. But that teaching rests on the premise that everything is entitatively simple; a thing cannot receive an existence other than its own, even by God's power, because it does not receive any entitative act at all; each limited creature *is* its own actuality.

Following necessarily, too, on the identification of essence and existence, is Suarez' teaching that some existence can convene to things which are not supposites. For example, incomplete substantial existence can convene to a nature not yet subsisting; incomplete existence can convene to matter and to form, accidental existence to accidents, etc. These things have some essence; therefore if real essence is, of itself, existence,

[422] *Ibid.*, sect. 13.

[423] *Ibid.*, sect. 12.

these realities must of themselves, have some existence.[424] The argument is easily grasped, but the Thomist cannot accept such an argument. Existence is that by which a thing is formally constituted outside its causes and outside nothing. Existence then, for the Thomist, since it places a thing outside its cause presupposes the causes of a thing to have already fully exercised their causality so that no further cause of that same order can cause the existing thing. So the Thomist does not admit a distinct existence of matter and form, for example, arguing that if each is existing, then each is already in the order of being beyond the causality of the other, beyond any intrinsic, substantially causal union. As the Thomist sees it, the only union possible between them is that which is had between two actual things, that is accidental union. How can realities so perfect in their own actuality that each is outside its causes and, therefore, beyond further causal intrinsic composition be yet so imperfect as to be incomplete in the order of essence, and crying out, so to speak, for composition with the other? As existing, they cannot mutually exercise substantial causality on one another; so how is their union substantial? Again the Thomist asks, what would an existing but not yet subsisting substantial nature be? As substantial, and outside its causes, it is beyond any further causality in the substantial order; how can it be other than subsisting? The same question arises with regard to the separate existence of primary matter. This matter of its essence is, formally, actually nothing; its existence then would be the existence of that which is, formally speaking, no actual thing. As to a substantial form existing of itself, since it is beyond any intrinsic causality of matter, the Thomist argues, would it not be, in its order, unlimited actuality? But these objections, to Suarez, all miss the point. Because he starts with the judgment that that which is itself actual can be itself limited, incomplete, imperfect, he composes in one principle both aspects. Matter and form can exist independently for even existence can be incomplete, and imperfect; and so too for the other Thomistic arguments.

[424] *Ibid.*, sect. 11.

Suarez next concludes that creatures can be principal, not merely instrumental, causes of the existence of their effects.[425] Having identified the essence of the effect (which clearly can be caused by a creature as by a principal cause) with its existence, he could not teach anything else without denying all principal causality to creatures. (Suarez' argument on this point is very interesting and has important ramifications for our principal interest, but before coming to that we must consider the Thomistic answer to this question.) The Thomist holds that creatures can be only instruments in the production of any existence, because a power which is a principal cause of existence must be subsistent being, i. e., it must have existence of its very nature for a thing must first *be* such before it can produce a like thing and a created essence *is not* its existence. Suarez, of course, admits that such a cause must be its own existence, but denies that it is therefore, subsisting being. His arguments against the position that the creature effects *such* being, not being simply, are illuminating.[426] In part, at least, they seem to rest on the motion that the action of the created cause must effect *something* or else it is not real action. If it effects something he would say that it must effect (as a principal cause) an existing reality (again we notice the notion that what is real is of itself actual) for whatever is, is of itself actual even though it also be of itself limited.

Suarez did not understand the Thomistic position that, since not all that is actual is itself act, a cause can be the principal cause of essence without being a principal cause of its existential actuality. What is of more interest to us is this: if the existence of an effect (action and its term) is from the creature as from a *principal* cause, then that cause is not premoved physically to the action, for a principal cause is that which, by *its own proper power*, and not by any instrumental force, produces its effect. If, then, a creature causes its action and the term of that action as a principal cause it does so by its *own power*; the effect *is* by reason of that creature's own power, not

[425] *Ibid.*, sect. 9.

[426] *Ibid.*, n. 12 ff.

by reason of the application of that power through an instrumental force (physical premotion). It would follow that without premotion any created agent can have some second act depending on it causally; the very thing, then, which is by nature a *potency*, can have second act depending on it without God's premotion. Truly Suarez judged that whatever is, is, itself, actual.

Intimately connected with this teaching that creatures can be principal causes of the existence of their effects is Suarez' stand that existence is really that through which creatures cause.[427] This clearly supposes that a created existence *of itself* has all the limits and restrictions found in any secondary cause. A Thomist considers existence of itself as simple actuality in its order; if it (*per impossibile*) were to act efficiently, its adequate effect could be only simple actuality in that order of being supposing no extrinsic limitation of its causality. That is not true for Suarez, and it is not true for him simply because he conceived the actual as intrinsically limited by itself.

Side by side with these propositions which flow from Suarez' identification of the creature's essence and existence, are certain other judgments which are very revealing—his view of what is entailed in the Thomistic teaching of a real distinction.

At the outset of his discussion, Suarez points out that if essence and existence are distinct, then by the very fact that each is really distinct from the other, as being from being, each has this that it is a being and distinct; and consequently one cannot, formally and intrinsically, *be through that other.*[428] Here the interesting thing is the concept that things really distinct are distinct as being from being, one of which cannot constitute the other. Thomists, in maintaining the real distinction, do not imply that neither of the two can intrinsically constitute the other, for they never conceive these two as *things*, i. e., each a being in itself. Suarez did so conceive them (on the supposition of a real distinction) because, so it seems, he did not understand well the Thomistic teaching that the

[427] *Ibid.*, sect. 10.

[428] *Ibid.*, sect. 6, n. 3.

perfecting and the perfectible *must* be distinct, yet complementary; they are not things but principles of things. Suarez, already convinced of the fundamental simplicity of things and on the assumption that these principles are really distinct, concluded that each of them in its own right must be a real actual thing.

Again, Suarez writes that, supposing a real distinction between created essence and existence, an actual essence could be conserved without existence by divine power, for while God cannot supply for intrinsically component formal causes He can supply for the dependence of one component part on the other.[429] This proposition shows how Suarez conceived this whole question, for even when, for the sake of argument, he supposes a real distinction of the two elements, even then he does not conceive them as intrinsically constituting or modifying one another. So utterly basic is his conception that all real being has some actuality of itself, that, even in supposing the Thomistic position, he does not suppose the more basic doctrine behind it, namely, that a reality can be actual through an act which is not the actuated element, proximately, that an essence can have actual existence through an act which is not the very essence itself. It is no accident that Suarez does not suppose this; his principles do not allow it. He saw that to a Thomist for any essence to be in nature without any existence is impossible, but his position, even when he grants the distinction which Thomists teach, is that an actual essence which *is* not its existence is impossible. There is one basic reason why he teaches this: his principle that real being is actual being.

In much the same way, Suarez says[430] that those who hold for a real distinction can give no reason why God could not separate a created existence and existence one from the other and preserve each alone. Thomists do teach a real distinction and at the same time teach that God cannot preserve each element separately (created existence with no essence, created essence with no existence). For them this has to be so, because

[429] *Ibid.*, sect. 12, n. 3.

[430] *Ibid.*, nn. 9-12.

existence, without *this* determined limiting essence, is pure actuality; it is being outside of its cause and of itself unlimited. Essence without existence cannot be preserved in reality because, without existence, it *is* not in reality; a non-existing thing *actually in nature* is, to Thomists, a contradiction. To Suarez there is no contradiction; having supposed a real essence he already supposes entitative actuality, for he does not admit the doctrine of subjective potency as Thomists understand it, i. e., a reality which is made actual through an entitative act distinct from itself. Thus Suarez writes that a thing ceases to be in potency when it is created.[431] The Thomist admits this but adds that some reality even after it is created continues to be *potency*, a potency now actuated, to be sure, but still potency with respect to that act. Suarez can write too [432] that if one holds that an essence-in-act adds distinct existence to an essence already an actual being, but potential with respect to existence, it follows that an actual essence differs from itself in potency, not in the act of being, but in its very essential entity. Thomists hold that an actual essence, as such, does add a distinct existence to an essence; they do not teach the consequent Suarez draws, and that precisely because they teach that the existence *is* the actuality of the essence-in-act. Hence it is through that act of being that the actual essence is distinct from the potential, and not through some actuality which is the essence itself.

2. *The Physical Order.* We have seen that, in the metaphysical order, the entire body of teaching in which Suarez differs from the Thomists is reducible to the single principle that, since even created being is not intrinsically composed of distinct potency and act as its first and intrinsic principles, all being is of itself actual. In the physical order (the realm of substantial form and primary matter) we shall find again that the core of Suarezian doctrine is this very principle; here too, those particular teachings in which Suarez differs from the Thomists rest on this single foundation.

[431] *Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 4. [432] *Ibid.*, n. 6.

The heart of the Suarezian teaching about matter and form is this: each of them has its own distinct entity of essence and existence; each of them, of itself, *is*. It is abundantly clear that this is his teaching. In explicit terms Suarez says that matter of itself alone has its own entity of essence and existence; [433] it is of itself in an ultimate species of matter; [434] form, too, has its own being.[435] These basic proportions of the Suarezian account of matter and form are simple applications of the principle we have indicated; if in the physical order both matter and form have their own separate entities of essence and existence, it can be only because all being is of itself entitatively actual.

In his arguments for the proper essence and existence of primary matter Suarez clearly shows how actual he conceived primary matter. His proof for the independent *essential* reality of matter is simple: Matter is a real subject in nature; therefore, it has some real essence. But the essence of matter cannot be constituted intrinsically through form.

Therefore, matter is independent of form. The minor is proved by this that matter is simple and incomplete; therefore it is not constituted through anything other than itself. If so constituted it would be a composite and complete thing. Suarez adds to this that, since matter can preserve numerically the same entity while losing one form and gaining another, its essential perfection is different from that given by the form.[436] To all this the Thomist answers that matter certainly is a reality with a real function in nature, but it is not of itself an entity, a perfection; it is but mere potency or capacity for being, not actual being.

In view of the fact that many things have the same specific being, the Thomist reasons that something which is not that specific being must receive it and is its principle of limitation and multiplicity, for one thing cannot of itself be multiple. The receiving thing since its function is only to receive, is purely passive. It is not properly a thing but rather one of

[433] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.
[434] *Ibid.*, sect. 3, n. 18.
[435] *Ibid.*, sect. 5, n. 17; sect. 4.
[436] *Ibid.*, sect. 4, nn. 9-11.

the principles of many things. Hence, it is not really an essence, but a capacity to compose, with formal actuality, an essence; therefore, it *is* not of itself. Even that it be a *real* capacity to receive convenes to it not by reason of itself but because it is constituted as real, and that constitution is through another. Suarez cannot concede that; to him, if the general proposition " what is is of itself actual " be true, then this matter which in nature *is* must be actual of itself. If nothing can be constituted in its own reality through something other than itself, then, certainly matter cannot be so constituted. We have seen his proposition that matter of itself has being which is real, for if matter were nothing it would have no real function in nature.[437] From that Suarez concludes that matter has its reality from *itself*; he cannot entertain that other possibility advanced by Thomists, that matter can be real by reason of an actual reality derived from something other than itself. He cannot entertain it because of his guiding principle: what is, is, of itself, actual.

The argument for the proposition that matter of itself has existence is fundamentally this: Matter has its own essence.[438] But existence adds no real thing or real mode to the entity of essence as this latter is actual and outside its causes. This is only a particular application of Suarez' general identification of essence and existence (even partial essences as we have seen), and so we shall not consider it here. But the second proposition by which the argument is confirmed (which teaches the distinct entity of matter and, therefore, its distinct creation) most clearly shows that Suarez conceived matter as an actual thing directly produced by God in its own proper actuality. The third confirmatory proposition (if matter did not really exist it could not be a real subject) would be quite acceptable to all Scholastics. However the conclusion, that matter has this existence of itself, does not follow for those who hold that not everything which is actual is its own act but that act can be

[437] *Ibid.*, nn. 3, 5.

[438] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8, n. 7; disp. XIII, sect. 4, n. 13.

distinct from the thing actuated; on the other hand, it must follow for those who identify reality with entitative actuality. In summary, one needs only reread Suarez' argument: Matter has its own actuality of essence and existence, not from form, but of itself, because matter is a real subject; therefore, of itself, it has actual being. One premise is not explicitly advanced in the argument; it is the major " Whatever is real and actual is *of itself* real and actual ". And there is the crux of the whole problem.[439]

An immediate consequence of Suarez' teaching that both matter and form have of themselves actuality of essence and existence, and, as it were, a property of that teaching, is Suarez' conception of the nature the composition of bodies. He writes, for instance, that substance cannot be composed of nothing, but requires at least incomplete substances.[440] Further, he says that a thing which is *per se* one can be composed of things which are incomplete actual beings.[441] Even more explicitly he affirms that, as the essence of a corporeal substance is composed of the partial essences of matter and form, so its existence is composed of the partial existences of these two elements.[442] Suarez could not have fully understood the Thomistic position that of two actual things a thing which is *per se* one cannot be made, for he answers here that the principle is true only of things which are *complete* in actual being. To the Thomist that is not satisfactory; for him the very notion of the actual is that it be, in its order, perfection. For the Thomist any existing actuality, must be, in the order in which it is actual, complete, for the actually perfect cannot be incomplete in that order in which it is perfect. The position then, that a substance is composed of two actual (though incomplete) existences a Thomist must dispute on the ground that act of itself, is precisely *perfection* in its own order. On the other hand, that position Suarez must affirm on the ground that what is, however imperfect it be, is of itself. Here again is the omnipresent proposition that created being is simple. Suarez affirms the

[439] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.
[440] *Ibid.*, nn. 3-5.
[441] *Ibid.*, sect. 5, nn. 16-17.
[442] *Ibid.*, sect. 4, n. 13.

actuality of the incomplete, and implies that one thing, as actual, has of itself its own perfection. As incomplete he implies that of itself it has its own intrinsic limitation, since nothing extrinsic to it limits it in its actuality. Here then is a clear application of the central Suarezian proposition.

Flowing from Suarez' notion of the partial actuality of even primary matter are many other points in which he disagrees with Thomists. Foremost among them is his teaching about the pure potentiality of matter.[443] By his premise that there is nothing which does not, of itself, have its own entitative actuality, Suarez was led to assert that matter is metaphysically an act, but an act which is pure potency in the sense that it is totally ordered to receiving an informing act. It is, therefore, an actually existing thing which is at the same time formally only potential in the physical order, but partially active in the metaphysical order. We have seen the difficulty of that position, the difficulty that what is actual, since it is outside its causes, is already so perfect that it cannot be in dependence on any other cause in the same order. How can such a thing be incomplete in the order of essence? Suarez did teach that matter does not depend on its form as on a cause, and so there is difficulty in seeing how their union can be substantial. As to form, also, since it is of itself existing, and therefore is outside its causes, it is hard to see how it can yet depend on matter as on its cause (as Suarez teaches that it does depend). If form and matter are so complete and perfect in themselves as to exist by their own distinct existence and if they can be conserved without one another, the Thomists find it difficult to understand how they are partial essences. But Suarez, sticking fast to the proposition that one thing can be perfection and intrinsic limitation (even incompletion) of perfection affirmed that (1) both matter and form have distinct existences; (2) matter is purely potential with respect to substantial form; (3) its union with form is not accidental but substantial, and this last in spite of the fact that the Suarezian system also main-

[443] *Ibid.*, sect. 5.

tains that it is not of the ratio of existing matter that it have form, nor does the essence of matter demand this. Truly there is a conception of substantial potency which is far indeed from what Thomists name by that term.

Matter is produced and conserved by an act distinct from the act inducing and conserving its informing form.[444] Should any doubt remain that in the Suarezian system potency, of itself, *is*, this proposition must dispel it. Matter (which is substantial potency) as the term of substantial production and conservation properly *is*, for, as Suarez affirms, that is properly made and created which properly *is*. Hence a thing *is*, and *is* potential in one and the same order, the order of substance. Suarez would answer of course that only under different aspects is it both acutal and potential, entitatively is is actual, formally it is potential. But the thing to grasp is that here once again the Suarezian system does in fact admit that in one and the same order a thing can be both actual and potential.

Closely allied to this teaching is Suarez' proposition that matter alone, without any form, can be conserved in nature, not in the ordinary course of nature, but through God's power,[445] a clear corollary from the teaching that matter of itself alone *is* and does not have intrinsic *dependence* on the being of its form. It is patent that one who teaches this doctrine cannot conceive primary matter as purely potential to all act. But, interestingly enough, Suarez develops the point that, even if essence and existence were really distinct in creatures, there would be no reason why God could not give existence to matter alone, as God does in fact make accidents exist which are separated from any subject. Here Suarez is maintaining that (on the supposition of a real distinction) primary matter alone, and without form could be actuated by an act which is not primary matter, but is a reality distinct from it. It is clearly an act, the act of being outside of its cause and outside noth-

[444] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 8, n. 18; cf. also sect. 3, nn. 6-7; disp. XIII, sect. 4, nn. 16-17.

[445] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 9, n. 1.

ing, but it is the act of that which is, of itself, both formally and entitatively, actually nothing.

The Thomist can not grant what Suarez here supposes, on the ground that matter, since it is of itself actually nothing, can not receive existence, for the existence of what is actually nothing is repugnant. Suarez does not have that difficulty; having already placed in primary matter its own partial essence, he can, on his principles, admit a corresponding partial existence, even if that existence be supposed as distinct. Again, the reason he can teach this is the judgment that what is of itself limited can, of itself and in the same order, be actual. The argument of Suarez from the fact that accidents without a subject can exist to the possibility of matter's separate existence seems to indicate that he conceives matter, like an accident, as itself having some essence.

The being of matter depends on form, not as on a cause, but as on a necessary condition and added actuality,[446] yet matter is a true cause of form.[447] The first part of this proposition seems to the Thomist a simple deduction from the position that matter is, of itself, actual; what is already act does not depend for its entity on the causal influence of some further act of the same order. This position, immediately following from Suarez' central proposition of the physical order, is mediately reducible to his central point in the metaphysical order—what is, is its own actuality.

The position that form depends on matter as on a cause, yet has its own separate existence and can be conserved in nature (by God's power) without matter [448] is, on Suarez' principles, harder for the Thomist to understand. Whatever is existing for the Thomist, is so perfected and completed that, having been constituted by all its causes it is placed outside them and outside nothing. How, then, can form, causally depending on matter, *be* without matter? On the position that form depends on matter for its initial constitution, not for its

[446] *Ibid.*, disp. XV, sect. 9; sect. 8; disp. XIII, sect. 4, n. 13; disp. XXVII, sect. 2.
[447] *Ibid.*, disp. XXVII, sect. 2, nn. 4-5.
[448] *Ibid.*, disp. XIII, sect. 4.

conservation, the positions seem reconcilable. In that case, the Thomist says, given matter and form, each is so complete in being that it is existing without the other being metaphysically necessary to it. How is substantial union possible between elements each so complete in its own actuality? Substantial union is that which is required in order that a thing be so complete that it can exist without a subject of inhesion and without a further co-principle. Suarez' basic notion that the substantially actual can itself be so incomplete as to require further actuality in the same substantial order allows him to teach what he does.

To be expected from Suarez' principles is his position that a composed substance is not really or modally distinct from its essential parts taken together and united, but at most is rationally distinct from them.[449] This would seem to follow necessarily from the position that each element has its own actuality; the actuality of the composite therefore is a union of the component actualities and not distinct from all of them taken as united. The Thomists argue there is but *one* actuality, one being in any substance, not a union of actualities. The difference is fundamental.

Section II. Potency and Act in the Order of Operation

In order to understand the background of Suarez' teaching about the dependence of the human will on God and its motion by God, we have examined his teaching about potency and act in general. Our analysis of that doctrine in the order of being led to the conclusion that it rests upon one principle: whatever is (except God Who is pure act) is both actual (has perfection) and potential (has limitation) of itself, and not by reason of distinct principles which compose it. Or, equivalently: created act is not limited by potency only but can limit itself; and, conversely, what is limited can be its own actuality. That proposition expresses the sum of the Suarezian teaching about potency and act in metaphysical terms. We have seen that in the physical order, too, the same judgment is fundamental to Suarez' doctrine as to Suarez' teachings on

[449] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXVI, sect. 3.

potency and act in the order of operation, the question is whether that same metaphysical notion is applied by Suarez. Is the judgment conceived in the order of being adapted to and applied in the order of operation? The answer is that that same judgment is applied here also; there is continuity between the two orders in Suarez' teaching. The judgment in this order has its own peculiar form. It can be best expressed, perhaps, in this way: an operative potency can be at one and the same time in formal potency and yet have some act, in virtue of which it can physically reduce itself to formal act. We do not say that Suarez maintains this of *every* potency. He does teach, however, that it is not repugnant to the nature of a potency so to reduce itself to act, and he maintains that some potencies do thus reduce themselves to act.

It is evident that Suarez teaches that passive operative powers and some active operative powers, although with respect to formal act they are merely potencies, are yet so actual that they do not need to be premoved in order to have their acts depending upon them.

Suarez does not explicitly say of any active powers that they are, as powers, forms which are a virtual and eminent act through which they can reduce themselves to the formal act with respect to which they are in potency. Yet, from the start of his treatment, it is evident that Suarez did not consider it repugnant to the nature of an active power that it be, in itself, so actual that it can reduce itself to formal act. He writes "they (i. e., active powers) do not suffer by receiving anything after the manner of first act by which they are completed in the ratio of agent principle, for, as I suppose, they are principles complete in their own order (i. e., proximate or instrumental) and do not require a further act by which they are intrinsically completed for acting. Nor is it to the point that such faculties sometimes need application or the motion of another potency to exercise their actions . . . for this motion is not through physical action and passion . . . but is brought about through a sympathy of the powers of the same soul, and

therefore this does not keep such a faculty from being purely active, physically and properly speaking." [450]

Here, then, in clear terms, Suarez indicates his conception that a purely active power, as such, does not necessarily need any physical application to its own act. Such a power can be so complete as to have sufficient actuality in itself to move itself, without any extrinsic physical application, since as formally potential such a faculty lacks formal act. Since, however, it is physically sufficient to move itself to act, it must have in some way the very act which it lacks in a formal way. This single passage we have quoted might easily lead one to suppose that Suarez teaches, not only that some active powers are of themselves sufficiently actual to reduce themselves to act, but that *all* active powers are such. However, he teaches explicitly [451] that when formal act is to be acquired through a virtual quality through physical and natural motion, then the formal act in question is *natural* to the agent; therefore, motion to it is principally from the generator. That does not contradict what Suarez said later. What is involved is not an assertion that it is intrinsically repugnant for a thing to be in virtual act and in formal potency, but an assertion that motion to a connatural form is principally from the generator. Hence, in those cases in which the motion is principally attributed to the generator, Suarez assigns, not the nature of *potency*, but the demands of natural motion as the reason why the virtual act which is a potency to a natural form is *moved* to formal act.

We must not forget that Suarez explicitly states that, even for active powers which do require application, the application is through moral not physical motion. In the twenty-second disputation, he rejects a distinct physical premotion of created powers by God; [452] in the thirty-first, he teaches that creatures

[450] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 2, n. 1; cf. footnote # 392.

[451] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7.

[452] Dico ergo: divinus concursus quatenus est aliquid ad extra per se essentialiter est aliquid permodum actionis vel saltem per modum cujusdam fieri immediate manantis a Deo . . . Concursus primae causae praeter id quod est per modum actionis non includit ex intrinseca necessitate aliquid de novo inditum ipsi causae secundae quod sit principium actionis ejus, vel conditio ad illam necessaria. Dico

can be principal causes of the existence of their effects.[453] The corollary of these teachings is that at least some created physical powers can physically apply themselves to second act. In the cases where one thing can not be at one time in virtual act and in formal potency the reason is the special nature of the formal act involved and, therefore, of the motion to it. Suarez teaches that it is not contrary to the nature of an active power that it can apply itself to its own act, and that some active powers do so. It would follow that such a faculty as a power, has in itself in some way the acts in question.

As to *passive* powers the teaching of Suarez is even more clear. He writes that a passive power *per se* ordained to a determined act is *eminently* its active principle.[454] Again he says a passive power, in as much as it has the actual perfection of such a species, can be a power *eminently* or *virtually* containing another act and formally actuable through this act. Later he implies that a power *can* both receive an act and be its principle inasmuch as it contains that act virtually or eminently.[455] Suarez, we have seen, taught that the principle " one thing cannot be in potency and in act at the same time " does not apply in the case of immanent or vital actions.[456] Hence, some things can be in virtual act and in formal potency; as to immanent acts, the second act is contained in first act, virtually and eminently. In these cases, the dissimilarity between agent and patient is dissimilarity between a form formally taken and another which eminently contains it. The human will, for example, as first act, eminently contains its own second act. Any form that contains another form virtually and eminently has that other in a more perfect mode; it *actually* contains it in an exceeding degree. Here, then, in the notion of the eminent actuality of passive powers and of all

de novo inditum quia certum est concursum causae secundae supponere in illa virtutem agendi datam et conservatam a prima causa (*Ibid.*, disp. XXII, sect. 2, nn. 15, 19; consult this whole section for Suarez' rejection of premotion and predetermination).

[453] *Ibid.*, disp. XXXI, sect. 9.

[454] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6.

[455] *Ibid.*, sect. 2, n. 14; *Ibid.*, n. 16.

[456] *Ibid.*, disp. XVIII, sect. 7, n. 19.

equivocal agents is his basis for saying that many things seem to move themselves from potency to act.

It is worth noting that, concerning the particular principle of immanent acts which is the human will, Suarez teaches that it *alone* is the proximate principle *quo* of both acting and receiving. He rejects the position that, whereas will plus appetition of the end is the principle of acting, the will alone is the principle of receiving.[457] The will as principle of acting is not distinct from the principle of receiving even by partial entity as the including is distinct from the included; by *itself* it is sufficient to move itself. Here then in the order of operation is a clear application of the metaphysical notion that the limited can itself be somehow actual.

Interesting, too, is the Suarezian teaching about the relative nobility of potency and act.[458] Speaking of active power he says that its act is not from its very genus more perfect than the power for, to the latter, act adds no perfection since it does not exceed the active power of the potency; that is, the potency from its very genus is more perfect since the potency perfects the act rather than the other way around. Speaking later of passive powers, Suarez says, that the act is in some way the more perfect, since it is better to be with act than without it, but this view does not consider things simply.[459] A passive power which is *per se* ordered to this act is more perfect than the act, for the potency is eminently the active principle. Thomists hold that it does in fact exceed the power of any faculty, that of itself it actually moves itself to act and through such motion has its act causally dependent on it. Since the very perfection of potency consists in actually having its act and since potency cannot give itself act, the potency *receives* its perfection; it is not sufficient to give its own perfection to itself. Then, precisely as potency, it is less perfect for it can not alone achieve that for which it *is*, namely, its operation.

[457] *Ibid.*, n. 51.
[458] *Ibid.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6.
[459] *Ibid.*, n. 19.

Chapter IV

CRITICISM OF THE SUAREZIAN TEACHING ON HUMAN FREEDOM

Section I. The Free Act

1. *The Central Doctrine.* Having seen the background for the whole of Suarez' doctrine on potency and act, we can hope to approach with understanding the task of criticizing his teaching about that potency which is the human will and its act. The student who would read Suarez on human freedom alone and attempt to criticize that doctrine without regard to the more general teaching could hardly arrive at a certain conclusion. While he might suspect the Suarezian principle underlying the teaching on the will, he would not find adequate verification of the principle in the doctrine on liberty alone. What then is the underlying concept in Suarez' whole treatment of the human will and its motion under God? The principle involved here is the metaphysical principle we discovered as basic in the Suarezian concept of potency and act: The limited and imperfect can be its own actuality; the actual can be its own intrinsic limitation. More proximately, and as adapted to the order of operation that principle can be formulated thus: A created faculty which is potential with respect to formal second act can have in itself a virtual and eminent actuality in virtue of which it can, without distinct physical premotion, reduce itself to formal second act. That is the judgment which is basic in Suarez' account of the acts of man's free will and its movement by God, and that is the principle which gives this teaching continuity with the whole Suarezian system.

That Suarez bases his doctrine about the free act of man on that principle is beyond question; the whole foundation of his teaching about the created free act is that the potency is not physically premoved to that act, but reduces itself to act

under simultaneous concursus. A thing can be reduced from potency to act only by a being in act; clearly then, the will which is (with respect to formal act) potential *is* yet of *itself* so actual as to move itself to that act without a prior reduction to act. With regard to the motion of the free will, he writes that in a free act neither the first cause nor the second has any priority of nature; neither acts on the other.[460] It must follow that God does not move the will, but that it moves itself. Clearly, then, the very reality which is a potency is somehow itself actual. Suarez also says that God's concursus is not previous to or distinct from the human act; it is not concerned with the principle of the act (the faculty), nor does it in any way incline or strengthen that principle for acting.[461] What can this mean but that the will alone is a sufficient physical principle of its own reduction to act and that, therefore, even as potency it is actual? Is not essentially the same notion involved in Suarez' statement that God's act *ad extra* has no priority to the act of the creature other than a priority of nobility? [462]

Especially interesting, however, is Suarez' more detailed argumentation against God's premotion of the human will.[463] His general reason is that the essential subordination of second causes to God is amply safeguarded by simultaneous concursus. He argues, in particular, that the will needs no application to its act. His reason is that there is a sufficient application through the proposition of the object. Clearly, then, a faculty plus its object (which object Suarez insists from the beginning has no efficiency with regard to the act) is *ipso facto* sufficiently applied to its own act without a previous divine intervention applying the faculty. Necessarily, then, either the faculty in itself contains in some way the very application, or no efficiency at all is required to apply a faculty to operation. Thomists, insisting on the real distinction between potency and act, maintain that it is metaphysically impossible for that which is only power to apply itself to act for nothing can give a perfection which it itself lacks. Suarez, however,

[460] *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 15, n. 7.
[461] *Ibid.*, cap. 4, n. 6.
[462] *Ibid.*, n. 8.
[463] *Ibid.*, capp. 5-6.

can teach that the human will needs no extrinsic application to act, and he can teach this because from the outset he has judged that the limited and potential is also, in some way, its own perfection and actuality. Therefore, as his own words show clearly, the only application he conceives here is the presentation of the object to the power. That this power as such needs application to act he does not see, for the potential is somehow actual. The real point of difference here between Suarez and the Thomists, then, is not simply a question of human freedom; what is involved is the very nature of potency and act.

According to Suarez, also, the will needs no *motion*, for the motion would have no term which he can determine. The term can not be the act of the second agent for, if it were, only God would be active in producing the act. This teaching (so thoroughly in accord with what Suarez had written about the complete active and dominative power of the will over its own act) is flatly opposed by Thomists who insist that the will can be active in producing its act only on condition that it be moved by God. In itself, the will is (with respect to act) mere potency which to be active *must* be activated, for the potential is not, of itself, actual.

Thus God's motion does not deny activity to the power; rather it gives activity to it. Suarez reasons that if God moves the power to act then the power itself must be only passive. He does not conceive as possible a motion of this power to its act, a motion which gives to this power the actual activity of the power. He does not conceive it because he has already conceived the very power as somehow actual in such a way that for God to activate it would mean that its own connatural and due power to reduce itself to act is thereby impeded.

In Suarez' view, the will needs no complement in order to act, for every power is adequate to its own act. Especially to be noted is his argument against any complement which is a fluid quality. He argues that a faculty with such a quality and with simultaneous concursus either needs another premotion, or it does not. If it does, the process continues to infinity (which is patently absurd). If it does not need another,

then the first premotion is not needed either. Second causes by nature do not require it (since *this* second cause, viz. faculty plus quality, does not need premotion), and why could not God give creatures permanent powers equal to the combination of faculty plus quality? The Thomist answers, of course, that given this quality the faculty does not need another, as a ship already moving does not need another motion in order that it be moving. This one premotion, however, is necessary; even the *moved* second cause, while moved, requires to be moved. In other words the second cause can not reduce itself to the actuality of its own act. Every secondary agent, then, even the agent which has this quality, does by nature require it in order to act. In the second place, the Thomist adds, a permanent quality is impossible, for the reason that this quality is essentially a *motion* not a form. Suarez argues as he does because he has not understood fully the nature of this motion, and the reason he has not well understood it is because he has already excluded the need of any such motion on the ground that the potency itself is somehow actual.

For Suarez, no excitation of the second cause is needed, and here again the final reason for his position is the basic judgment that the will can reduce itself to act. Ultimately the whole Suarezian position about the motion of the will from first act to second act rests on the principle that there is no medium between first and second act. If that be true, if between power to act and the very acting there is no medium, then, of course, the will as a power is not moved to act by anything extrinsic to itself. It can be true only if the power itself *is* somehow actual. Only then can the will have (in the Suarezian sense) that complete active power over its own act which Suarez postulates, an active power so complete that the very potency moves itself to act.

As to the *determination* of the human will it is abundantly clear that Suarez maintains that it is from the will alone that the intellectual appetite which is in a special way undetermined and indifferent (from its very nature as following an intellectual knowledge) can determine itself. Thus, he says that determination of the will, not only need not be, but can not be

from any agent extrinsic to the will or from any reality previous to the act of the will, for the determination is formally and physically the very act of the will.[464] It is, of course, admitted by all that the determination of the will is the act of the will; the will determines itself. Suarez does not mean only that; he means that this determination is from the will as the latter is untouched by any previous determining quality. For him, if the will receives determination prior to its act, it is passive.[465] This is against the position that the will receives determination to determine itself. If any doubt remains, we have his arguments that predetermination of the created will would destroy indifference of specification and of exercise; he says that, since the will has freedom both of specification and of exercise, it cannot be pre-determined.[466] Speaking of the supernatural order, Suarez argues that there is in us no determining aid which is neither habit nor act, and he further notes that determination (through grace) would destroy that freedom which the will must have.[467]

Suarez simply dismisses any predetermining element; the will is not, in his system, predetermined in order that it determine itself. His reason is crystal-clear; the proposition " an indifferent power cannot of itself produce a determined effect " is true of a power which is indifferent by reason of some imperfection or defect. It is not true of a power (such as the will) which is indifferent from its very perfection.[468] A faculty which is positively and actively indifferent can of its own intrinsic power determine itself to its acts. Here, too, he is supposing that the undetermined, the potential, is, in an eminent way, its own determination, its own perfection. Indetermination can be an expansive perfection embracing the perfection of the many possible determinations; the potential can be an expansive actuality which somehow embraces the perfection of the many possible acts. The formula is by now familiar; there is unity and cohesion in the system of Suarez.

[464] *Ibid.*, cap. 8.
[465] *Ibid.*, n. 4.
[466] *Ibid.*, capp. 9-11.
[467] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 12.
[468] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 8, n. 6.

2. *Consequent Teachings.* The central and vital point in Suarez' teaching about the motion of the free human faculty is clear: the human will can, of its own intrinsic powers, move and determine itself to second act without a predetermining motion by God. The metaphysical basis for that position is also arrestingly clear: what is potential and undetermined can contain eminently and virtually, the perfection and determination of many actual determinations. From these notions stem many of the other points on which Suarez and the Thomists disagree. That is hardly surprising; one would expect that disagreement in so fundamental a question as is here involved would inevitably lead to disagreement on many subsequent points. We shall here indicate some, at least, of these points, and their connection with this great central point. In so doing we shall, implicitly, be confirming our thesis that the differences between Suarezians and Thomists cannot be approached or settled as though they were isolated questions which bear only on human freedom. Those differences are so great, so fundamental, as to reach back with surprising proximity to the very starting-points of these two schools. But let us see the Suarezian propositions which flow from this judgment that the will is somehow its own actuality.

I. God's concursus (with this faculty which is the human will) must have an eminent, universal, and abstract character; and, Suarez adds, determination is too restrictive for the will.[469] That is one of the best revelations of the mind of Suarez which is to be found in all his writings on liberty; there, epitomized, one finds the mind of Suarez on this matter. God's concursus must be eminent and universal because it should be of like nature with the power with which it concurs, and that power (the will) is not bound to any one thing; it is itself an eminent, universal thing, so eminent and universal from its very perfection that determination is too restrictive for it. The will in its very aspect of potency and indetermination is conceived as more expansive in its perfection than any particular act which may formally determine and actuate it, for this eminence and

[469] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

universality of the human will is eminence and universality from the very perfection of the faculty. The will as a potency is not conceived here as something of itself imperfect (because potential and undetermined) which is simply perfected by the second act actuating and determining it. Rather, the greater perfection is in the unrestricted potentiality which from its eminent virtuality can choose this or that particular act, and retain under act its own greater perfection. Here we remember the Suarezian dictum that a passive faculty which is *per se* ordered to such or such an act is, simply, more perfect than its act for it is, eminently, the active principle.[470]

Here, then, is a denial that act is simply more perfect than potency in the same order, a denial based on the premise that the potential can be more perfectly actual than that which, formally, is act. Thomists reject Suarez' teaching about the motion of the human will on the ground that nothing can reduce itself from potency to act, that such reduction can come only from that which is itself in act. But that proposition can hardly be made to apply in Suarez' eyes. In his system there is no question of the potency achieving by motion to a determined act a perfection it in no way has of itself. Rather, that motion is motion to something which is not, simply, more perfect than the will at all but motion only to one of the many formal actualizations which the will already eminently has of itself.

Quite clearly, then, the teaching that God's concursus should be of an eminent, universal, and abstract character (which is so contradictory to the Thomistic teaching that concursus is a determining motion to this particular act) flows from Suarez' notion of the eminent and virtual actuality of the human will as a potency. The disagreement about concursus then is proximately rooted in the disagreement about the nature of the will as an operative potency.

II. In the second place, it is absolutely basic in the Suarezian teaching that the effectiveness of God's concursus rests with the determination of the human agent. Thus Suarez writes that

[470] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XLIII, sect. 6, n. 20.

God wills to concur with men who cooperate with Him, but such a volitional act of God of itself alone effects nothing.[471] The Thomist can not accept that. He can not adopt the stand that it is the creature who determines that God's volition shall be effective, and not God Who predetermines the effective volition of the creature. It is the created will, the Thomist insists, which of itself alone effects nothing, for the created will of itself alone is a mere potency, not act. But Suarez was certain to teach what he here enunciates. If the created potency is, in an eminent, virtual way, its own act, if its very nature as such a potency makes possible (and its free nature demands) that it move and determine itself, then either God's volition must be conditional and, of itself alone, actually without the effect, or God must violate the very freedom He has established. Rejecting the latter alternative Suarez accepted the former. This position is made possible only by Suarez' starting point that the will can reduce itself by eminent virtual act to formal act, more remotely that the potential can itself be actual. Given that possibility and then the doctrine that freedom *demands* that the free potency so reduce itself to act this position became inevitable.

Suarez argues that in the supernatural order man has it in his own power that God's sufficient grace, already given him, become concursus,[472] i. e., man has it in his power to determine that the good act be placed. He writes that God's influence enters in on condition that the human will cooperate.[473] Clearly, Suarez was not maintaining that God's influence was the moving element which predetermined the human will to cooperate; on the contrary, he maintained that the second cause determined the effectiveness of the conditional act of God's will. Here again the Thomist disagrees, insisting that the potential (the human faculty) is determined by God, Who is pure act, for the potential of itself alone is merely potential. Suarez could teach that the second cause gives effect to God's

[471] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 3.
[472] *Opus. Primum*, Liber III, cap. 6.
[473] *Ibid.*, cap. 14.

conditional will only because he conceived the potential as itself somehow actual. The formula is now familiar. One who would know Suarez must expect to meet it often, for like a great central theme it rings out again and again in the pages of Suarez.

III. No less essential in Suarez' account of God's moving of the human will is the teaching that the efficacy of God's efficacious grace is a *moral* efficacy, and not physical.[474] It is an efficacy which is rooted, not in the vocation itself, but in God's infallible foreknowledge that the created will shall consent to such a vocation. The Thomist can never accept this; for him a merely moral efficacy is unacceptable. How, he asks, can such a grace infallibly have efficacy from God's foreknowledge since the will as free is not of itself determined to consent to this particular vocation. On the supposition, it is not determined by God's motion either. Where, then, is the objective basis for God's infallible foreknowledge that *this* is the grace to which this human will shall consent? Where then is the efficacy of this grace if it is not in the vocation itself and can not be in this supposed foreknowledge of God? Suarez, faced with the fact of the efficacy of some grace, and with his own position that grace cannot physically determine the human will, was bound to resort to an efficacy which is merely moral. The very possibility of this position, too, rests upon the teaching that the created will as a power can move itself, by eminent or virtual act, to formal act. Had Suarez not first accepted that proposition he would have had to account for the efficacy grace in some other way. The interesting thing is Suarez' point that this efficacy is really rooted in God's foreknowledge. The Thomist can argue that God's knowledge is an intuition of reality. Therefore, if God, in knowing this will knows (without God Himself determining it) that the will shall consent to such or such a call then how can the power be free and of itself indifferent? There is some kind of determination there in the very second cause; how else is God's knowledge infallible? If

[474] *Ibid.*, n. 9.

God knows that the will shall consent, it shall indeed consent, but if, as Suarez says, the determination that it shall consent is not from God, then is it not from the second cause, and where then is freedom?

This argument would have little weight in Suarez' eyes, and that simply because of his notions of potency and act. Since Suarez held that the will is eminently and virtually its own act, it is not surprising that he also held that God can foreknow what the will shall do. Knowledge is indeed of reality, but the act of the will is already somehow a reality, supposing Suarez' position that act is *eminently* virtually in the will as a power. The very power therefore *actually* contains it, in an eminent way. We do not imply that the Suarezian position is without difficulties. However, granted his fundamental notion about the nature of potency, his position seems to be much stronger than one realizes who conceives potency as Thomists conceive it. What God foreknows is (on Suarez' grounds) already a reality, already has a certain objective truth and that without resorting to the alternative that the will is determined in itself and therefore not free. In other words, this position of Suarez seems quite consonant with his teaching about liberty as a whole, granted the eminent actuality of the will as a power; that principle makes this position almost inevitable, certainly logical.

IV. Intimately connected with this is the Suarezian teaching about mediate science (*scientia media*) by which God knows what the will would do in any given set of circumstances.[475] Here again one can object that a non-determining divine science about what the human will *would* do in given cases is impossible because where there is no determined reality to be known there is no certain science. In this case there is no determined reality for the will is not by nature determined to this act and (on the supposition) it is not determined by God either. But, again, this position of Suarez really has great force, accepting the principle that a potency can eminently con-

[475] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 15; Liber III, cap. 14, n. 9.

tain its own act. If the will as a power does eminently contain these many possible determinations, then those determinations *are* eminently in the will, and so some of the difficulty of maintaining that God knows them is removed, for they are (in an eminent way) actual reality. Here again we do not imply that the teaching of Suarez is without any difficulty, but that teaching is in light of the basic notion we have explicated, surely consistent. That notion makes these various teachings of Suarez unified, all parts of one homogeneous doctrinal body.

V. Suarez explicitly teaches that there is this difference, on God's part, between efficacious and sufficient grace: God foresees the effect in one and not in the other, but man has it in his power " to make God foresee that he will consent to the call." [476] Essentially the same notion (i. e., God's knowledge depends on the creature and on its activity) is implied in Suarez' teaching about God's foreknowledge and mediate science. Thomists emphatically reject the position that man can make God foresee anything, arguing that God's knowledge does not depend on creatures, that rather His knowledge is a cause of the creature and of the creature's act. Yet this teaching of Suarez, so widely divergent from that of the Thomists, this position that some of God's knowledge depends on the creature, comes, necessarily, from Suarez' original position that the will as potency can (and, in order to be free, must) determine and reduce itself to act. This must follow, for if that be true, if, physically, the will, without determination by God, reduces itself to act, then, since God must know that determination, His knowledge of it can only be knowledge depending on the human agent. That position is rooted deep in the formula that what is potential can, by its own eminent actuality, reduce itself to formal act.

VI. Suarez, having conceived physical premotion and predetermination as impossible, explains God's providence with regard to our free acts through predefinition. In itself this predefinition is, " a certain eternal decree of the divine will by

[476] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 14.

which it absolutely establishes that something be done in time"; it precedes foreknowledge of the future act and it decrees, absolutely, the act. There is no predetermining or necessitating of the human will involved because the execution of this absolute predefinition takes the form of applying a means (to the predefined end) which means infallibly attracts the will, though it does not necessitate it; the human consent to this means is certain from divine foreknowledge. The connection between predefinition and the execution of the act of the second agent is thus founded in divine foreknowledge plus providence, not in the physical efficacy of a decree determining the human will to one thing.[477]

With all this, again, the Thomist must disagree. He argues that the will since, it is a free potency, is of itself undetermined that it shall or shall not consent to this means (the medium through which the predefinition is executed). The will is, according to Suarez' system, physically not predetermined by God; it would therefore be impossible (supposing that God does not predetermine the human will) that God foreknow the consent of man to this means. Thus God's perfect providence of our free actions could not be saved in the way Suarez explains. But if one grants the Suarezian concept of potency, if one supposes that the human will as a potency eminently contains its own act, it is then apparent that much of the difficulty the Thomist has with this position is removed. If the will, as a power, eminently contains its own act then that act is actually, eminently, in the will; there truly is something there for God to know. Here again, therefore (while admittedly difficulties do remain), this basic judgment that the potential can itself be somehow actual seems to be the foundation which renders possible and explicable another of the great issues which divide the Suarezian and Thomistic schools.

VII. The judgment (found so often in the pages of Suarez and used by him as something in the nature of principle) that predetermination of the human will would be necessitation of

[477] *Ibid.*, Liber I, cap. 16.

it is another very great point of difference between him and the Thomists. The latter teach that the will is as a free power so potential and indifferent that without determination it can never have its connatural free act; its very nature demands that it be reduced to a determined act. Suarez teaches that if the will received its act from an extrinsic agent it would be necessitated, not free, [478] that predetermination would be necessitation,[479] that it is the same thing to say that the will is not necessitated by something other than itself as to say that it is not determined to one by that other.[480] The notion, then, that determination is necessitation is truly a principle which Suarez uses again and again. Thomists maintain that determination is a genus containing under it, as species, determination which is contingent, and determination which is necessary.

Why should Suarez go on repeating and so often using the judgment that determination is necessitation? The answer lies in his concept that the will as a potency, is so eminently actual that it reduces itself to formal act. Conceive the will as an eminent actuality which by nature *can* and (in order to be free) must reduce itself to formal act, and you must conceive that the will's connatural way of operating freely is to operate without determination from any other agent. Therefore, if the human will in a given instance *is* determined by another agent, then that act is altogether outside the way in which the human will does act freely. The act, in other words is truly necessary and not free at all. If one grants Suarez' basic notions, then one must grant the conclusion that the determination of which Thomists speak would indeed be necessitation. Here, too, then the fundamental reason for this very important difference between the two schools is the omnipresent judgment about the nature of potency.

VIII. One very obvious difference between the Suarezian and Thomistic accounts of God's movement of the human will is in regard to those free acts which are sinful.[481] The Thomist

[478] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2.
[479] *Ibid.*, cap. 4.
[480] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6.
[481] *Opus. Primum*, Liber II, capp. 1-9.

maintains that, since the will is in potency to act and everything which is reduced from potency to act is moved by a being in act, the human will is moved by God even to acts which have a morally evil aspect. Yet it does not follow at all that God causes sin (moral evil) as such. Evil as such is not being; it is a privation of due perfection in an apt subject. As privation it has no *per se* cause but only a *per accidens* cause. So, the Thomist says, what God causes relative to a sinful act is not its sinfulness (which is not being; and God is not the Author of what is not) but its actuality, i. e., the natural being and perfection found in it. The moral defection is totally attributed to the deficiencies of the second cause, whereas the physical and metaphysical perfection of the act cannot be ultimately attributed to him. God causes actual reality, not the act's deficiency in the moral order. Suarez rejects this, arguing that if God were both to determine and concur in this act He would be a cause of sin (which is obviously impossible) for what is it to concur to an act, even determining concursus to this evil act, but to be a cause of sin?

The Thomist replies that it is not only possible but necessary that God move second causes. In moving them, however, He always respects their natures and peculiar exigencies. He moves them in a fitting way and according as they are disposed in themselves; so a thing ultimately disposed to act evilly God moves even knowing that disposition. What underlies Suarez' position is the judgment that a potency (this potency which is the will) can reduce itself to act having neither premotion nor predetermination from God. Because Suarez held that the will can act without a divine motion falling on it to determine and apply it, he could hold that God does not premove a man to the material element of an act which is evil. In Suarez' view, the very will itself as a potency can move itself to act; there is no need then to fall back on God's causality to explain the physical actuality found in any reduction of a potency to its act.

IX. Last of all we point out a most striking conclusion of Suarez with regard to God's efficacious grace, the conclusion

that (metaphysically or logically speaking) there is no inconvenience in saying that there could be a man whom God could not call efficaciously (though morally speaking that never happens) because there could be some one whom God foresees will never cooperate with grace.[482] Suarez finds it easy to safeguard divine omnipotence by appealing to God's power to impede the use of such a man's freedom. But the conclusion itself, that (metaphysically or logically speaking) there could be a man whose free acts are beyond the reach of God's efficacious grace, a man whose freedom can never be efficaciously ruled and guided by God's grace, is there and that conclusion, so far removed from Thomistic teaching, is a natural, an inevitable outgrowth of Suarez' starting point. If a power, as a power is so actual that it can reduce itself to act, and if *this* power as free *must* reduce itself to act so that God does not physically predetermine and premove it, then God's grace can not physically reach out, so to say, to guide and lead it in its free acts. Hence this freedom can indeed escape that grace of God.

Such is the Suarezion account of man's free acts: an account which is far indeed from that rendered by Thomists. For that difference there is one reason, Suarez' starting point. To it, ultimately, can be traced the great outstanding propositions in which he differs so widely from Thomism.

Section II. The Free Potency

Throughout our criticism of Suarez' teaching about man's free acts, the point we made was that the various teachings of Suarez which we discussed all flow from his notion that the human will as a potency can reduce itself to act. That notion comes from his position about the very nature of potency and act. The possibility, therefore, of Suarez' teachings on the acts of man's free faculty hinges upon that famous conception of potency and act concerning which so much has already been said here. But we can not afford to overlook the point that

[482] *Ibid.*, Liber III, cap. 14, n. 16.

Suarez did not teach that potency *must* reduce itself to act, nor that all potency does in fact so reduce itself. However, he does say that *this* potency which is a free operative faculty does reduce itself. We saw that at the very beginning of the previous section. Now why did Suarez teach that? We know this much: Suarez' teaching about man's free *acts* rests upon his doctrine about the nature of a free power. We know also that the very possibility of Suarez' doctrine about the free power rests upon his more general doctrine that at least some potency can be eminently actual. However, we do not yet know *why* he maintained that a *free* potency *must* be a potency which is of itself so actual that it can reduce itself to act without a distinct premotion. Until we know this we have not fully seen the basis of the Suarezian teaching.

The answer to the problem is a very old one. Suarez realized that freedom is a property which includes (if it is not identical with) indifference, active indifference in virtue of which a faculty can determine itself to act. The really vital question about man's *liberum arbitrium* is this: what faculty or faculties enter into its act? On the answer to that question depends the kind of indifference one shall posit as necessary to freedom. St. Thomas answers that this faculty is " none other than intellect and will "; [483] " a free judgment of reason "; [484] and he explains that " the root of liberty is the will as a subject but reason as a cause; for the will can bear on different things because of this that reason can have different concepts of the good." [485] St. Thomas, then, while recognising that the *liberum arbitrium* is not a distinct faculty from the will is far indeed from minimizing the role of intellect in freedom. Election, the proper act of the *liberum arbitrium*, is, for him, substantially

[483] *Ergo* liberum arbitrium non est aliud ab utroque; liberum arbitrium non est potentia separata a voluntate et ratione; non videtur quod liberum arbitrium sit alia potentia a voluntate et ratione (*II Sent.*, d. 23, q. 19, 3).

[484] Liberum arbitrium . . . definitur esse *liberum de ratione judicium* (*II Cont. Gent.*, c. 48).

[485] Radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum sed sicut causa est ratio. . . . Ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas conceptiones veri (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 17 a. 1, ad 2um).

an act of will, but *formally* an *act of reason*, for the form supplied by reason enters in to fashion, so to speak, the act of the free will. As a consequence its act can never be necessitated with respect to partial goods simply because it is, formally, from the intellect. Man has, through reason, a norm (which is the universal good) and so can always compare this particular good with that universal norm. Seeing the object and act as partial, particular things, inadequate to his appetite for universal good, he can not be necessitated with regard to them, for only those volitional acts of man can be necessary which regard universal good. Hence from the very fact that the act of *liberum arbitrium* is formally an *arbitrium*, i. e., a *judgment*, it is metaphysically impossible that that act ever be necessary with regard to a particular thing known to be such.

Suarez, as we have seen, had a quite different notion about human freedom as a faculty. To be sure, he derived that free faculty from man's intellectual nature, but practically speaking he divorced intellect from will in the order of operation. That divorce is what basically divides Suarez' account of man's free faculty from the Thomistic account, just as his judgment about the nature of potency and act is that which basically divides his teaching about free acts from the Thomistic teaching on the same point. Having divorced the two, he could still preserve freedom maintaining that its indifference is such indifference of a faculty with respect to its acts, that without divine premotion the will can move to act. In other words, it is a power indifferent in the sense that it has such dominion over its own acts that it can *of itself* move itself without God's premotion to this act or to that act, or not move itself at all, just as it chooses. He does, in fact, indicate that indifference as liberty. In doing so he made it inevitable that he should teach the doctrines about free acts which we have already discussed.

1. *The Central Doctrine.* We have already seen that for Suarez the will is the *liberum arbitrium.* The proposition that the will is properly the subject of freedom (since election, the free act, is substantially a volitional act) is admitted by all. But what Suarez really taught was that the will *alone* of human

faculties is the *per se* cause of free acts, and in that lies the root difficulty. We have seen that he argues that knowledge is a *per accidens* cause of the act of an appetite. Again he teaches that the appetite cannot use the formal apprehension (of the object) since it exists in another faculty, and that an appetite is of itself constituted in first act and needs no form to constitute it in first act.[486]

It is certain that an appetite is, in its being and without other modification, an inclination to some good. It does not follow, the Thomist argues, that, because an appetite is such in its very being, the will, is also with regard *to any operation*, without previous modification, a tendency in first act. If no form determines the will to this object it can never will this object, for its *natural* tendency is to the good in general, not to particular goods. Yet in fact the will tends to existing, concrete objects; hence, even in first act it must somehow be modified in order to tend to such concrete goods, by a modification which can only be from knowledge. Even with regard to the good-in-general the will is not of itself on the order of *operation* in first act. That good is the object of no particular act of will, but rather the ratio or driving force of every voluntary act. But Suarez' mind in this matter is abundantly clear: the human will alone, without an essentially causal modification coming from reason, is the principle of the free act. The free act has no essential, causal dependence on any faculty other than the will. Suarez did not merely divorce intellect from will in the free operation of the latter. He also freed the intellect and other faculties from any motion by the will which is, philosophically, *per se* efficacious, maintaining that the will's motion of them is a moral motion, an efficacy which is, philosophically speaking, *per accidens*.

That Suarez did not penetrate the interplay of reason and will in a free act seems evident, too, from his argumentation against the Thomistic position that intellect determines will finally and that will determines intellect efficiently.[487] In that

[486] *De Anima*, Liber V, capp. 2-3. [487] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6.

argument Suarez takes the judgment of reason to be the application of the object to the will, an act which precedes the free choice. In a case where true choice is to be made the application is rather counsel (the proposition of many objects) than a final judgment. What Suarez conceives as intellectual proposition of the object is actually the free choice itself on its intellectual side: it is the ultimate judgment by which man freely determines himself to the selected means. Suarez did not make this " application of the object " an essential part of the free act; he made it a preceding act. Suarez then failed quite completely to see that the acts of the *liberum arbitrium* contain in their very essence an intellectual side; he did not understand that free choice is in fact rational, formally speaking. Suarez says that the formula: " a judgment must determine will," is false in the sense that intellect first judges: " this is to be elected," for that would be opposed to the liberty of the will. In fact, intellect does judge " this is to be elected " and without prejudice to the free act, for that judgment is precisely the intellectual phase of the free act.

There can be no doubt then as to the fact: Suarez did teach a divorce of intellect and will in the order of operation. The will is not, philosophically speaking, a *per se* efficient mover of intellect, and intellect is not a *per se* cause of a voluntary act; therefore it is not a *per se* cause of that voluntary act which is a free act. Hence, and here is the important conclusion, freedom can not be simply the dominion of the faculty over its own act coming from the fact that the object of the act is manifested by reason as something indifferent, i. e., inadequate to the appetite of good in general. Yet liberty does certainly imply indifference. So, Suarez, to safeguard human freedom, appealed to the indifference in the will itself, an indifference he conceived as complete active indifference by which the will is so active *that it can determine its own indifference without predetermination by God.* Suarez never fully understood the intimate and intricate connection of intellect and will in any voluntary act. He divorced those two faculties; he saved the free power by maintaining that it is an eminently actual thing,

and in that lies the root of all disagreement between him and Thomists.

2. *Consequent Teachings.* To avoid all ambiguity, we must realize that in describing the free faculty as "active" Suarez does not use the term as it is frequently used among Scholastics, i. e., as naming a faculty whose act is transient. Suarez, of course, said that the act of the free power is an immanent act, and therefore he classifies that power as "passive" in the technical use of the term.[488] His meaning is clear: the free will is active in the sense that its act is not a received act as, let us say, the act of existence is received into created essences (according to Thomists). Suarez' reason for insisting on the active quality of the free power is clear: what is received cannot be rejected. If the will receives its act it cannot reject that act, and hence is not free, for freedom is power to act and not-act. Thus the quality of being active is posited as a necessary consequence of the will's indifference.

This basic doctrine is clearly opposed to the Thomists for, as we have seen, they teach that the will does receive actuation. Yet, from the actuation necessity does not follow because *liberum arbitrium* is an appetite which is intellectual, and which therefore, cannot, under any circumstances, be necessitated with regard to certain objects, no matter how it is moved toward them. The patient, Suarez says, is never free to reject or accept motion; when the agent moves the patient, the latter is moved necessarily. On the contrary, the Thomist says the will is of such a nature that it can not possibly be moved to any partial good as to something which necessitates it. The very nature of the will indicates that. The will can tend to a thing only as that thing is known, through intellectual knowledge. When a particular thing is known to be a partial, incomplete good, the will can tend to it only as to a partial good, i. e., as to something the appetition of which is contingent—always and necessarily contingent, since the will has as the object of its natural (and, therefore, necessary)

[488] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 1-6.

tendency only the complete and perfect good. Therefore, even when the will receives motion to act it does not act necessarily; since, in nature, the will is of such disposition that it cannot be necessitated by this motion then the motion does not necessitate it. Yet given this motion of God there is truly a necessity of infallibility about the action. This does not deny freedom of exercise. The very act is a judged object of the *liberum arbitrium*. The act itself is known and judged to be something contingent, i. e., to be something which is not the perfect good, and which is not connected by a line of strict necessity with the perfect good. Hence, the act, when placed, is seen and valued as a contingent thing without which the end of the will (the necessary thing) can be attained. Thus the very exercise of the act still is free.

The motion under discussion is adapted to the will, since God moves things according to their natures. Under this motion the will elects this act as a thing known not to be necessary to it; the motion, therefore, is motion to a contingent and not to a necessary act, even though the act infallibly follows. The necessity (of infallibility) is from the efficacy of God moving the will; the act is still free from the nature of the will, as St. Thomas makes clear. As long as the will tends to a good known to be incomplete (and even the exercise of the act is such a good) the will can not possibly act otherwise than freely and still retain its nature. Hence the freedom of the will does not postulate that it be active in the Suarezian sense; one can still reconcile freedom with divine motion by appealing to the intellectual nature of a free act.

Suarez again and again, though in slightly different forms, uses the same argument, i. e., if the will receives determination prior to its act it is not free. He writes that from a previous supposition comes necessity, but not from a subsequent supposition.[489] The answer already given is valid here, too. A previous supposition falling on a thing which by nature can not be necessitated does not necessitate the thing in its opera-

[489] *Ibid.*, cap. 6, n. 7.

tion. The will by its very nature can be necessitated by no supposition (even previous) because in respect of a partial good man always acts dominatively. He always sees the contingency of his act (unless reason is impeded) and has the real power to reconsider his judgment and elect not to act. Suarez attempts to prove that, contrary to Thomists' teaching, some necessity of consequence is opposed to liberty, saying that in the argumentation " man sees God, therefore, man loves Him " there is necessity of consequence, but yet no liberty. The necessity is necessity of consequent, not, the Thomist answers, of consequence, for the nature of man's will absolutely demands that man love God once he sees Him. The proposition therefore is in necessary matter, not contingent.

Why, in the physical order, did Suarez, contrary to the Thomists, postulate this peculiar active quality of the will in virtue of which the very faculty without premotion can move to act? Simply because of his failure to understand that, because the will is an intellectual appetite, its act with regard to any partial good must always be free, and therefore, *liberum arbitrium* is free even as moved by God, even in receiving its act from God. Because he did not see that, he safeguarded human freedom by appealing to this " active quality ". Having by his divorce of intellect and will, blocked off the will's being free from the intellectual nature of its act, he saved freedom by positing a potency so actual as to need no divine motion to premove it.

From the doctrine that intellect is not a *per se* cause of voluntary act, it follows at once that the will without regulation by the intellect can act. That doctrine is in Suarez. Thus, he says that some free volitions are had without a determining judgment, i. e., the will, undetermined by a judgment, acts.[490] Reason precedes volition even in the first act, the Thomist says, for in that act, God directly moves both intellect and will, but in an ordered way; the intellect in that act, as in all others, is the first mover of the will in the order of specification.

[490] *Disp. Meta.*, disp. XIX, sect. 6, nn. 2-3.

Suarez supposes that the will can be ultimate. The position that the will's own freedom is the unique reason for the choice of one of several equally eligible means [491] amounts to just that; it is an assertion that will can act without reason's regulation. The fact, according to Thomists, is that will, since it is a rational appetite, always follows reason, i. e., it chooses the more convenient (i. e., the better, at least apparently better) object. In the case of means apprehended as equally good, the will can not select one until reason indicates some aspect in it which, in fact, makes it better than the other goods, as St. Thomas says. But Suarez' position is clear: the will of itself is (in the order of second cause) sufficient to account for the choice. Consider, again, Suarez' statement that it is not absolutely necessary that an error of judgment precede a sinful act.[492] It follows that, absolutely speaking, a man can know what is right (judge properly) and in that act choose what is wrong. That is a very clear revelation of Suarez' mind in this matter. It supposes not merely that reason does not here and now regulate the volitional act; it even supposes that reason and will can be in open contradiction and yet an act follows. It is transparently clear that he conceived the free power as (*per se*) exclusively volitional, able to act in defiance of the reason which, according to Thomists, is of its very essence. Most certainly that position can rest only on the notion that intellect and will are not intimately interwoven in any free act.

Suarez, in common with Scholastics generally, teaches that indifference is necessary for freedom. But the question is what does indifference mean; does Suarez mean by it precisely what the Thomist means? It is clear that by indifference Suarez understands an eminent indetermination in virtue of which the indifferent faculty can, without God's predetermination determine itself, so that as the will is ready for act it is, proximately, equally prepared as to both act and non-act.[493] That is not the Thomistic conception of the indifference of the will. The

[491] Cf. *ibid.*, nn. 12-14.

[492] *Ibid.*, sect. 7, nn. 9-11.

[493] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, 5; *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, cap. 1.

Thomist agrees that the faculty is, of itself, determined to neither alternative; as it is ready for act it is *predetermined* to act by God Himself. Yet man is still free because he can reflect upon this act he is about to place; he can compare it with the norm reason supplies (the good in general), see the deficiencies of this act and so he can not act. Hence, for a Thomist indifference or freedom does not suppose indetermination in the faculty as that faculty is proximately ready for act. But why did Suarez require this indifference (which is indetermination) even when the will is ready for act? Here again the fundamental reason is Suarez' divorce of intellect from will. In the face of that separation he found it easy to safeguard the faculty's dominion over its own act through such indifference.

Had Suarez admitted the Thomistic position that the will is indifferent precisely because reason proposes to it objects which are presented as partial goods and which are therefore incapable of causing a necessary act of the will, had he seen that as a consequence even the act of selecting such a good must be itself an object elected as a merely partial good, he would have seen that the dominative power of the will as that faculty is proximately disposed to act does not require indifference in the sense of indetermination. The will can be determined and free because, even in choosing, this object is known through reason to be a contingent good, the willing of which can be omitted without the will's losing its end, and in that power is true and sufficient dominion over the act. After all, our freedom is analogous to that of God, yet God's free acts are from all eternity, determined. Suarez answers that God's eternal determination does not destroy his freedom because it comes from that freedom. The Thomist adds that the determination of the human faculty comes from that free faculty, too, though not as that is unmoved by God since any potency, free or otherwise, must be reduced to act and, as a potency, can not reduce itself. We know that God is determined because we know that He is immutable pure act; we know that He is free because we know that certain objects cannot possibly necessitate His will since those objects are merely partial goods. No degree of

immutability can necessitate freedom, granted such objects; and, analogously, no degree of determination destroys man's freedom provided he is presented with objects known to be merely partial goods. Hence, for the Thomist there is no contradiction between freedom and predetermination. But for Suarez there is, because in his system man's reason does not enter into the act of *liberum arbitrium* as a *per se* cause. Therefore, the indifference (with respect to objects) rooted in that act of reason does not enter as a *per se* modification of the free act; hence if the faculty is determined by God there can be not left sufficient indifference to safeguard liberty.

Another of the conditions posited by Suarez as necessary to man's free faculty is that it have complete active and dominative power over its free acts.[494] No Thomist will quarrel with the statement that the *liberum arbitrium* has active, dominative power over its acts, for that faculty, under God's motion, does truly determine itself; its act is certainly under its dominion. The difficulty is with what Suarez understands by the *complete* power of the faculty; and there can be no doubt as to what that is. Suarez means simply that the created free faculty can move to second act without distinct premotion, predetermination. We know that Suarez *could* hold that because he held that it is not repugnant that the potential be, itself, somehow actual. Why did he hold that *this* potency *as free* must move without premotion? Having denied to intellect any *per se* causality with respect to a free act he could not explain the fact of human freedom by appealing to the role of intellect in free acts, but it was an easy matter, in light of Suarez' notion of potency to safeguard that freedom by making the will " completely active and dominative ". Here, too, there is a constant pattern; the possibility of Suarez' teaching on free acts rests upon his notion of potency and act, that those notions of potency and act were inevitably applied in treating of human freedom rests upon the concept of the divorce of intellect from will. Once they were divorced, Suarez' concept

[494] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 2, nn. 10-12.

of potency and act was a very natural way for him to explain the fact of man's liberty.

That the will as it is proximately disposed for act must be equally " expedited " for both act and non-act Suarez insists.[495] The Thomist of course argues that the will under God's motion is truly unimpeded for act and non-act, yet precisely as ready for act it does not regard both in the same way, for actions are individual determined things. Any agent proximately disposed to act must be disposed to an individual determined thing; he must not be indifferent to a disjunction. The indifferent faculty Suarez posits (an eminent thing capable of self determination without God's premotion) is in harmony with and supposed to, this teaching. Suarez maintains that to suppose that the will must, as disposed for act, be determined to one thing means that it is proximately impotent as to one part of its power, therefore not free.

Thomists answer that with determination freedom is not lost, for the faculty still has dominion over its act since both act and object are contingent not necessary things; and man, knowing that, can reconsider and in light of new counsel not act. God's determining motion is not motion to act in a way which violates the nature of the free power; it is motion to an act the object of which is judged to be a contingent good. Hence the act with respect to it is always revocable. Such motion as that does not destroy the freedom of the act or of the faculty, the Thomist argues; that motion is a true cause of the being of the act and of its being free. What underlies Suarez' argument? The assumption that the will is free in the sense that, with no distinct premotion, it actuates itself. Having accepted the Scotistic divorce of intellect from will (in operating) Suarez saved the fact of liberty in this way. Consider a free act as *per se* dependent on intellect and another avenue lies open.

Suarez continues that, supposing Divine premotion, the will does not have a proximately free power, for the condition for its not-acting (namely, the withdrawal of God's motion) would

[495] *Ibid.*, nn. 13-15; *Opus. Primum*, Liber I, capp. 1, 2.

not be under the will's power.[496] According to Thomists, even under divine motion the will has in its power the condition for its not-acting, namely, the imperation of a contrary judgment. The divine motion is a motion to the proper act of a faculty which has that power; it is not a motion which changes the intrinsic nature of the free faculty. One cannot find anything to truly exemplify God's motion of the will. Anything other than the will is naturally and necessarily determined to one act only; but the *liberum arbitrium* can never be necessitated because of its peculiar object. But, Suarez writes, an act in which the power is determined is not free since the act does not have the note of freedom except from the faculty which, in the case, is determined and not free.[497] That is the concept of freedom as active indifference carried to a logical conclusion; liberty is conceived as a disjunction existing in man, both parts of which disjunction are ready to leap into act. Actually, *liberum arbitrium* is one faculty bearing in each act on one object with regard to which it can actually have at one time only one attitude, although the contrary or contradictory attitude is always possible since the faculty must bear on this object in that way, i. e., recognizing it as contingent. Therefore even as determined by God the will must remain free.

The essential thing in all this discussion is that what is basically in question is the very nature of freedom. Can the free will be determined, yet free? Yes, the Thomist says. Because its act is formally an act of reason, a judgment indicating the merely partial goodness of this object, man has such dominance over that act that he can reconsider and elect not to act for he knows that this act is not necessary. Suarez can not accept freedom of that kind; he has already judged that a free act is so much an act of will that reason is not a *per se* cause of it. Hence the note of freedom cannot adequately be preserved by appealing to the influence of intellect. Freedom becomes the will's own active and dominative power to determine itself without God's distinct predetermination. To such freedom as that, predetermination is patently opposed.

[496] *Ibid.*, cap. 3, nn. 12-15.

[497] *Ibid.*, cap. 2.

Intimately connected with his failure to penetrate the Thomistic doctrine on the will as an intellectual appetite, is Suarez' explicit teaching that agents extrinsic to the will can necessitate the will with respect to partial goods. We read, for instance, that the act of a created will can be truly voluntary and therefore free of coaction, yet necessary because impelled by an extrinsic cause.[498] Again, Suarez says that to deny that God can necessitate the will with regard to indifferent objects is to deny God's omnipotence.[499] These are but a few examples of the doctrine. Thomists say that it is a metaphysical impossibility for God, even by His absolute power (and *a fortiori* for anyone else) to move the will in such a way as to make its act with respect to a partial good, known to be partial, a necessary act. The reason we have already seen. The *liberum arbitrium* moves to an object as the object is known to be a partial good only, a good which does not adequate the norm which man has of the perfect good. Man can not possibly will this object then as though it were the perfect good, since will follows knowledge. Since he cannot will it as the perfect good he can not will it necessarily, for he sees that it can be willed or not willed without either attaining or losing the perfect good (which he does will necessarily). As partial good the object has defects, imperfections. Whatever is known to have defects can never be willed necessarily, for man knows that the act of will bearing on it does not have to be; he can change his consideration from the good aspects of the object to the evil. Thus, whether he wills it or not, the act is contingent, and can be nothing other than contingent. To attribute to God's omnipotence power to change all this and to move the will so that it acts in a necessary way for a contingent object is to ask the impossible; for it demands that the *liberum arbitrium* become, under God's motion, not what it is, namely, an appetite which follows reason. But Suarez can maintain this possibility. In Suarez' eyes, therefore, any predetermining motion falling on the will can only necessitate its act. He teaches

[498] *Prol. Primum*, cap. 1. [499] *Ibid.*, cap. 4.

that simply because he did not admit that an act of *liberum arbitrium* is formally an act of reason which manifests the inadequacy of this object (and act). Therefore, the act of willing or not willing the object can only be free, granted reason's operation, no matter how the will is predetermined.

How could God physically determine the will, which He can do only by necessitating it? God necessitates the will Suarez writes, by effectively restraining its natural power of resisting God's help.[500] This is his conclusion, then, that God's physical predetermination of this human faculty can only be something contrary to the connatural way in which this faculty acts, something which impedes the faculty from operating in the way its very nature (according to Thomists) demands. The very possibility of this teaching lies in the notion that a human potency can be such as naturally to need no premotion by God. The teaching that God's physical premotion can only necessitate proximately rests on the supposition that intellect does not enter as a *per se* cause of a free act. One who does maintain that causality of reason in this free act sees how the act cannot be other than free.

From this study of the teachings of Suarez it seems to us most evident that his teachings on human liberty so different in themselves from those of the Thomists, do in fact, rest upon the two principles we have indicated. Those principles are the final reason for the differences between Suarezian congruism and Thomism. And the fact that those two principles are so ultimate, each in its own order, has been the explanation of the continuing disagreement of the two schools. Agreement between them shall be reached (saving an intervention on the part of the Church herself) only in that day in which the two schools shall come to see eye to eye on the nature of potency and act on the very nature of a free power. Then and only then shall their differences be reconciled; then and only then shall there be harmony in their teaching.

[500] *Ibid.*, cap. 5.

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